Autentisk Eksistens by Bjørnstad, Bendik






















Fall Semester 2019 
 
Bendik Bjørnstad 
Universitetet i Bergen 

















For unconditional support 
 
Anne Granberg 
For excellent mentorship above and beyond the call 
 
Joakim Vindenes 




The Philosophy department at the University of Bergen  
For a continuing list of deeply supportive, passionate and inspirational mentor figures 
 
The Philosophy department at the University of Tromsø 





Page 3 of 103 
 
English Abstract 
In this paper I present my research on Authentic Existence. I argue how, contrary to popular 
self-help literature, authentic existence does not involve adherence to a more self-realized or 
self-actualized aim, but really is about dissolving the inauthentic sense of alienated selfhood. 
The key components of what authenticity is, how it is to be found, what it disputes and its 
relationship to our conception of selfhood is explored in this paper. The role played by what is 
called problematic thoughts as they relate to inauthenticity and the problems of modernity are 
similarly themes of exploration. The paper discusses how the removal of inauthentic mental 
constructs, such as emotionally charged personal negative narratives, problematic thoughts and 
ruminating thought loops all tied to an I-construct lead to the re-discovery of a pre-reflective 
mode of being which is authentic. The paper explores how the constituent parts of the 
narratively created ‘I-construct’ can be explored and discarded phenomenologically, and 
explores how a repeated use of this process via existential inquiries removes the problematic 
thoughts in the form of neurotic internal “chatter”.  It is argued that an adherence to self-inquiry 
returns subjects from alienated states caught in ruminating thought patterns into an abidance in 
authentic modes of being. In closing the paper investigates supportive parallels from emerging 
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Norsk Abstrakt 
I denne teksten presenterer jeg forskningen min på Autentisk Eksistens. Jeg argumenter for at 
autentisk væren ikke innebærer former for selv-aktualisering sett i moderne selv-hjelp litteratur. 
Istedenfor viser jeg hvordan autentisk væren innebærer en dekonstruksjon av en inautentisk 
form for selvhet. Denne teksten tar for seg hva autentisk eksistens er, hvordan det kan bli 
oppdaget, hva det motsier og forholdet til selvhet. Rollen til det jeg kaller problematiske tanker 
og deres forhold til inautentisitet og problemene i samtiden er også temaer som blir utforsket. 
Jeg diskuterer for hvordan man, ved å fjerne inautentiske mentale konstruksjonen slik som 
følelsesladdede personlige negative ‘narrativer’, problematiske tanker og ruminerende 
tankemøsntre bundet til et slags ‘jeg-konstrukt’ leder til en gjennoppdagelse av det som har blitt 
kalt en pre-reflektiv eksistensiell modus, som oppleves som autentisk. Teksten går gjennom 
hvordan oppbyggende deler av dette narrativt-genererte ‘jeg-konstruktet’ kan bli utforsket 
gjennom det fenomenologiske perspektivet, og hvordan en gjentatt bruk av denne prosessen via 
det som kalles ‘eksistensielle undersøkelser’ fjerner problematiske tanker i deres form av 
nevrotisk intern ‘selvprat’. Det blir argumentert at en gjenntakelse av eksistensiell selv-
undersøkelse kan brukes som en måte til å overkomme inautentiske måter å være på til 
autentiske måter å være på. Avslutningsvis vil teksten utforske paralleller til denne tesen i form 
av nylig forskning av hjernens struktur og aktivitetsmoduser og hvordan dette relaterer til tesen 

















2. The problem of Thoughts 
a. The Structure and Effect of Problematic Thoughts 
b. Alone with your Thoughts 
3. Terms of Art 
4. Authenticity in Philosophy 
5. The Appeal of Existentialism 
6. Terms and Themes 
a. Ontology and Existence 
b. Existence precedes essence 
c. Reason and Thinking 
d. Being in the World 
e. Existence as problematic 
f. Overcoming Dualism 
g. Selfhood 
h. Alienation 
i. Waking up from the natural attitude 
7. Husserl and the origin of Existential Phenomenology 
a. The early Husserl 
b. The Natural Attitude 
c. Husserl, Heidegger and the Existentialist critique 
d. The Late Husserl 
e. Husserl’s motivations 
Page 6 of 103 
 
8. Phenomenology and Existential Ontology 
a. Dasein, ontological inquiry and inauthenticity 
b. Mind and Body 
c. Cartesian Concerns 
d. Intentionality, Reflexivity and Pre-reflective Self-Consciousness 
e. The Consequence of the Reflexivity of Intentionality 
9. No Self 
a. Examples of theories of non-selfhood 
b. Authentic existence and no self 
10. Two Networks and two modes of Being 
a. Brief remarks regarding Science and Philosophy 
b. The Task Positive Network and the Default Mode Network 
c. The Default Mode Network and Mental Health 
11. Conclusion 
 











Page 7 of 103 
 
“All of humanity's problems stem from man's inability to sit quietly in a room alone.” 
– Blaise Pascal, Pensées 
 
1. Introduction 
Authenticity, and the pursuit of a life lived authentically, has long been a central theme in the 
existential canon. Few concepts – with the possible exception of freedom – has received more 
attention from the existentialists. As I see it, it is not just the existentialists who has engaged 
with questions relating to authentic being. I think that the problem of authenticity is represented 
in philosophy long before the advent of existentialism under different terminology. As I see it, 
the problem of existing authentically is a modern version of a much older philosophical pursuit, 
that of living the good life. 
The search for the good life was originally a personal existential commitment to living a life in 
balance with all the varying aspects of being human and engaging in the world. Wisdom was 
meant to represents the means to reach this goal, and thus the love of and search for wisdom 
was the highest pursuit to which man could aspire. As I see it, in today’s modern, interconnected 
and vastly more complex world this pursuit is more important and necessary than ever before. 
Because we today have access to all sorts of easy distractions, from smartphones, television, 
radio, podcasts and especially social media, the pursuit of the authentically lived life is more 
important than ever. According to a 2018 article in The Guardian, we check our phones on 
average every 12 minutes. 
Besides distracting us from what is actually going on in the present moment, these emergent 
behaviors of distraction and escape also represents an escape from a very basic human activity, 
that of being by oneself and being comfortable alone in silence. This comes as no surprise, as 
the phones and applications are designed with this intent in mind. As I see it, the trend of 
neglecting paying attention to one’s life in the pursuit of creating and maintaining a glorified 
social construction is detrimental to our long term future. I worry that, as a species we find 
ourselves distracted from our authentic natures to the point where it endangers us. 
I am not alone in this, either. Such sentiments have been expressed by most of the writers who 
were gathered under the label of existentialists. It is my suspicion that if the ‘father’ of 
existentialism, Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard (1813 – 1855) was writing today his tone 
would very different than his cynical, charismatic and humorously amused one. As the prolific 
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and complex writer that he was, Kierkegaard wrote with an occasionally humorous trademark 
wit against the established silent conformism of his time. I worry that we still have not come to 
terms with what Kierkegaard was trying to tell us, and I suspect his tone today would be less of 
a cynically amused one and more urgently prophetic, if not one of complete denouncement and 
resignation. Another thinker, the German phenomenological existentialist philosopher Martin 
Heidegger (1889 – 1976) saw back to Athens and wrote about the neglect of the question of 
what it means to be in his 1927 work Being and Time. According to Heidegger, the question 
had today been forgotten, and had been largely left untouched since the time of the Greeks. He 
states that “this is not just any question. It is one which provided a stimulus for the researches 
of Plato and Aristotle, only to subside from then on as a theme for actual investigation” 
(Heidegger, 1927, first English translation 1962, p. 21). 
As I see it, the insights of philosophy, especially among them the pursuit for a balanced, well-
lived life has to re-enter our public attention. American philosopher William Barrett writes in 
his now classic textbook Irrational Man, a study in Existential Philosophy that “philosophers 
are really [the group] to deal with the problem human existence – and no other professional 
group in society is likely to take over the job for them” (Barrett, 1958, p. 3). As I see it, we are 
in a need for a change in approach to the way we live, to our very being. Fortunately, there is 
instilled in mankind an answer to the challenges posed by modernity. It is my contention that a 
change in our way of being should be oriented towards a retrieval and reconnection to a pre-
existent mode of being, an authentic one. 
As I see it, the return to an authentic mode of being is not a new solution, but one of the oldest 
known to our species, already pre-installed as it were. I will attempt in this paper to indicate its 
primacy of being, and show how most, if not all, of our current modes of being function in lieu 
of this primary existence. As I have come to understand it from my research, the return to a pre-
reflective form of being entails a direct experience of something pre-given, which is 
experienced in a way best described as authentic and true to what Kierkegaard called one’s own 
subjective truth. In his Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Kierkegaard described such a truth 
as “the highest truth attainable for an existing individual” (Kierkegaard, 1846, first English 
publication 1941, p. 182). The aim of such a truth is not epistemological, as much as it is 
existential. While subjective truth does not give us absolute knowledge about the external 
world, Kierkegaard would argue that such pre-reflective and ontologically prior states are more 
fundamental because it gives me knowledge about who I am and how I should live my life. 
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As I see it, there is in man an authentic mode of being, characterized by a stillness at the core 
of our being. We are in need of a reconnection with this pre-reflective inner stillness as a 
different way to operate in today’s world, fundamentally different from being distracted by 
apps, likes, short lived dopamine hits, selfhood-related attention and reality escapes. What is 
needed, I think, is an existence lived in accordance with a primary feature in mankind – our 
existential curiosity. The world is vast, and we are, despite everything, a very curious and 
adaptive species. Previously we did not only seek approaches to nature designed to utilize it, 
but we also sought a deep concern for the question of ourselves. Socrates famously began 
philosophy with the slogan of “Know Thyself”. It is a return to this very fundamentally human 
pursuit with which this paper will be concerned. 
There is, fortunately a relatively contemporary philosophy with a modern vocabulary which is 
more attuned to the needs and perspectives of the modern individual than the writings of the 
Greeks. The search for the good life has not been neglected in philosophy, neither historically 
nor contemporary. Today we find its expression as the pursuit of authenticity. To translate the 
ambition of the Greeks into existentialist terms: being-in-the-world as an already previously 
engaged individual leads us to the inescapability of our existence as problematic and thus raises 
the central existentialist questions “Who am I?” and “How should I live?” Barrett writes 
regarding the Greeks that philosophy “instead of a specialized theoretical discipline, philosophy 
was a concrete way of life, a total vision of man and the cosmos in the light of which the 
individual’s whole life was to be lived” (Barrett, p. 5). 
I wish to posit that these existential concerns, the inward oriented pursuit of what I call self-
inquiry – questions like “who am I?” especially – represents the means to recover authentic 
existence. By uncovering what we truly are, and casting aside our stories about ourselves, our 
limited belief structures, our attachments to specific outcomes and opening up to the already 
given moment, we uncover a means to living the good life and bringing some peace, clarity and 
sanity back into our current lives and troubled world. Addressing existential questions can be 
seen as a means to uncover authenticity. Questions like “who am I?”, “how should I live”, and 
“what is man?” are all contemplations which in themselves denote authentic being. To engage 
with reality as phenomenological experienced, to turn the gaze around at one’s own ontology 
and question it, is, to my mind, one of the activities that define human beings and separates 
them from other life forms. As such it can be considered their most natural and authentic 
undertaking. 
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These are broad claims, and I write with an awareness that many of the intellectual freedoms I 
permit myself would have been hard to permit under any other philosophy than existential 
philosophy. In a certain sense, concepts like authentic existence are as much terms of art as they 
are philosophical terms. However I permit myself a certain amount of leeway as it is hard to 
avoid when dealing specifically with existential thinkers. I write this paper with the sincere 
belief that there is a pressing need for authentic being. There is something flat, dead, dare I say 
unsatisfactory about modern life, something which the smartphones are but a symptom of. Not 
to beat a dead horse, but as Socrates famously said, “The unexamined life is not worth living”. 
Note that in this paper the focus is not on authentic personhood. Rather, the term authentic 
existence designate a way of being – a mode of existence – which is existentially authentic. If 
the claim that an authentic way of being is of pressing relevance to our time seems unfounded, 
keep in mind the significant and unfortunately very real ramifications of alienation. While 
concerns about alienation may seem vague, speculative, so foreign as to be redundant or even 
unfounded, I think it is important to note that this picture only lasts until one start considering 
and factoring in that alienation actually represents a sincere problem which has seen substantial 
philosophical, literary, artistic and poetic reference by some of the greatest minds, poets and 
writers we have had. Alienation was, in their eyes, a sincere reflection of both the human 
condition, but also of the age, with potential species wide ramifications. 
As a potential way of thinking about alienation, not as “yet another concern” to pile upon our 
shoulders on top of things like climate change, politics, inequality, poverty, corruption or 
famine, consider that it holds very real implications when treated as a potential root cause of 
the distress we see as opposed to yet another symptom. I did not set out to do this research as 
research on a forlorn topic of ages past in the interest of dusting off old tomes. Rather I engage 
with this in full belief that it is a pressing contemporary concern, as we shall see in section 2 
and 9 where I discuss the nature of problematic thoughts. Similarly, I do not think it is accidental 
that alienation has featured so prominently in existential philosophy, or that this philosophy 
saw a previously unprecedented level of public interest in turn.  
In this paper, I hope to make the case that a reconnection to what I call authentic states is of 
contemporary relevance. If authenticity is presented in this paper as the solution, then the 
encumbrance of problematic thoughts may be seen as the problem to which authenticity 
responds. A recurring notion which shall emerge at different points in this paper before it is 
ultimately dealt with is the role of existential self-inquiry as a means to uncover authenticity. 
Self-inquiry is a technical term in this paper, which will be explored rather late, but suffice it to 
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say it is a ‘red thread’ of sorts to be aware of, as the promise of authentic existence for our 
contemporary problems lies in existential self-investigation. In other words, the aim of living 




2. The problem of Thoughts 
As I see it, I consider one of the leading problems of our time to be one of Problematic 
Thoughts, and as stated I think authenticity is the best means to overcome this challenge. To 
my mind, authentic being or refers to an existential state, which as noted are marked by the 
reduction and concern posed by several philosophical dualisms. That of mind/body, 
subject/object, internal/external and so on. As we shall see later the overcoming of dualisms in 
favor a pre-reflective engagement with the world, sometimes referred to as being-in-the-world 
by Heidegger, has been a recurring existential theme. By authenticity then, I mean a state 
characterized by a reduction of problematic thoughts. It also follows that existentially 
inauthentic states are ones which are lived significantly within the confines of the disconnected 
mind, the “thinking substance” of Descartes, referred to in this paper as cogito.  
A shared critique of inauthentic being by the existentialists is a life lived within the confines of 
our narrative realities about who and what we are. Cooper echoes this when he writes that 
“existentialists reject […] the whole idea of the isolated subject caught in an ‘egocentric 
predicament’ of trying to acquire knowledge about a public world on the basis of private 
experience” (Cooper p. viii). Cooper similarly remarks that one of the most salient aspects of 
existentialism is the onslaught on Cartesian notions of the self or subject and on the dualisms 
which they inspire (p. 16). I contend that the sense of alienation and separation are constructed 
by what I call problematic thoughts – building blocks of the cogito one might say. I wish to 
maintain that the presence of these kinds of problematic thoughts are the signature feature of 
alienation, a common existential theme. 
A shared critique leveled at modernity by most, if not all, of the existentialists is the diagnosis 
as our current predicament as inauthentic, living with feelings of alienation and angst. I think 
there lies some truth to this. It is not wholly unfounded to consider our current way of being as 
mired by inauthenticity. However I do not wish to categorically blanket modernity as 
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fundamentally inauthentic, suggesting that we were better off in some perfect past. The only 
way forward is forward, and I do not think there is a return to mythological ‘garden’ in any 
sense of the word. I wish instead to reiterate the existential hope – the “good news” as it were 
– that there is a way of being which relates to the overcoming of alienation and its 
accompanying ails. That is to say that there is merit to overcoming our ways of being which are 
bound to limiting beliefs about ourselves and the world, and that such a response to alienation 
is still valid and relevant.  
As I see it, we have a problem with thoughts. Now, in making this statement I wish to be very 
careful. I am not trying to say that thinking is bad, or that making use of our cognitive abilities 
– as in problem-solving, reasoning, planning or writing – is somehow inauthentic. Much to the 
contrary, as I shall hope to argue, a return to an authentic mode of being is functionally 
enhancing, to all aspects of being, thinking included. The increase in functionality that authentic 
being brings about is applicable to everyone, both to people engaged in knowledge work 
professions, like philosophy, and those engaged in other ones.  
As I see it, there is a vast and significant difference between two different kinds of thoughts; 
compulsive self-referential negative chatter on the one hand and non-self-concerned related 
problem solving activities on the other. For example, we can be lost in spiraling thoughts, 
ruminating, worrying and stressing about our work, our place in a given social hierarchy or 
about what others might think about us. Or, we can function effectively to execute tasks, such 
as learning, problem solving, writing articles and so forth. 
What we are after, and shall attempt to account for in this paper is a certain form of increase in 
one’s existential competence. That is to say, one’s ‘skill’ or ability to adapt to the various 
challenges and features of existence. As I see it, authentic modes of being are characterized by 
personal increases in enjoyment, functionally enhancing uses of thinking, existential increases 
in competence and task related completion. Meanwhile inauthentic ones are marked by 
unhelpful, cumbersome, conflicted and negative thought. 
It is my thorough belief that authentic states are not a debate only viewable in the hindsight 
mirror of history, but can serve as guiding lights on the path forward through history. In other 
words these concerns are not ones of a trivial nature, or ones of narcissistic “self-actualization” 
in praise of the ego as they sometimes are defined. The driving force of this paper is not 
something akin to “people feel fake and I’d rather they did not” or something of that nature. 
Neither is the problem of inauthenticity, I think, a problem divorced from the world, an arcane 
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subject to be tackled by airy scholarly debates running through the centuries. Quite the contrary, 
I consider the uncovering to be vital. If existentialism got anything right, it was the 
identification of the paramount importance and urgency of a new way of being. What was 
needed, they expressed in different ways, was a new way of relating and being which addressed 
the challenges of modernity. As I see it, a new and important way of being is related to realizing 
the role played in inauthentic being by problematic thoughts and subsequently overcoming 
them. 
 
a. The Structure and Effect of Problematic Thoughts 
To my mind, one of the more disturbing and confusing human problems today is the near 
constant stream of personal ‘narrative’ thoughts, often negatively charged. By narrative I mean 
thought loops which hold us to a certain storyline about ourselves and the world, often untrue 
when examined and certainly self-limiting. The problematic thoughts which form these 
narratives take the shape of thoughts about what persons “X” and “Y” think about me, 
exaggerated or compulsive concerns about one’s social standings with this group or that group, 
past feelings of reject, memories of poorly performed social situations, taxing self-encumbered 
unexamined storylines and so on.  
Of course, this is not to say that the sort of experiences of temporary setbacks and social 
repudiation are not useful for learning and adapting constructively to a changing environment. 
They are, it is how we avoid making the same mistake twice. However, to carry an expanding 
container of specifically negative personal experiences that are decades in the past serve no 
such adaptive function. The lessons they were supposed to bestow has passed from historical 
relevance. 
Note that, when attempting to account for problematic thoughts, one encounters a very peculiar 
problem. It is my experience that in attempting to illustrate the difference between problematic 
and non-problematic thoughts, a common response is what I have come to call the Either/Or 
response. One might find oneself going to the completely opposite point regarding the specific 
thought in question, seemingly coming to their defense as it were. When this happens I ask the 
person to feel very truthfully whether such a response feels rational and valid or if it is a 
response that comes from a defensive, reactionary place. 
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For example, if I were to put forth the notion that compulsive and stressful concerns about a 
situation we cannot change are unproductive, there might arise a response like “but if I never 
worry about anything I would not be able to function!” This is a common representation of the 
Either/Or response. The question to be asked is whether or not this rebuke is a fair assessment 
of the point about cumbersome mental activity that was being made. Of course, in attempting 
to critique thought, it is very important to be clear and concise. Let me in that regard be very 
clear. It is no part of this thesis that the use of concern, thinking, planning, adapting, reasoning, 
learning or any productive use of thinking will be removed or discarded by a return to pre-
reflective authentic states.  
In my mind, the Either/Or response fails to account for the subtle, but significant difference 
that is being suggested. There is an Aristotelian middle ground to be found between the 
extremities of virtues, such as being overly daring and overly cautious for example. Similarly 
there is the recognition that our current way of thinking is often unproductive in its intensity, 
not necessarily in content. An insight or a useful thought like “how do I get to the lecture?” is 
unproblematic. Notice the subtle but important difference between that and “how the ¤#/% do 
I get to the lecture?!” “I always get there too late!” “The others are going to notice!” “I’ll be 
laughed at”, etc. It is useful to keep this in mind, which I why I stress the problem as correct 
use of reason rather than a blanket dismissal of it. 
It is, in my experience, difficult to focus on important thoughts with the interference from 
problematic thoughts. For example, an intellectual problem like “How can I best convey the 
essence of Kant’s response to the problem of induction posed by Hume?” competes for brain 
resource with problematic thoughts like "why did Peter treat me the way he did?", "I will tell 
him next week what I think of him", "I should stop eating ice cream - Greek yogurt would be 
better", "What should I wear tonight?", and so forth. These latter thoughts are not helpful in 
solving the problem-at-hand, and rather pulls our attention away from our work and productive 
contribution. The contention between these two kinds of thoughts is regarding how intellectual 
resources are used.  
As we know the brain consists of neurons. It is also not too far a stretch to consider the brain as 
related to thinking activities – although I am saying this with tongue in cheek awareness of the 
myriad of multifaceted philosophical problems regarding to the brain, consciousness and 
thoughts. It is not my aim to champion for any particular theory of consciousness. If we take 
the perspective that thinking is in some ways related to the brain, irrespective of what 
metaphysical theory we adopt regarding consciousness and its origin, then it follows that 
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thinking relies upon what makes up the brain, i.e. neurons. Note that thoughts, thinking, 
consciousness etc. might not reside in, or be based on, or even connected to the brain. I wish to 
make as few conclusive statements as possible regarding the metaphysics as possible. However 
if we adopt the perspective that thoughts relate to brain activity, and that brain activity relates 
to the constituent parts of the brain – like a car relies on the different parts of the engine, say – 
then the competition between useful and problematic thoughts can be seen as competitions 
regarding use of these parts. In other words, the relation of productive and problematic thinking 
regards how neurons are being used and how the connections between them - called synaptic 
connections – are oriented. In this sense the function of these two kinds of thoughts can be 
considered as a literal competition for physical territory. What this means is that one kind of 
thinking will – to some extent – disallow the activity of the other kind.  
Consider it this way: if we had an infinite amount of capacity for thought – literally infinite – 
then we could, in theory, think every thought possible at all times, simultaneously. Since we by 
and large do not exhibit such feats of intellectual prowess, it stands to reason our capacity for 
reason is not literally infinite. Neither is it none. We have a certain, but limited, amount of 
available resources for intellectual work. If we accept the view that thoughts relate to brain 
activity, whether or not the “space they appear in” has its foundation on the brain or not, then 
it stands to reason to frame the limits of reason as a territorial problem of neurons and their 
wiring. Unfortunately, this opens us up to the consideration that as we become encumbered by 
problematic thoughts, the less space there is for the well-adaptive functional thoughts like 
solving intellectual problems.  
Problematic thoughts can be very negative and painful, and getting caught in a “sticky” stream 
of them also consumes large amounts of energy. It is often advised for individuals suffering 
from depression to take frequent walks outside and avoid spending a lot of time indoors by 
themselves, as they may be pulled into such negative spirals. This is not only relevant in the 
cases of mental illness, such problematic thoughts on a whole waste a lot of the brain’s 
“bandwidth” as well. Energy which could be used productively. Ultimately, increases in the 
energy of negative, emotionally-charged memories can lead to depression, anxiety, excessive 
worries, craving, attachment to specific outcomes and so forth.  
As an indicator of how these problematic thoughts manifest themselves, consider the 
unfortunate times we witness people faced with “bad news” or situations they could not handle, 
control or expect. Occasionally, we see this in others, and sometimes we see it in ourselves. In 
these times we react in ways best described as problematic; losing both composure and 
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behaving quite unrestrained and emotionally unrestrained. These kinds of moments, when the 
world reveals itself as lacking in comfort or adherence to our internal scripts can be quite 
challenging to the untrained mind, especially one which is confined to constant spirals of 
negative self-chatter. By carrying around these heavily encoded narratives about “the way the 
world has to be” we are in a way set up for failure when the world fails to unfold to our liking. 
I think such reactions reveal very deep pain that people hold inside. It is not too far a stretch to 
envision this as a runaway effect of inauthentic being. Barrett writes about this, saying that 
“irritation usually arises when something touches a sore spot in ourselves, which most of the 
time we would like desperately to hide; rarely if ever does the fault lie totally with the provoking 
object” (Barrett, 1956, p. 43). 
 
b. Alone with your thoughts 
“Everything depends on ‘the moment’. And this is the tragedy of so many lives. That 
they never sensed ‘the moment’, and that in their lives the eternal and the temporal were 
always separate. And why? Because they could not be silent.” (Kierkegaard, The Lily 
of the Field and the Bird of the Air, 1849) 
The uncomfortable nature of the problematic thoughts have not just been the topic of existential 
philosophy, but has recently been the subject of recent scientific studies. One particular study, 
from Timothy Wilson et al. called Just think: The challenges of the disengaged mind published 
in the journal Science in 2014, (p. 75-77) had some very interesting findings. The research 
subjects in the study were asked to spend 15 minutes alone in a room with their thoughts, after 
which they were asked to report on their experience, which most of the participants reported as 
problematic or uncomfortable. The authors proposed that one of the things suggested by the 
findings in the study is that the distraction devices which we currently use may be causally 
involved in this. The abstract states 
“Nowadays, we enjoy any number of inexpensive and readily accessible stimuli, be they 
books, videos, or social media. We need never be alone, with no one to talk to and 
nothing to do. Wilson et al. explored the state of being alone with one's thoughts and 
found that it appears to be an unpleasant experience. In fact, many of the people studied, 
particularly the men, chose to give themselves a mild electric shock rather than be 
deprived of external sensory stimuli.” (Wilson et al., p. 75). 
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Surprisingly – but tellingly – in the eleven studies Wilson and his team conducted, what they 
observed was that the participants of the studies found the activity of spending six to fifteen 
minutes in a room by themselves with nothing to do but think “deeply uncomfortable and 
unenjoyable”. The subjects in the studies, ranging from college students to a broader sample 
size consisting of general community participants (from 17 – 77 years old, median age 48.0 
years) enjoyed doing mundane external activities much more than being alone with their 
thoughts, and a significant number of the participants preferred to administer electric shocks to 
themselves rather than being left alone with their thoughts. The abstract concluded that “most 
people seem to prefer to be doing something rather than nothing, even if that something is 
negative” (p. 75). 
The authors of the research paper notes that two questions arises from the findings. Do people 
choose to put themselves in ruminating thought states by disengaging from the external world, 
and secondly, when they are in this ruminating mode, is it a pleasing experience? According to 
their observations, people did not choose whether or not to engage in problematic thoughts, but 
were “subjected to their activity” regardless of preference. The subjects also did not enjoy being 
alone with their thoughts, and reported enjoyment levels rose when given an external activity 
such as using cell phones, reading a book or surfing the web was offered. “We have seen”, the 
paper reads “that most people do not enjoy “just thinking” and clearly prefer having something 
else to do. But would they rather do an unpleasant activity than no activity at all?” (p. 76). 
The answer, surprisingly, is yes. The research subjects were offered the chance to self-
administer painful electric shocks if they wanted to. “We went to some length”, the paper reads, 
“to explain that the primary goal was to entertain themselves with their thoughts and that the 
decision to receive a shock was entirely up to them” (Wilson et al., p. 76). A quarter of the 
women, and 67% of the men opted to receive painful shocks rather than be alone with their 
thoughts in a neutral scenario, the research location. They were also offered the chance to redo 
the experiment in their homes. Surprisingly, the mean reported enjoyment was actually lower 
when they were at home than when they were in the laboratory. Wilson et al. considers this 
“striking”, and notes that simply being alone with their thoughts for 15 minutes was so aversive 
that it “drove many participants to self-administer an electric shock that they had earlier said 
they would pay to avoid.” (p. 76). 
A key question given these findings, which the paper raises, is “Why was thinking so difficult 
and unpleasant?” This is a major philosophical question in itself, which the research paper 
largely glosses over. They offer one suggestion however, which resonate with the problem of 
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problematic thoughts “One possibility is that when left alone with their thoughts, participants 
focused on their own shortcomings and got caught in ruminative thought cycles” (p. 76). 
Admittedly the authors conceded that there is no doubt that people are sometimes absorbed by 
interesting ideas, exciting fantasies, and pleasant daydreams. What is telling, they note, is that 
the research thus conducted suggests that our minds are difficult to control, and that it might be 
particularly hard to “steer our thoughts in pleasant directions and keep them there” (p, 76). The 
difficulty involved in controlling our thoughts and the pleasant nature when we manage this has 
been suggested by similar findings in related fields, like psychology. For example, in his 1990 
book Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience, psychologist Mihály Csíkszentmihályi 
discusses the pleasant nature observed of the mind when unencumbered by problematic 
thoughts and writes about the relation between the unencumbered brain and subjective pleasant 
experiences. Whether pro athletes, chess grandmasters, joggers, swimmers, musical performers 
or hammer-wielding carpenters, to make a Heidegger reference, when the subjects entered a 
state of flow they reported marked increases in subjective enjoyment (Csíkszentmihályi, 1990).   
I suspect that most of us have at different times in our lives experienced such moments of ‘flow’ 
or what can be called being “in the zone”, where one experienced a cessation of the problematic 
narrative thought streams I have described. In my experience, when these states occur, the 
accompanying fear, anxiety and worries involved with these thoughts either go away or dial 
down significantly. These states occur, for example, when we are able to lose ourselves in a 
creative process, like writing philosophy for example. Pyschologists also refer to this feeling as 
feelings of mastery. There are many examples of this, Jean-Paul Sartre viewed jazz as a 
representation of freedom and authenticity, for example, and Heidegger discussed being-in-the-
world as emergent in fluency with readiness-to-hand like flow, famously mentioning the 
carpenter with his hammer and nail. 
In conclusion, the Wilson et al. article states that the hardship involved in steering and 
controlling our thoughts “may be why many people seek to gain better control of their thoughts 
with meditation and other techniques, with clear benefits”. “Without such training, people 
prefer doing to thinking, even if what they are doing is so unpleasant that they would normally 
pay to avoid it. The untutored mind does not like to be alone with itself” (p. 77). 
Given the problems related to problematic thinking, it stands to reason that we might benefit 
from ways of taking back control of our runaway minds. I consider it useful and potentially of 
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great productive value to note that such ambitions have already seen engagement in existential 
philosophy, in what is called authentic existence. 
 
 
3. Terms of art 
The books which have formed the basis for this paper are works of Husserl, Sartre, Heidegger, 
and Kierkegaard. Notable works are Dan Zahavi’s books on Husserl, Heidegger’s Being and 
Time (1927), Sartre’s early work The Transcendence of the Ego (1936) and Kierkegaard’s The 
Sickness unto Death (1849) and Fear and Trembling (1843). I have not been able to integrate 
the literary figures and works associated with existentialism, however in a larger context I wish 
I could as the problem of authenticity is poetically and beautifully depicted in many literary 
works associated under the label of existentialism.  
Very useful and important has been introductory and supplementary tomes to existentialist 
thinkers like David E. Cooper’s classical Existentialism, A reconstruction (1990, second edition 
1999). Likewise the iconic Irrational Man: A Study in Existential Philosophy (1958) by William 
Barrett, which, according to goodreads.com is “Widely recognized as the finest definition of 
existentialist philosophy ever written”, has been useful.  
More recently the contemporaneous book Existentialism, An Introduction (2014) by Kevin Aho 
has also been of great value. Not only because Aho takes into account new research done on 
the classical writers, but also because it dedicates a couple of chapters to existentialism’s 
contribution to contemporary challenges. These include oppression of civil rights, psychiatry 
health and illness, contributions in ethics and existential perspective on climate change. As Aho 
argues, viewing the climate challenge through an existential perspective can help to make it 
urgently relevant and a matter of personal significance (Aho, p. 152).  
Interestingly, the introductory volumes are very different from each other. Barrett for example, 
perhaps due to having written in a time when existentialism was more contemporary recent, 
bring more of the ‘living spirit’ of existentialism to the pages than does Cooper or Aho. Barrett 
also writes with passionate existential tones, reflecting authentic dread, hopelessness and 
despair. I found it way more taxing than the other two scholarly works. Sometimes Barrett’s 
approach is reflected in this paper by some parts striking a different tone than the more 
informative, scholarly tone otherwise aimed for. Barrett writes with a full engagement with 
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what can be called “the existentialist spirit”, which can occasionally be quite infectious. Cooper 
attempted in the 1990’s to reintroduce existentialism as an analytical philosophy, by rephrasing 
the history of modern philosophy as one centered around alienation and its overcoming, a claim 
which Barrett echoes when writing that “alienation and estrangement constitute the whole 
problematic of existentialism” (Barrett, p. 29). Aho on the other hand focused more on 
reclaiming the relevant insights without championing for the validity of the philosophy 
generally, presenting most of the ideas divorced of their more transcendent aspects. These three 
are not the only introductory textbooks to existentialism – there is a vast and near inexhaustible 
list of works to draw on – however Barrett and Cooper are generally considered to be of the 
more respected and influential ones, while Aho is the most contemporary and reasonably cited. 
What becomes clear when reading through the various works in the existentialist canon, 
philosophical or literary, is that the concepts in use – like authentic existence – function like 
terms of art. That is to say, they have multiple layers of meaning imbued to them, and function 
most effectively if they be afforded a kind of patience. Rather than demanding a mathematical-
like level of instant rigor, a certain amount of reflective reception is needed. The meaning is, in 
some cases ‘behind the words’. As with poetry, the deeper level of significance imbued in the 
terms resonate with the inner workings of man’s psyche and being, while it may not leave the 
clinical scalpel of disinterested or disembodied reason anything to slice. 
This was in stark contrast with other fields of philosophy I had previously engaged with, like 
epistemology or philosophy of language, and it took some adapting to. However, I found it 
useful that the phenomenological tradition employed similar language, and certain overlapping 
themes. For example, investigations into the structure of selfhood, the ego as shown to 
consciousness and the function and directionality of consciousness are all themes which the 
phenomenological tradition explored. 
Regarding terms of art, David Cooper writes that “existence […] is a constant striving, a 
perpetual choice; it is marked by a radical freedom and responsibility; and it is always prey to 
a sense of Angst which reveals that, for the most part, it is lived inauthentically and in bad faith. 
And because the character of a human life is never given, existence is without foundation; hence 
it is abandoned, or absurd even. The reason why recitation of this existentialist lexicon does 
not, of itself, advance our understanding is that, without exception, these are terms of art. None 
of them should be taken at face value, and the thinking of Sartre and others is badly 
misconstrued if they are” (Cooper, p. 3 – 4). 
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As Cooper suggests, what these terms point towards are insights which require a suspension of 
critical thinking. As I read them, I became aware that the writings yielded most meaning when 
I afforded them patience, realizing that, as Jazz legend Miles Davis famously said, “the music 
is the space between the notes”. 
That is not to say that existentialism is not logical, or not philosophy. Aho notes that “to be 
sure, existentialists are concerned with issues of truth and knowledge, but knowledge of what 
it means to be human” (p. 22). In one sense, terms like authenticity, inauthenticity, alienation, 
angst are technical terms, which have designated uses (they mean one thing, and not another 
for example). Such terms have in addition a poetic or intuitive side to them, they can only point 
to something, not explicitly spell it out; their deeper value lies past the immediate face value of 
them. Both Cooper (p. 25) and Barrett (p. 42 – 65) highlights the resemblance and similarities 
to existential themes and human expressions in poetry and art. Cooper remarks this when he 
writes that the insight inherent in art may present an “all-absorbing essence in which subject 
and object can no longer be distinguished”. However Cooper is aware that such descriptions 
may sound too romantic to some ears, and adds that “it may be that the sense of alienation is 
resistant to literal, analytical definition” (p. 25). 
Similarly to how a person’s attempts at transcendence is always inherently subjective – it is 
always something the existing individual has to attain on the basis of its own layout. The 
wisdom imparted in these terms lies as much in their resonance with one’s subjective intuition 
– which could be called gut feeling if one was so inclined – as it does with its formal 
philosophical notions. The formal definitions of their philosophical meaning can only take you 
so far in the attainment of personal authenticity, say. What the words point to is what is 
important.  
The topic of transcendence has seen historical attention in philosophy. According to Aho, there 
are two conflicting traditions which have informed our sense of who we are, Hebraic faith and 
Greek reason. Both traditions offer the idea of the human being as unique to the extent that we 
are self-conscious and have ‘higher’ potentialities that allow us to surpass or transcend our finite 
early existence (Aho, p. 1 quoting Dreyfus 2009, 2012). Traditionally, the Platonic means to 
attain an “escape from time” was to strive for a “God’s eye view” over time and abstract ideas 
(eidos), so as to gain access to eternal essences. For the existentialists, transcendence is oriented 
largely towards the overcoming of dualisms inherent in the Cartesian schism between mind and 
body, and the engagement with the lived experience of the body (Aho, p. 2 – 3). Aho writes that 
“for Plato transcendence was not attained by the passionate faith of the whole person” (as is the 
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case of the biblical story of Job or Abraham in Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling), “it was 
achieved when reason, the higher or divine part of the soul rose above the lower animal part” 
(Aho, p. 2). 
Since transcendence is ultimately personal, and due to the inherent difference in human 
individuals, what leads one person to their subjective truth may not stimulate or work for 
another, and vice versa. If one is confused about what is meant by personal transcendence or 
subjective truth, imagine a time when the mundane concerns of day to day living where 
suddenly overcome. Maybe on a nice, relaxing vacation, or a spell of solitude out in nature. 
Moments where the worries, problems, ruminations and anxieties we carry with us faded away, 
and revealed a deep and satisfying moment of inner clarity, peace and stillness. Such moments, 
albeit rare, do exists, and it is the thesis of this paper that they can be cultivated.  
Regarding terms of art, as I see it, to deeply engage with and open up to poetry, literature and 
philosophy generally – not just existential – requires a certain willingness to do so, or better 
yet, a suspension of disbelief and critical dismissive thinking, much like enjoying a play at the 
theatre or watching a movie. For example, it would not be a very effective means of enjoying a 
play if one was to constantly point out the arbitrary nature of how one is watching paid 
professionals in makeup and costumes read lines from a script. The emergence into the play 
beyond disbelief allows one to take part in the activity of the theatre. This participation allows 
one to reexamine one’s values and beliefs, explore sympathies for the human condition 
unconstrained by egoic attachments and escape the concerns of one’s day to day concerns. 
Both Aristotle and Plato wrote about the societal function of the theatre. Aristotle pointed out 
how imitation (mimesis) of life in the form of drama permitted for catharsis, the release of 
corresponding negative emotions in the viewer, saying “tragedy is an imitation of an action. It 
achieves, through pity and fear, the catharsis of these sorts of feelings” (Stanford, Aristotle, 
section 13, siting the Poetics 1449b, p. 21–29). Plato similarly engaged with mimesis. Suffice 
it to say that the two disagreed about its value for society and its role.  
While engaging with the theatre, the movies or books, what occurs is that you are being shown 
something, thought its full or deeper meaning might not be immediately accessible. That two 
plus two equals four yields its truth immediately, it is full on the surface. Understanding or 
experiencing Meursault however, the main characters of Albert Camus’ L’Étranger (The 
Stranger) requires a different, more resonant approach than mathematics. In order to experience, 
be frustrated or confused by Meursault’s lack of interest in life, even to the point of murdering 
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someone without feeling remorse, one has to be moved. What the novel shows is illogical 
behavior, which is exactly the point. Life is absurd, thinks Camus, and what better way to 
convey this absurdity than telling a story which uncovers our modern, alienated state, with no 
solution being presented. These are insights of a different nature than “2 + 2 = 4”; they are 
insights of wisdom – knowledge for the soul one might say – as opposed to insights of reason. 
When exploring the terms of art approach, one almost gets the feeling that one is being offered 
a perspective, urged in a way to “try it on”, as it were, as opposed to deconstructing the 
previously held perspective or position permanently in the favor of now permanently adopting 
a new one, such as in going from a coherentist view of knowledge to a foundationalist one, say.  
As Cooper, Barrett and Aho remarks, the insights aimed for by philosophy, and perhaps 
existential philosophy specifically, cannot always be adequately put directly into a system, and 
occasionally elude words. To my mind, this is because philosophy is not a cooking recipe. One 
either “hears the notes”, as it were, or one does not. For this reason, Kierkegaard had “no interest 
in the Socrates who figures as the mouthpiece of Platonism (Barrett, p. 157). His interest lay 
with the man Socrates, the concrete man of flesh and blood, who said that he had no system or 
doctrine to teach, that he had no knowledge of his own, but could only play the midwife to other 
men in bringing to birth the knowledge they had within themselves. For Socrates, philosophy 
was a way of life, and he existed in that way” (p. 157-8).  
 
 
4. Authenticity in Philosophy 
One of the challenges of conducting research on a term which originates from a movement 
which features so many diverse thinkers has been employing correct terminology. For example, 
whole papers could be written on the relationship between the terminology employed by 
Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, who all used terms like ontology, being, 
existence, and phenomenology in their works. All employed different conceptions of 
phenomenology for example, different methods and different results (Stanford, 
Phenomenology, section 4). Sometimes their uses vary, and on occasion they are similar. 
Sometimes these differences are subtle and other times significant, as with Husserl’s notion of 
formal ontology and Heidegger’s foundational ontology, for example.  
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As it stands, terms such as authentic and inauthentic are hard to categorically define, at least in 
a sentence. The search for a categorical definition is complicated by the fact that the 
existentialist writers wrote at different times and different languages and employed differing 
terminology. Kierkegaard wrote in Danish, Heidegger and the German philosopher Friedrich 
Nietzsche (1844-1900) both wrote in highly complex and inventive German and the French 
philosophers Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980) and Albert Camus (1913 – 1960) wrote in French, 
centuries after Kierkegaard. 
According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy the word ‘authenticity’ stems from a 
word invented by Heidegger, ‘Eigentlichkeit’. The word ‘Eigentlichkeit’ in turn comes from 
the German word eigentlich meaning really or truly, built on the stem eigen, which translates 
into the Norwegian ‘egen’ or the English word “own” (Stanford, Authenticity, section 3.1). The 
word ‘authenticity’ became closely associated with Heidegger from the early translations of 
Being and Time into English. Heidegger’s notion about ownedness was seen as the way to be 
the “most fully realized human form of life” (Stanford, Authenticity, section 3.1).  
According to Aho, the word ‘authentic’ derives from the Greek authentikos, meaning original 
or genuine. Aho further notes that while Heidegger is the only one who liberally uses the word, 
existentialists are generally united in emphasizing the significance of authenticity as being true 
(p. 80). Aho notes that “the commitment to one’s own truth is difficult because our normal 
tendency is to drift along conform to the average expectations and meanings of the public 
world” (p. 80). 
A complicating matter regarding research into such themes is that, due to the particular cultural 
popularity of existentialist philosophy, the terms ‘authentic’ and ‘inauthentic’ found themselves 
adopted for personal individual interpretations, sometimes by people largely uninterested in 
reading Kierkegaard, Heidegger or Sartre themselves. Fringe or counter cultural behavior or 
norms found themselves justified by youth as attempts of living “an authentic life”, “being 
authentic” or “being true to one’s self”. Today this finds its expression in self-help literature 
which instructs people to, among other things, be a more ‘true’ self. As we shall see, the concept 
of authentic existence has less to do with self-aggrandizing expressions of self-absorbed 
narcissistic behaviors and more to do with a fundamental inquiry into the ontology of the ego, 
a reexamination and rejection of one’s egoic structure altogether. The self-help literature of 
Californian origin is not filled with remarks about deep and persistent existential inquiry of the 
sort “who am I?”, and for good reason: it does not sell. 
Page 25 of 103 
 
Regardless, what I came to realize from researching this paper is that authenticity is currently 
an obscure area of contemporary philosophy. I suspect this is not only because of the rather 
poetic nature of the term, but also due to the commitment and complexity involved in 
researching it. Sincere and fruitful research into these subject areas are complicated by the fact 
that uncovering existential authenticity represents an existential undertaking on the part of the 
researcher. Because what one is investigating is the subjective nature of one’s own existence 
and how it can be authentically lived, the role of the researcher cannot be ignored. While this 
might seem foreign today, consider that for the Greeks, the pursuit of philosophy was 
inseparable from the philosopher himself. 
To understand this, consider philosopher Stephen Mulhall’s quote from his Routledge 
philosophy guidebook to Heidegger (2005): 
“To invoke questions of authenticity within the precincts of philosophical endeavor was 
once a commonplace: to engage in philosophizing was long understood as a way, 
perhaps the way, of acquiring wisdom about the meaning of human existence, and thus 
of leading a better life. Nowadays, the idea that one’s success or failure at 
philosophizing can legitimately be assessed at all in personal terms is not often 
considered; and the idea that one’s philosophical position might be criticized as 
existentially inauthentic might appear either ludicrous or offensive. Such reactions 
betoken a conception of the subject that represses the fact that it is human beings who 
produce philosophy, that philosophizing is a part of a human way of living. It is, of 
course, perfectly possible to act out such a repression; nothing is easier than to write 
philosophy in a way that represses the fact of one’s own humanity. But, as Kierkegaard 
pointed out, such forgetfulness – particularly when one’s very topic is what it is to be 
human – is liable, where it is not comic, to be tragic in its consequences.” (Mulhall, p. 
33-34) 
The attainment of authenticity was a central themes and primary goal in the writings of the 
existentialist writers. This is similar to how the praxis of living the good life was the aim of the 
Greeks. This is an aim I resonate with, and it is my guiding perspective that by authentic states 
are meant existential states which are in union with a pre-existing mode of being. 
Another obstacle to research into authentic existence is the tradition from which authenticity 
emerged, existentialism. Whatever one thinks of existentialism (and there are many good 
reasons for rejecting much of the sensationalism associated with it), it cannot be denied that it 
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is a philosophy deeply committed to the lived life of the individual. It could be argued that if a 
philosophical concept which merited sincere research were to emerge from that tradition – 
which I believe authenticity is – that research into that term could be discouraged for no other 
reason that its origin.  
The Stanford encyclopedia article on existentialism reflects on this, saying that “if 
existentialism's very notoriety as a cultural movement may have impeded its serious 
philosophical reception, then, it may be that what we have most to learn from existentialism 
still lies before us” (Stanford, Existentialism, section 5).  
 
 
5. The appeal of Existentialism 
Let me just state for the record that it is not my aim to argue for existentialisms place in, and 
relevance of, the philosophical canon. I think that as a ‘movement’ it is well dead and buried. I 
do however hope to show that authentic existence is a topic which still merits philosophical 
attention. Because our lives are, on occasion, lived inauthentically, I consider authentic 
existence to be a resonant and pertinent theme for today. This is reflected, I think, in the peculiar 
popularity existentialism received. 
There are many ways to think about existentialism, with many “catch all” definitions failing to 
catch all the subtleties involved. Cooper, Barrett and Aho all write extensively about the history 
of the movement, with different aims and definitions. One of their shared agreements is that 
there lies an actual philosophy behind all the fluff and flash. They all agree that existentialism 
has its place in the history of philosophy and not merely as a post-war literary and stylistic 
phenomenon. As Cooper writes it, “existentialism grew, in part, out of Husserl’s 
phenomenology, which in turn was a critical response to nineteenth-century materialism and 
positivism: it was certainly not a bolt from the blue” (Cooper, p. 13). The flash and scandal 
attached to it is unfortunate, I agree with Cooper’s claim that underneath all of the flash and 
dread of existentialism there lies a “systematic, coherent, definable and structured philosophy” 
(Cooper, p. 6). 
Cooper continues to note that the special meaning which informs the existentialist’s use of the 
term ‘existence’ comes from Kierkegaard, who apparently got his inspiration for the use by 
attending the lectures of Schelling (Cooper, p. 2). The view of Kierkegaard as the father of the 
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movement is not unchallenged however. According to the Stanford article on Existentialism, it 
was Heidegger, in his phenomenological pursuit of the categories that govern being-in-the-
world, who became the reluctant father of existentialism (Stanford, Existentialism, point 1). 
Although – the entry remarks – if this is the case then it is so because he drew inspiration from 
two seminal, though in academic circles then relatively unknown, nineteenth-century writers, 
Søren Kierkegaard and Friedrich Nietzsche. To link the history of the term exclusively to these 
two thinkers is also somewhat incorrect, as one can find anticipations of existential thought in 
many places (for instance, in Socratic irony, Augustine, Pascal, or the late Schelling), however 
the roots of the problem of existence in its contemporary significance lie in the work of 
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche (Stanford, Existentialism, point 1). 
Aho agrees with Cooper when he writes that existentialism, when viewed historically cannot 
be dismissed as a “moribund, decade-long episode in postwar France” (p. 17). Cooper echoes 
this, when he remarks that all the best-known existentialist works were written prior to the 
beginning of the war, or before it ended (p. 13). The reason Cooper and Aho make these remarks 
is to refute what they see as prevalent and misleading notions about existentialism. They do this 
not to reawaken the more populist, scandalous and irrational part of the cultural impact, but to 
advocate for the fact that behind the noise lies an actual philosophy. 
Barrett wrote that “the very themes of Existentialism were something of a scandal to the 
detached sobriety of Anglo-American philosophy… Matters as anxiety, death, the conflict 
between the bogus self and the genuine […] are scarcely the themes of analytic philosophy. 
They are, however, themes of life: people do die, people do struggle all their lives […] and we 
do live in an age in which neurotic anxiety has mounted out of all proportion” (Barrett, 1958, 
p. 9).  
As Barrett notes, the popularity of the movement probably had to do with the engagement with 
the lived life of the everyday man. Spanish existentialist Miguel de Unamuno, for example, 
engaged with “the man who is born, suffers, and dies” (Aho, p. 11). Aho takes an interesting 
perspective, writing that existentialism “represents a centuries-long engagement with the most 
fundamental of human questions: ‘Who am I?’ and ‘How should I live?’” (p. 17) and refers to 
a “diverse group of philosophers and literary figures who were concerned about the question of 
what it means to be human” (preface, p xvii). On this view, it engages in themes not only found 
in modern philosophy, but also in Athens. 
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As I see it, and without succumbing to hyperbole, Existentialism, in this view, can be seen as 
representing a potent flourishing of themes which has been developing in western philosophy, 
like the mind/body dualism. This becomes clear when we gain some space from the preceding 
century, and when we read Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Heidegger in their own rights. 
Barret wrote about the appeal as it was fading, or in the very recent past, saying that 
“existentialism is the best in the way of a new and creative movement that these rather 
uninspired postwar years have been able to turn up. We have to say at least this in a spirit of 
cool critical assessment, even when we acknowledge all the frivolous and sensational elements 
that got attached to it.” (Barrett, p. 9) Since the time of his writing, 1956, was a very different 
one from the current day Barrett’s perspective is limited by the horizon of history, and yet there 
is still a fair point to be extracted about existentialism. Barrett continues: 
“The important thing … was that here was a philosophy that was able to cross the 
frontier from the Academy into the world at large. This should have been a welcome 
sign to professional philosophers that ordinary mankind still could hunger and thirst 
after philosophy if what they were given to bite down on was something that seemed to 
have a connection with their lives” (Barrett, p. 9). 
As the history of philosophy has played out since the 1950’s, the perspective of existentialism 
as a vibrant and flourishing philosophy has not taken hold. As best as I can gather, existentialism 
is well represented in the camps open to it, and systematically ignored in the camps whose fancy 
it fails to catch. At this point I sincerely doubt that any amount of scholarly attention will 
demand its most ardent opponents to give it its due. 
Perhaps it is precisely the final and ultimate destruction of a medieval world picture – one where 
this world is somehow a privileged realm tailor made for humans, guarded by an omniscient 
and meaning-bestowing deity that gave existentialism its enduring relevance to the everyday 
man. In the wake of religious answers to the problem of alienation, what remained for the person 
in tune with the problem of existence was to attempt to face up to this fact philosophically and 
still attempt the pursuit of a good life.  
However this kind of heroic rebellion against one’s absurdity, to use Camus’ terms, or the 
ambition of a Nietzschian ‘Overman’ (Übermensch) to own up to one’s finitude seems more 
and more rare. Kierkegaard would underscore how this was our factual state, and as such an 
escape from this facticity was not possible. While redemption in the figure of Christ might not 
be a realistic resolution, Kierkegaard’s diagnosis of the existential dilemma is well put. We do, 
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after all, already exist. What the thinkers attempt to make clear is essentially a simple yet potent 
point, that existence is not a cumbersome predicate which mean spirited existentialists want to 
forcefully designate us, rather it is a pre-given for our lives which is inescapable. 
The motivation of man today seemm not to be pursuits of Socratean commands like knowing 
oneself or living an examined life, but instead the motivation seems to be to one of escapism. 
On the existentialist view, the escape is from alienation, and we see it in the form of technology, 
work, drugs or romantic affairs. As I see it, the problem is that by seeking to escape the dualistic 
and alienated sense of self, to escape himself as it were, man also is removed from the means 
of overcoming the alienation he feels from society and the world altogether. Rather than facing 
himself and investigating the sources of his alienation, the current cultural mood (moods being 
a shared existentialist theme) of the time seems to be one of a rampant escapism at all costs. 
In an absurd world where no creator grants any essence, and where morality is bound up to 
social systems showing their clear deficiency, leading to horrors like concentration camps or 
nuclear warfare, it can be understood that man comes face to face with existence with no 
answers. It is precisely at this moment – when the absurdity of continuing an old and redundant 
way of being cannot any longer be reconciled with one’s subjective intuition – that man has 
arrived at the point where the search for a reconciliation with one’s authentic existence becomes 
necessary. 
If I may offer a closing remark, the shift into escapism which we observe in our time with things 
like smartphones and drug addictions worries me. Alienation and estrangement has been a 
recurring theme in the literature of our century to far a greater degree than in the past, and I 
worry on occasions that alienation might be increasing. 
 
 
6. Terms and Themes 
In this section I will present briefly terms and themes as they relate to the investigation into 
authentic existence. This is done because the investigation may be difficult to undertake without 
a certain understanding of the tradition and insights upon which they rest. Therefore, in this 
section I present the relevant terminology and thematic engagements shared by existentialist 
writers as they relate to the subject in this paper. 
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As mentioned, existential terms sometimes function like terms of art. Because of this, the best 
way to form a coherent and holistic picture is to observe what emerges when reading the 
different writers and looking for how they are similar and converge, as opposed to how they 
might differ. It has been my approach in this paper to search for an emergent coherency rather 
than focusing on defending specific interpretations. This is done in order that a holistic 
multileveled picture may emerge that captures the best insights all the thinkers have to offer. In 
this regard I am influenced by Cooper. 
The terms existence and being are used interchangeably. Both denote, for our use, the facticity 
of our existence, the fact that we exist at all and that our existence is a moment-to-moment 
engagement, which is on occasion problematic. 
The thesis regarding authentic existence is presented throughout the paper as opposed to being 
saved for a specific section. The points are made either by direct references, or sometimes more 
subtle intonations that arises as an emergent picture arises. When the philosophical terminology 
and their use are understood and a coherent picture has formed, we can move on to the topic of 
existential self-inquiry and authentic existence. 
 
a. Ontology and Existence 
“It is said that 'Being' is the most universal and the emptiest of concepts. As such it 
resists every attempt at definition.” (Heidegger, 1927, p. 21). 
Classically, the term ontology was used to denote that which existed, as opposed to that which 
did not exist. Historically, different philosophers and systems had different ontological 
commitments and accompanying metaphysics. As a first approximation, ontology can be 
defined as the study of what there is (Stanford, Logic and Ontology, section 3.1).  
The classical view of ontology is something the existentialists critique, because as they see it, 
the whole perspective upon which such aims are done is a mistaken one. What the classical 
picture of ontology presents is the activity of performing ontology and attempting to create 
rational systems of sense regarding the existing entities. What this view fails to account for is 
the fact that, as existing beings, we fundamentally already exist, and that this is to be viewed as 
primary. We could not perform ontological inquiries if we did not first were. 
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Instead of ontology, existentialists prefer the term ‘Existence’. Existence can be understood as 
what it is like (to use Thomas Nagel’s term) to be one’s ontology (in the sense of what exists). 
However, this use complicates matters because the phrase “what it is like to be one’s ontology” 
can be confused with the act of ‘performing ontology’, in the sense of conducting ontological 
inquiries, for example. To clear this up, picture the following. There is something existing, let’s 
take a cat as an example. A cat exists. Is there ‘something it is like’ to be the cat? Is there a first 
person point of view, some(thing) which the sensory apparatuses deliver its content to? 
Assuming there is, this cat has an ontology (it formally exists), and it is also something it is like 
to be that cat. It has a phenomenological perspective, one might say. 
We must express and experience the phenomenological perspective that our ontology includes. 
As formally existing beings, performing formal ontology (in the sense of making ontological 
lists) is one activity we can perform on the basis of our existence. Existence, then, denotes both 
the fact that we are and the sense of what it is like to be that being. 
The problem, as Heidegger points out in Being and Time, is not that existence is a better word 
than ontology, but that the task of ontology is to explain Being itself. By Being itself, Heidegger 
aims to denote the fact that we are and what this entails as the true aim of ontology, as opposed 
to theoretical concerns with ideal essences, for example. Heidegger expands on this in his 
analysis of Dasein, his term for the kind of beings we were. Essentially, he remarked, it is 
existing beings who must perform ontological inquiries. And because the type of being which 
we are has the possibility and option to perform such an inquiry as one of its modes of being, 
Heidegger thinks that Dasein is uniquely suited to undertake this activity, the ontological 
investigation into being. 
Dasein is then at once the inquirer and what is inquired into, which Heidegger writes as “in so 
far as Being constitutes what is asked about, and ‘Being’ means the Being of entities, then 
entities themselves turn out to be what is interrogated” (Heidegger, Being and Time, 1927, first 
English translation 1962, p. 26). He continues by noting that “to work out the question of Being 
adequately, we must make an entity- the inquirer – transparent in his own Being. The very 
asking of this question is an entity’s mode of Being; and as such it gets its essential character 
from what is inquired about – namely, Being. This entity, which each of us is himself and which 
includes inquiring as one of the possibilities of its Being, we shall denote by the term Dasein” 
(Heidegger, 1927, p. 27). In this way, it might seem that Heidegger aims to reinterpret human 
beings from the Aristotelian definition of the rational animal to the ontologically investigating 
human.  
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Stephen Mulhall’s interpretation of Heidegger and his inquiry into being is that “Heidegger 
thinks that Dasein is the type of entity which must be interrogated in any exercise in 
fundamental ontology. The aim of any such exercise is to interrogate Being as it makes itself 
manifest through the Being of an entity, and the fact that Dasein’s essence is existence makes 
the relationship of its Being to Being a peculiarly intimate one (Mulhall, 2005, p. 13). 
To my mind, what Heidegger points out is that what we are investigating is being itself and not 
something that is made apparent in virtue of being, such as ideas, concepts, chairs or ontological 
metaphysical systems. He also points out that the very asking of this question, i.e. “what is 
being” was our very mode of Being. In other words, the way we are, for Heidegger, is curiously 
inquiring ones, performing self-inquiry, one might say. It might be that Heidegger here is 
referring to the activity of ontological inquiry as inherently authentic, as we “get our essential 
character from what is inquired about – namely Being”.  
Heidegger would give further credence to this reading when he says that “the question of Being 
is nothing other than the radicalization of an essential tendency-of-Being which belongs to 
Dasein itself – the preontological understanding of Being” (Heidegger, s. 32). Similarly, he 
notes that “We are each of us the entity to be analyzed. The being of this entity is always mine” 
(Heidegger, s. 41). We can begin to note here in Heidegger some beginning tendencies towards 
phenomenological inquiries into ontology as primary for humans. 
In conclusion, the way I see it that in whatever metaphysical framework one operates, it is an 
inescapable fact that in order to construct or subscribe to a system – any system: ethical, 
political, metaphysical or ontological – one must first exist. What this entails is that by existence 
is meant the fact that existence is primary, which is to say that it precedes essence. 
 
b. Existence precedes essence 
“So far as he logicizes, man tends to forget existence. It happens however, that he must 
first exist in order to logicize” (Barrett, p. 305). 
The point has been made rather stridently by Kierkegaard and by other existentialists that there 
is something pre-given, something that is more direct, personal and immediate than our 
thinking. This “more primal” aspect is our existence as such. For Kierkegaard, one’s subjective 
truth – the truth of the individual – was infinitely more important than objective truth. For 
Kierkegaard it was only by committing to one’s own subjective truth that one could “lead a 
Page 33 of 103 
 
complete human life” (Aho, p. 24), and this commitment could never be grasped through 
appeals to disinterested reason because it constitutes my own singular experiences, emotions 
and needs. In pushing this point, Kierkegaard breaks rather demonstrably with Cartesian 
traditions which pictured a disconnected rational mind as primary.  
What Kierkegaard was trying to remind his readers, and the philosophical tradition generally 
was that prior to detached reflection, existence occurs. Another way of making this point, is 
saying that one must first exist in order to think. As a response to idealistic systems, such as the 
one presented by Hegel, Kierkegaard raised the objection that these ignores and is detached 
from the flesh and blood particulars of individual existence for the sake of abstraction and 
objectivity (Aho, p. 25). By interpreting truth subjectively, Kierkegaard undermined the 
traditional view of the self as a disinterested mind or cogito – this is because prior to detached 
reflection I exist. The real subject, according to Kierkegaard was not the cognitive subject, but 
the existing subject (Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, first English translation 
1941, p. 281). This is summed up by Kierkegaard when he says “I must exist in order to think” 
(p. 294).  
What this reflects, I think, is that everything done by a human agent has required, and been 
dependent on the existence of that human agent. Even in fringe cases, or extreme conditions, 
like drug-induced trances, deep states of hypnosis, sleepwalking or near-death, there is still a 
necessary condition that an agent exists before the agent can do actions. Logic seems to require 
the existence of a being to occur as a necessary condition for any action the being undertakes. 
I, for example, may only write this paper because I satisfy the condition of existing, and likewise 
a similar principle applies for whoever reads it.  
Therefore, if someone, a philosopher for example, wishes to address existence through some 
kind of formal system, there is a necessary condition that that philosopher existed. Existence 
seems necessarily primary. A rationalist arguing that by means of logical reasoning one could 
construct a system or schema to prove otherwise seems for me to miss the point entirely. 
Namely, that she or he must exists in order to undertake this task. 
The theme of existence as primary is particularly clear in Kierkegaard’s Philosophical 
Fragments (1844), in one sense, it is axiomatic of the whole tradition or ‘movement’. Sartre 
would expand on this concept, coining the explicit formulation “existence precedes essence” 
in his 1946 lecture Existentialism and Humanism, which subsequently became somewhat of a 
slogan for the ‘movement’.  
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Another aspect to this slogan – one of its most salient meanings – is that one must first exists 
before instantiating any essences. Traditionally in philosophy, lending much from Plato, 
essences were taken to be what was primary. Permanent and timeless essences where 
instantiated by ‘mere’ existing things. As we have seen, the existentialists critique aims to point 
out that the opposite is the case. Existence is what is primary, not only ontologically, but also 
prior to disinterested reason or philosophical systems as a whole. As Kierkegaard noted, “I must 
first exist in order to think” (1941, 281). 
For Sartre, the slogan had an ethical dimension to it as well: human beings created their own 
values and determined their own meaning for their life. They had the ability to do so because 
they, as humans, do not possess any inherently given essence. Their identity was then left open 
to the individual to create. Indeed, the individual had no other choice, he was, in Sartre’s words, 
“doomed to be free”. Interestingly, when Sartre coined the term in his 1946 lecture 
Existentialism and Humanism, he made explicit references to Heidegger: 
“Atheistic existentialism, of which I am a representative, declares with greater 
consistency that if God does not exist there is at least one being whose existence comes 
before its essence, a being which exists before it can be defined by any conception of it. 
That being is man or, as Heidegger has it, the human reality. What do we mean by 
saying that existence precedes essence? We mean that man first of all exists, encounters 
himself, surges up in the world – and defines himself afterwards” 
And indeed, in Being and Time Heidegger writes “The essence of Dasein lies in its existence” 
(Heidegger, 1927, p. 67). Sartre echoes this, when he writes “I recognize, as entirely authentic, 
that man is a being whose existence precedes his essence” (Sartre, 1946, p 52).  
These remarks opens the way for the task of ontic inquiry as a primary concern. Related to this 
notion, and as we shall see in later sections, I consider the task of existential self-inquiry to be 
the means of exploring this existential authenticity. Following Kierkegaard, Heidegger would 
expand significantly on both the historical neglect of this area of philosophy, and the potential 
of this study in his exploration of what he termed ‘Dasein’. 
 
c. Reason and Thinking 
The existentialist tradition has had a long engagement with reason and its relation to existence. 
One of the more salient critiques of the existential tradition is against uses of thinking. Indeed, 
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one of the enduring contributions of existentialism has been its critique of what Merleau-Ponty 
called “high-altitude thinking” (Merleau-Ponty, 1968, p. 73). Kierkegaard, as we saw, made 
similar points when he said that only by committing to one’s own subjective truth could one 
lead a complete human life. Reason, to use Heidegger’s word, is one activity available to 
Dasein, it is not Dasein.  
This reflects a common existentialist protest: that we cannot take the traditional standpoint of 
theoretical detachment and objectivity when it comes to questions about what it means to be. 
This is because, insofar as we exist, we are already caught up in the concrete situation that we 
find ourselves in. This means that one’s existence can be accessed only from ‘inside’, that is, 
from within one’s own situated, affective, and embodied point of view (Aho, p. 17).  
Kierkegaard presented this critique by attempting to express the differences between the 
impersonal and the objective truths on the one hand and what he calls “The highest truth 
available for an existing individual” on the other. Accordingly, these latter truths are subjective 
and are fundamentally uncertain and inaccessible to logic and reason. Thus, according to 
Kierkegaard, these subjective truths cannot be thought, they can only be felt with inward 
intensity in the course of living one’s life (Aho, p. 4).  
What motivates this critique of reason is the urgent primacy of the human experience as it is 
lived. This is a shared and unifying concern of the existentialists, even for Nietzsche, Jaspers 
and Merleau-Ponty, they are insistent on recovering a personal awakening from modes of 
estrangement, which is of existential significance – be it via religious commitment or the 
abandonment of our old restrictive views – which Sartre called Bad Faith.  
This is in stark contrast to an enduring philosophical assumption – that by adopting a standpoint 
of theoretical detachment and objectivity we can arrive at a rational explanation of human 
behavior (Aho, p. 22). This has led to some thinkers reexamining the role and potential of reason 
in general, at least insofar as it relates to understanding existence. As early as the seventeenth 
century the French philosopher and mathematician Blaise Pascal (1623-1662) introduced the 
phrase ‘logic of the heart’ (Logique du coeur) in an attempt to give an account of the affective 
mystery of human existence that traditional reason and logic could never access (Aho, p. x) 
Heidegger would echo a similar claim regarding the relationship of existence to thinking, 
writing that “thinking only begins at the point where we have come to know that Reason, 
glorified for centuries is the most obstinate adversary of thinking” (quoted by Barrett, p. 207). 
Barrett echoes this point when he writes “Existence and a theory about existence are not the 
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one and the same, any more than a printed menu is as effective a form of nourishment as an 
actual meal” (p. 158). Nietzsche echoes the critique on reason when he remarks that the belief 
that our actions were grounded in rational explanation set in a universe of mechanism, stability, 
order and control was nothing more than an invention – an intellectual fable of sorts – which 
we told ourselves to deny how “transient aimless and arbitrary human existence actually is” 
(Nietzsche, 1954, p. 42). 
According to Cooper, the existentialist’s claimed that the classical aim of providing 
fundamental understandings of the world through reason rested on misconceptions regarding 
the relation between understanding and the world. Cooper notes that the “vehicles of 
fundamental understanding are not the theories but practical activities and situated moods” (p. 
15). Heidegger reflects this when he writes about “‘cognition’ reaching far too short a way 
compared with the primordial disclosure belonging to moods” (Heidegger, 1927, p. 134). 
Before we can cognize the world we must first encounter it, both understandingly and 
affectively, as a world of things to be embraced, avoided, used, discarded and so on. 
This theme is very relevant to authentic existence, as we shall see in the subsequent sections. 
The pursuit of authentic existence, of subjective existential truths generally, involves a ‘putting 
aside’ of reason alone, in the sense of a mind-enclosed thinking substance that can cognate and 
control the world from its solipsistic mental hideout. In authentic existence, this perspective is 
cast aside in favor of a pre-reflective mode of being. This is echoed by the point which the 
writers are striving to make: that when it comes to the concrete concerns of the human situation, 
reason is inadequate. They argue that we are taken in by thoughts, to the point where we confuse 
our existence (the immediate experience of this moment) with the ideas presented to this 
existence. To my mind, it is very much like treating the images on the cinema screen as real 
while ignoring the fact that you are looking at the screen itself.  
However in stating this I am aware of the issue that, by stressing the limits of reason to 
understand existence, one may quickly find oneself in what might seem anti-rational or 
irrational tendencies. This is neither my aim, nor the aim of the philosophers who make these 
remarks. Kierkegaard does write of himself in his Journals that “it was intelligence and nothing 
else that had to be opposed. Presumably that is why I, who had the job, was armed with an 
immense intelligence” (Barrett, p. 149). It is easy to read this as an all-out attack on sense or 
coherency generally. However, this would be a misrepresentation of the existential aim. As I 
see it, it is not the removal of the faculty or capacity for thinking Kierkegaard was after, but the 
attachment to thinking as the means and measure of all things against which he was opposed. 
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Kierkegaard would analogously refer to the role of suspending reason in the search of 
something more existentially inherent in his quote from The Sickness Unto Death: “to have 
faith is precisely to lose one's mind so as to win God”. The word God is fairly loaded, but suffice 
it to say that Kierkegaard pointed to the attainment of a higher personal truth by the intentional 
suspense of reason (my contention). 
Regarding the limits of reason, Kierkegaard has us note that the founding story of philosophy 
has Socrates sentenced to death by drinking hemlock, found guilty of “corrupting the youth” 
and “mocking the gods” by expounding the limits of knowledge (Barrett, p. 156-8). Socrates 
professed himself as the wisest, because at least he knew how little he knew. These aims are 
shared by Kierkegaard, whose self-imposed task was similar to that of Socrates. Much as the 
ancient Socrates had played the gadfly for his fellow Athenians, stinging them into awareness 
of their own ignorance, so Kierkegaard would find his task in raising difficulties for the easy 
conscience of an age that was smug in the conviction of its own material progress and 
intellectual enlightenment (Barrett, p. 157).  
The debate regarding passion and reason, between pre-reflective claims to knowledge and 
disembodied thinking substances has seen itself expressed throughout philosophical history, 
not only in the classical A priori/a posteriori manifestation. The etymology of philosophy itself 
reflects a certain ambiguity, as it can either be interpreted as the love of wisdom or the love of 
knowledge. It seems to me that the existentialists take preference towards the former rather than 
the latter.  
The theme regarding the vision of philosophy seemingly goes back to the beginning, as Socrates 
and Kierkegaard’s approach is in stark contrast to another Greek thinker, Parmenides, who had 
stated that “it is the same thing that can be thought and that can be”. According to Parmenides, 
“what cannot be thought cannot be real. If existence cannot be thought, but only lived, then 
reason has no other recourse than to leave existence out of its picture of reality” (Barrett, p. 
158-9). Kierkegaard would find himself opposed to similar remarks in the form of the idealist 
system of Hegel, who claimed to have knowledge of the whole of reality. 
Incidentally, there is a lot to be said about the relation between thinking and existence, both for 
the existentialists and philosophy generally. Barrett in particular seemed acutely intent on 
exploring this subject. However a further engagement with the critique of reason would take us 
too far afield from authenticity. Suffice it to say that much of what motivated the existentialist 
response was a reply to overreliance of thinking. Barrett notes that “certain German forerunners 
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of Kierkegaard had also attempted a critique of the intelligence, and that earlier opponents of 
rationalism, men like Hamann and the later Schelling had spoken out forcefully for the 
instinctive, the intuitive and the mythical against a time that seemed no longer able to 
understand such things” (Barrett, p. 150). 
Because we cannot come to grips with the ontological aspect of the human being through 
theoretical detachment, the question then become how to gain a methodological access to 
human existence if not through disinterested reason. The answer to this is twofold, first it 
involves paying attention the phenomenological first-person perspective, and secondly it 
involves viewing humans not as disconnected thinkers but as Being-in-the-world. 
 
d. Being in the World 
As opposed to the view of humans as disembodied rational observers, seeking a vantage point 
on time and space from the perspective of infinity, or a Gods-eye-view as Plato described, the 
existential phenomenologists instead referred to human beings as Being-in-the-world. That is 
to say, insofar as we are caught up in the world, we embody a pre-reflective understanding that 
enables us to handle things and move through the world in a smooth and seamless way. Insofar 
as we exist, we are already caught up in the concrete situation that we find ourselves in (Aho, 
p.17). 
This means that in the flow of everyday life, our actions are usually unaccompanied by mental 
intentions (Aho, p. 46) and any reflective awareness of our perceptions and actions always 
presupposes a non-reflective, non-self-referential way of being-in-the-world (Dreyfus, 1991, 
54-59). This non-self-referential way of being to which Dreyfus refers is, to my mind, indicative 
of authentic existence. Existentialists are not denying that deliberate, self-referential actions 
take place; they are simply making it clear that every day and for the most part they do not. In 
our ordinary activities we are not thinking about what we are doing because we already embody 
an understanding of the relational context that we are involved in (Aho, p. 46).  
One of the core insights of being-in-the-world is that much of our ordinary activity can be 
described and understood without appealing to a self-referential mind, as it is largely through 
the embodied, pre-reflective acts that our projects, roles, identities and equipment make sense 
to us (Aho, p. 47). Under such a Heideggerian/existentialist view, the opposite account of the 
human being as a self-enclosed mind set over and against objects is ‘mistaken’ because we are, 
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first and foremost, a situated way of being that is already engaged in contexts of meaning, and 
it is this fluid engagement that allows things to matter us in the ways that they do (p. 47). 
Aho describes the workings of pre-reflective engagement when he points out that he does not, 
for example, first stare at a computer and reflect on its objective properties before he uses it. He 
notes that “as a professor involved in the acts and practices of the academic world, I already 
inhabit an understanding of the computer in terms of its practical function and use. My hands 
simply begin to press the keys, with my eyes leveled at the screen and my elbows resting on the 
desk. This kind of oriented and purposive activity is preformed pre-reflectively, without the 
accompaniment of mental representation” (p. 36). 
The state of being-in-the-world is similarly described by Sartre. As Aho notes, in my everyday 
acts and practices, there is no ‘inner/outer’ distinction because I am already involved with and 
directed toward intra-worldly things (p. 29). And as Sartre says, when I am late for work and 
chasing the bus down the street, I do not encounter myself as a bundle of desires and beliefs in 
a mental container; rather I encounter my self as “running-towards-the-bus” (Sartre, 1957, p. 
49).  
 
e. Existence as problematic 
“As beings who are self-conscious, our existence is always penetrated by feelings of 
uncertainty and doubt; we experience anguish in the face of our own death, in the 
radical contingency of our choices, and the sheer arbitrariness that anything, including 
ourselves, exists at all” (Aho, p. 22). 
As we have seen, humans exist in such a way that precedes any essence. As such, this leaves us 
with existences which are problematic for us, as most of the existentialists have been hard 
pressed to point out. The existentialists keep insisting on the lived experiences as it currently 
is, encouraging us to remove ourselves from our dogmatic assumptions about ourselves and the 
world so as to recover our pre-reflective authentic states.  
In Sartre, for example, we find the description of humans as condemned to be free (Sartre, 1946, 
p. 34). Since our existence is problematic for us, it requires us to engage with it on a moment-
to-moment basis. This can be great if what one experiences is pleasurable, and horrible if what 
one experiences is un-pleasurable. Heidegger conceived of our being, which he called Dasein, 
as relational. The term Dasein is now so loaded with philosophical weight and varying 
Page 40 of 103 
 
interpretations that the genius of employing it – using a word completely unloaded with 
philosophical baggage – is wearing off. However what Heidegger attempted to say was to my 
mind rather simple. That in living out our lives, we always already care: for each of us, our 
being is always at issue and this is made concrete in the specific actions we undertake and the 
roles we enact (Stanford, Authenticity, section 3.1).  
For Heidegger, our being is one of care (Sorge). While he does not take this to mean that we 
are constantly worrying about things, or paying solicitous attention to them, the term reminds 
us that we are creatures for whom the kind of life to be lived matters, and is an ‘issue’ (Cooper, 
p. 74). 
As touched upon, existence is not a cumbersome predicate which mean spirited existentialists 
want to force upon us to cause us harm or unnecessary malcontent, rather it is an inescapable 
fact from which we cannot escape – try as we might. Existence, for the existentialists, refers 
only to the kind of existence enjoyed by human beings (Cooper, p. 4). Human existence is also 
to be understood as the kind of existence which has a concern for itself. Kierkegaard famously 
said that human beings not only exists but is “infinitely interested in existing”. Or as Heidegger 
noted, humans are such that their being is in question for them, an issue for them. Cooper notes 
that existence is a constant striving and is always prey to a sense of Angst which reveals that, 
for the most part, it is lived inauthentically and in Bad Faith (p.9).  
This view of human beings as inauthentic emerges from Heidegger’s view of what it is to be a 
human being. Heidegger’s perspective on human beings – Dasein – sees humans as ‘relation of 
being’ and not as solitary subjects. This view echoes Kierkegaard’s description of the self as 
relational and in conflict. On Heidegger's account, Dasein is not a type of object among others 
in the totality of what is on hand in the universe. Instead, human being is a “relation of being” 
(Stanford, Authenticity, section 3.1).  
Human beings, thus, has an existence which is inescapable. It is their own. Despite their best 
efforts to conform to a society, becoming part of a herd or “falling asleep” to their own 
unconscious mental structures, human beings are in the world. Kierkegaard captures this 
beautifully in his 1843 work Repetition:  
“You stick your finger in the ground to smell what country you’re in. I stick my finger 
into existence – and there is no smell at all. Where am I? What is that supposed to mean 
– in the world? What does the word mean? Who has lured me into all this and then left 
me standing here? Who am I? How did I get into the world? Why was I never asked? 
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Why was I not taught the rules and customs here but just struck into the ranks as though 
I had been bought from some traveling slave-trader? How come I am a participant in 
this huge enterprise known as Reality? Why should I be a participant? Is there no choice 
in the matter? And if there is no choice, then where is the manager – there is something 
I want to say to him. Is there no manager? Then to whom shall I address my complaint? 
(Ferguson, 2013, p. 10, quoting Kierkegaard, 1843). 
 
f. Overcoming Dualism 
The view in this paper is in agreement with a common existentialist claim, that to be in authentic 
states involves dissolution of the sense of being a separate subject that is alone, alienated and 
isolated. One of the most salient aspects of existentialism is the onslaught on Cartesian notions 
of self or subject, and on the dualisms which they inspire (Cooper, p. 16). Existentialism is, in 
part, directed to the overcoming of those dualisms” (p.13). 
In a more passionately, personally engaged way, Barrett writes about man, modernity and 
alienation, saying that the whole problematic of existentialism unfolds form the historical 
situation, which he marks as “Alienation and estrangement; a sense of the basic fragility and 
contingency of human life; the importance of reason confronted with the depths of existence; 
the threat of Nothingness, and the solitary and unsheltered condition of the individual” (Barrett, 
p. 36). While this is stark, it is also a very accurate representation of the effect of moods – both 
cultural and personal – with which existentialism deals with a great deal.  
I think it accurate to view Existentialism, on a whole, as deeply committed to the overcoming 
of dualisms, especially the dualism of subject/object and the ‘gap’ between our inner life and 
the world. Aho writes that one of the great legacies of existentialism is its dismantling of the 
subject/object metaphysics that ‘has been largely axiomatic to the Western worldview since the 
time of Descartes’ (p. 149), and Sartre writes in the early pages of Being and Nothingness that 
the “dualism of being and appearance is no longer entitled to any legal status within philosophy” 
(Sartre, 1943, p. 1, introduction). 
Existentialism is in a certain sense practical, because it recognizes that getting lost in seemingly 
endless debates over intellectual concepts distracts from the rather immediate problematic of 
our direct personal experience. The aim of overcoming philosophical dualisms is not a ‘mere’ 
theoretical exercise for the existentialists. Many attempts had been made to overthrow Cartesian 
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dualisms prior. However where existentialist differed from many other critics of Cartesian 
dualisms was in relating the overcoming of that tradition to the conduct of an authentic life 
(Cooper, p. viii). 
When it comes to living a life dedicated to overcoming of dualisms, I suspect existentialists 
owe a great deal to Socrates, who, as Cooper writes, is for many the philosopher, not because 
of theories he taught, but because of his enquiring, honest, courageous life. Overcoming 
dualities inherent to man as a means to uncover authenticity suggests the notions that there are 
kinds of understandings which “transform a person’s stance towards reality, and hence his life” 
(p. 21). With his famous dictum of “Know Thyself”, Socrates certainly gave the go-ahead for 
existential self-inquiries. 
The existentialists maintained that the overcoming of alienation could be made a return to a 
pre-reflective mode of being, which Heidegger called being-in-the-world. The picture of man 
as fundamentally a being in the world, engaged in a pre-reflective engagement with that world 
directs philosophical attention away from a dualistic picture of a mind-enclosed substance or 
cogito. For this reason, it is to my mind a fair assessment that existential philosophy has been 
concerned with the uncovering of existentially authentic ways of being as a means of 
overcoming the duality imposed by mind. As I see it, the duality is experienced as alienation, 
which take the form of problematic thoughts. 
 
g. Selfhood 
Historically, formal technical terms like ontology and being had varied, complicated and 
contrary uses to them. While the same holds true for existential terms – like existence, being in 
the world, moods, angst, death, subjective truth, alienation, dread, facticity, freedom, 
transcendence, absurdity and of course authenticity – it is not just terms which are shared by 
existentialists, themes also have a strong undercurrent thought the existentialist writings. The 
existentialist canon has, for example, had a long and enduring engagement with the theme of 
no underlying permanent self. This is particularly found in Nietzsche, who viewed selves as a 
kind of convenient fiction. The view on selfhood, especially the perspective regarding a 
disconnected thinking cogito have been the interest, not only of both existentialist and 
phenomenologists, but contemporary and historical thinker’s voice similar sentiments. 
Philosophers like Hume, and contemporary figures like the late Derek Parfit and Daniel Dennett 
all share critiques on the view that there was a fixed self. The French phenomenologist 
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philosopher Paul Ricoeur explicitly explored a narrative theory of selfhood, and refers to the 
engagement with selfhood as “Philosophies of the cogito”. 
On the existentialist view, selfhood is either understood as relational (Kierkegaard), already 
previously engaged in the world (Heidegger), or without any guiding or rule-giving essence 
(Sartre). Aho writes that the existentialists developed a conception of selfhood that dissolved 
the substance-centered view of the self, views held by Descartes or Plato (Aho, p. 49). Classical 
substance ontology tended to regard the self as an encapsulated mind or will that was separate 
and distinct from objects (p. 49), but what the existentialists are arguing is that this view ignores 
the fact that in our everyday involvements we are already bound up in meaningful situations. 
Given this account, the standard view of the self as a detached cogito is a mistake that assumes 
the existence of an independent mental sphere that is somehow detached from the outer world. 
For the existentialists, there is no ‘inner/outer’ distinction (Aho, p. 49). 
The theme of no fixed self means that, on the one hand, existentialism can be described as a 
reactionary, or at least contrary movement in philosophy, away from an isolated Cartesian 
subject and into the direct experience of the lived human life. For Nietzsche, the self was a 
‘fiction’ which was “invented by people who required something inside others to blame, and 
inside themselves to go on to an afterlife” (Nietzsche, The Will to Power, 1968, section 485 
and The Genealogy of Morals, 1968, part 2). 
As we shall see later, I consider the relationship between selfhood, inquiry and authentic 




A theme which is shared by nearly all the existentialist and is relevant to this paper is the theme 
of alienation. There has been a vivid and acute description in existentialist philosophy and 
literature, about alienation and its related subjective feelings of finitude and despair. Almost 
without exception, the existentialists all dealt with alienation, although sometimes accompanied 
by or described in their own words – words more in tune with their specific message – such as 
absurdity (Camus) nausea (Sartre), anxiety (Heidegger) and angst (Kierkegaard). 
Much like different doctors might offer different treatments or prognoses based on the same 
diagnosis, the existentialists all agree upon this central feature of their ‘doctrine’ – Man is 
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alienated, from himself, from his society and from whatever his authentic nature, his ‘inner 
truth’ is. Alienation is in one way so salient a feature of existentialism, that the movement might 
justifiably have been named “alienationism” (my contention). Barrett notes that alienation and 
estrangement constitute “the whole problematic of existentialism”.  Much like all the thinkers 
have offered different approaches to overcoming alienation (if, indeed, they offered one), my 
thesis is that by authentic existence is meant precisely a state free of alienation. This might even 
suffice as a formal definition. Alienation points towards self-deception, a state which the 
existentialists make clear that it is possible to be shaken out of (Aho, p. 81).  
The moods which existentialists talk about all share the common feature of being able to pull 
us out of self-deception, to pull us out of inauthentic being. Aho writes that to the extent which 
we conform to the ready-made identities of the public world “we are alienated and inauthentic”. 
By this he means that we disown ourselves by simply going along with the crowd, never having 
to face up to the truth about who and what we really are. What are we really?” (Aho, p. 62). 
Cooper proposes an interesting perspective, namely that the most serious question with which 
philosophy has to deal is that of alienation in its various forms (Cooper, p. 8). According to 
Cooper, the entire history of western philosophy, especially epistemology, has revolved around 
the central topic of alienation. In his reasoning, the problem of self and world, and the problem 
how to obtain certain knowledge of the outside world is one in a larger context of alienation. 
Cooper writes “that neither puzzlement nor awe, neither a thirst for knowledge nor a craving 
for clarity has been the abiding inspiration for philosophy. Rather this has been the perpetual 
threat posed by the sense that men are hopelessly alienated from their world” (p, 23).  
This is an unusual perspective, which Cooper is aware off, writing that he can hardly intend in 
a few paragraphs to rewrite the history of philosophy. While probably incorrect, what it points 
towards is an important perspective in my opinion. The theme of overcoming alienation offers 
us not just a unifying perspective of philosophical traditional inquiries, but also a shared goal: 
that of returning to a less-conflicted state of being. It hardly seems too broad a claim to make 
that philosophy aims for clarity so as to make better sense of the world. 
Alienation can be seen as a feature of the modern world view, a feature which has been shared 
by the existentialist thinkers, even way before Kierkegaard. Aho goes back to Pascal, and notes 
that he experienced the new mechanistic and de-animated world of science not with optimism, 
but with dread (Aho, p. 6). Particularly in his Pensées, where Pascal gives a rather striking 
description of the modern world, stripped of any trace of divinity or overarching meaning. Aho 
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remarks that it is descriptions like those of Pascal’s which brings attention to alienation as 
coming to the fore in European thought: 
“This is what I see and what troubles me. I look around in every direction and all I see 
is darkness. Nature has nothing to offer me that does not give rise to doubt and anxiety. 
If I saw no sign there of a Divinity I should decide on a negative solution: if I saw signs 
of a Creator everywhere I should peacefully settle down in the faith. But, seeing too 
much to deny and enough to affirm, I am in a pitiful state… The eternal silence of these 
infinite space fills me with dread” (Pascal, 1670, this English translation 1995, p. 201, 
429). 
Whether one shares Pascal’s sentiments or not, descriptions such as these has found recurring 
expressions during the modern era. Take for example the words of Nietzsche, who wrote about 
the ‘darkening of the era’.  
“’Where has God gone?’ [the madman] cried, ‘I’ll tell you where! We’ve killed him – 
you and I! We are all his murderers! … Aren’t we wandering as if through an endless 
nothing? Isn’t empty space breathing upon us? Hasn’t it gotten colder? Isn’t night and 
more night continuously coming upon us? Don’t lanterns have to be lit in the morning? 
… God is dead! God remains dead! And we have killed him!’ (Nietzsche, 1882, p. 125). 
It has been said that no philosopher was more tuned into the upheavals of modernity than 
Nietzsche, who “vividly conveyed the frightening sense of abandonment and forlornness in the 
modern age, where moral absolutes can no longer serve as a source of security and meaning for 
our lives” (Aho, p. 9). The point is put forth by Barrett that what is sometimes overlooked in 
philosophy is the sheer struggle for everyday living voiced by the existentialists. Less 
concerned about the ultimate nature of essences and more concerned with making it to the next 
morning. Camus is especially poignant in this respect when he describes existence both as 
alienated and problematic: “Sometimes, carrying on, just carrying on, is the superhuman 
achievement” (Camus, The Fall, 1956). 
Interestingly, the existentialist’s concept of self-estrangement is virtually equivalent to what 
Heidegger calls ‘inauthenticity’ (Cooper, p. 101). As Heidegger puts it, “when Dasein’s 
ownmost potentially-for-being is hidden from it, this alienation closes off Dasein from its 
authenticity” (p. 178). Similarly, Sartre’s authenticity is the ‘self-recovery of being’ which is 
lost during self-estrangement. 
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Self-estrangement for the existentialists is intrinsically tied to an oft-explored theme, that of 
existential angst. Kierkegaard devoted more than one book to it, and Heidegger stated that angst 
and anxiety “provided the phenomenal basis for explicitly gasping Dasein’s primordial totality 
of Being” (1927, p. 182). Heidegger and Sartre’s debt to Kierkegaard is well considered, as 
Cooper notes, saying “both Sartre and Heidegger were exponents of existential 
phenomenology, and both were concerned [with addressing] the issues of human existence, 
such as Angst and authenticity, bequeathed by Kierkegaard and Nietzsche” (p. 198). 
While it was Kierkegaard’s original term of Angst which influenced the later existentialists, the 
different writers refer to the subjective feeling of alienation in their own ways. Sartre called it 
anguish, Karl Jaspers referred to it as ‘metaphysical fear’ and Heidegger referred to it as anxiety 
or dread, depending on the German translation. The importance of Angst for the existentialist’s 
are that since they describe everyday life as lived in bad faith, sunk in the “they” and under the 
sway of the “Other”, they presupposed an authentic existence from which average, everyday 
life is a ‘fall’ (Cooper, p. 127-128). 
Having explored in brief the nature of alienation, we now turn towards the existentialists 
thoughts on how this feeling is to be overcome. 
 
i. Waking up from the natural attitude 
”The story is told by Kierkegaard of the absent-minded man so abstracted from his own 
life that he hardly known he exists until, one fine morning, he wakes up to find himself 
dead”. (Barrett, p. 1) 
The realization of the unexamined nature of one’s life is another shared feature of the thinkers. 
I have, during the course of my research, taken to referring to all the different descriptions 
collectively as waking up from the natural attitude – a term which originates in the German 
philosopher Edmund Husserl (1859 – 1938). What the existentialist’s urged was waking up 
from this unexamined approach to life as a means to uncover authentic existence. In this sense 
it can be seen as a Socratic and Aristotelean aim, in the sense of urgently tending to examining 
and knowing ourselves in order to live the good life. 
In Kierkegaard’s The Sickness Unto Death, Kierkegaard outlines a step-by-step progression 
towards what he called the ‘crisis’, a state where one wakes up from dogmatic assumptions to 
the inefficiency of their unexamined beliefs to give meaning and growth to one’s life. The move 
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towards a crisis of one’s unexamined assumptions came from a state in which the sufferer was 
not even aware of their own sickness of the spirit, a sickness which he called the sickness unto 
death (Kierkegaard, 1989 p. 3). Sartre named this unexamined state living in Bad Faith (French: 
mauvaise foi) and the realization of one’s unexamined attitude and awakening from this state 
was referred to as realizing one’s radical freedom. 
As a philosopher, Sartre was very attentive to the moments when the world lost its meaning and 
we started to notice how weird everything is. He was very attentive to what he called the 
“absurdity of the world”. In states of opening and separation from the narrative conformity of 
our natural attitude we were acutely reminded that the logic and usage we ascribe to thing is 
arbitrary – nothing but constructs in our mind to help navigate the world. While these stabilizing 
assumptions might be in some sense useful to us for enjoying our day-to-day routines, they can 
quickly become prisons of habit which we use to fall asleep to, consciously or unconsciously. 
As it plays out, generally once such a system of understanding the world has been put 
sufficiently in place, we are able to live our lives more and more on “autopilot” (my term). The 
aim of casting off our unexamined notions is not to dismiss intellectual pursuits, but to return 
to and concentrate on what is already pre-given in the moment - the lived experience of the 
individual – and not “get lost in thought”, as it were. 
However, as the existentialists in general are hard pressed to point out, this way of operating in 
the world has several shortcomings, and when we are confronted with the arbitrary and 
insufficient nature of our mental constructs we are usually struck by a sense of confusion, or 
even angst. For Sartre, such moments point us to us that we are free – sometimes terrifyingly 
so. However, as I see it, the consequences of awakening from the natural attitude of the world 
into its absurdity is not necessarily terrifying. As Sartre points out, it can be immensely 
liberating. It permits us the opportunity to no longer be bound to what we thought was our 
‘essence’, but to encounter existence as a freeing and self-defining enterprise. In other words, 
things do not have to be the way that they are. While Sartre used the term Angoisse (Anguish) 
to describe this, this to my mind rather reflects the predictable initial reaction to waking up from 
the natural attitude rather than how it persistently feels once discarded. 
For this reason, our freedom to make of our existence what we want – Sartre meant we should 
not live in what I called autopilot, and what he called “Bad Faith”. We are, for Sartre, in Bad 
Faith when we shut our eyes to other ways of thinking and persist in what Husserl called the 
natural attitude. Insisting persistently that we have to live our life the way it is currently lived 
because “that’s just the way it is” is a prime example of living in Sartrean bad faith. 
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Kierkegaard, meanwhile, similarly wanted us to give up attachments to traditional systems of 
behavior. He was particularly skeptical of the claim that the institutions of society – the state, 
church and marriage – permanently equipped life with a purpose or meaning. His critique was 
especially salient against the established Danish church and its systems of religious norms 
prescribed to offer enough spiritual guidance to “patch up” alienation but leave us ultimately 
unsatisfied and unaware until it was too late. As seen by his use of the term Angest (angst) in 
his 1844 book The Concept of Anxiety, Kierkegaard wanted to illustrate the infinitude of choices 
we face, and the impossibility introduced in ever choosing one of them wisely. We see clear 
echoes of Sartre’s concept of Anguish at our radical freedom.  
As is the case with most of the existentialists, Kierkegaard’s diagnosis of what the problem was 
(in part our unconscious attachment to the natural attitude) is a lot more employable than the 
prescribed remedy for it. Much like Kierkegaard espoused surrender to God via the archetypical 
figure of Christ, and Sartre preaching the near utopian promises of Marxism, their diagnosis of 
the problem we face is potent and relevant despite the quality and validity of their proposed 
solutions. Some existential thinkers, like Camus, offers no seeming solution or “way out”, but 
instead invites or encourages us to heroically embrace life’s seeming lack of pre given meaning 
and live our lives with passion and fury at high speed. 
Heidegger similarly diagnosed human beings with certain sicknesses of the soul. Primary 
among these is that we have forgotten to notice that we are alive. Barrett echoes this when he 
writes that the estrangement from Being itself is Heidegger’s central theme (Barrett, p. 207). 
To put this into Heideggerian terms, performing ontological inquiry is one of the modes of 
being available to Dasein. According to Heidegger, what we were running away from was the 
opposite of being, what he called Das nichts (the nothing). What was important were the 
moments when we regained a sense of astuteness to the oneness of being and overcame our 
sense of alienation. Heidegger introduces the term Geworfenheit (thrownness) to indicate how 
we are caught up in a world, thrown forward into being. To my mind, I can picture that 
Heidegger attempted to point out the pace at which our lives unfolded and how rapidly we are 
pulled in by the sway of our inauthentic tendencies. 
Interestingly, it was by realizing and understanding our throwness that we were able to rise 
above it. In so doing, we could move from inauthentic modes of being (uneigentlichkeit) to 
authentic modes of being (eigentlichkeit) (Heidegger, 1927). However, while asleep to the 
natural attitude we are unable to uncover our authentic existence and we remain alienated and 
divorced from our being. For Heidegger, one aspect of this involved succumbing to the societal 
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and social norms presented to us, which he called the ‘they-self’. As I see it, this reminds us of 
the urgency of waking up from our unconscious beliefs, especially in the face of our own 
impending deaths. 
Both Heidegger and Kierkegaard made references to the theme of our death, as something 
which informed both the temporal dimension of our lives, and that our lives is irredeemably our 
own, and which we must face ourselves. No one can die for us, as it were. To keep this is mind 
– that all societal prescriptions are indeed not for the benefit of our authentic nature but for the 
role we play in society – is what the perspective of mortality can help remind us of.  
Regarding death, Albert Camus posed in his essay The Myth of Sisyphus that “There is only 
one really serious philosophical question, and that is suicide”. While seemingly dramatic, by 
suicide Camus was not referring only or explicitly to physical suicide. He also put forth the 
notion of intellectual or philosophical suicide, which involved an ignorance of appeals to 
question what is given, falling asleep to our dogmatic assumptions. The likeness to suicide is 
interesting, as it points out the urgency to which existentialists believed the task of owning up 
to our lives involved. 
What all these thinkers point at is inauthenticity, a separation of man’s attunement with his own 
subjective truth, his authentic existence. As I see it, and as the existentialist’s remind us, the 
first and initial step to uncovering authentic existence is waking up from our unexamined life, 
the everyday complacency and our self-deception by disclosing the fundamental freedom and 
finitude of our situation. Doing this allows us the opportunity to be honest with ourselves and 
own up to our lives with renewed passion, intensity and focus. 
 
 
7. Husserl and the origin of existential phenomenology 
Waking up from our previous ways of thinking about ourselves and the world is an often 
described first step on the existential journey. To my mind, the ability that humans display 
which the existentialists refer to – that of waking up from an alienated state – points to the fact 
that there is something to awaken to. In other words, we can only be inauthentic because it is in 
obstruction to something pre given and authentic. While some interpreters of existentialism 
generally, like Cooper, have described the end stage of this ‘awakening’ with the description of 
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being-in-the-world as a radically free, ethically engaged individual, I maintain that the 
existentialists themselves, and certainly Husserl, points to a deeper ontic layer of existence, 
which our inauthentic structures are contingent upon. This underlying, pre-reflective reality is 
what I mean by authentic existence. The presence of this underlying stillness and a 
methodological approach to it has, as I see it, been systematically explored by Husserl and those 
who came after him. In this section I wish to explore the relationship between Husserl and his 
contribution to authentic existence. 
One source from which existentialism derives its name is that in in its mature form it is 
existential phenomenology. In order to understand how the search for authenticity comes about 
as a means of existential inquiry, it is important to understand how phenomenology operates. I 
consider understanding Husserl to be relevant to understanding authenticity, a claim which 
Cooper agrees with, writing that “we should not ignore existentialist echoes of Husserl’s 
conviction that philosophy is no mere intellectual exercise, but a procedure of self-discovery 
and self-liberation as well. […] the idea that the philosopher is engaged in a kind of withdrawal 
that is also a movement of freedom is an important theme in existentialism” (p. 47-48).  
Barrett similarly consider Husserl as relevant, remarking that “by insisting that the philosopher 
must cast aside preconceptions in attending to the actual concrete data of experience, Husserl 
flung wide the doors of philosophy to the rich existential content that his more radical followers 
were to quarry” (Barrett, p. 12).  
Some of this research is based on prior research of mine on Husserl’s relevance to 
existentialism, which was submitted as part of the preparatory research article to this project for 
the course Research Project in Philosophy (FIL314) supervised by Franz Knappik. In that paper 
I made use of Danish philosopher Dan Zahavi’ 2003 book Husserl's Phenomenology. I have 
expanded upon that research significantly in this paper – supplementing with various 
approaches and readings both from research papers and review articles like the Stanford 
Encyclopedia and Zahavi’s 2017 book Husserl’s Legacy.  
 
a. The early Husserl 
It is certainly the case that if Kierkegaard was the father of existential philosophy then Husserl 
was the father of phenomenology. While not the first to coin the term ‘phenomena’, and not the 
first of Brentano’s students to expand upon the thesis regarding intentionality of consciousness, 
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Husserl did throughout his life and works found the school and methodology of 
phenomenology.  
Beginning with an interest in formal logic and mathematics, Husserl’s philosophy initially 
started from a rejection of a position known as psychologism. This critique was inspired by 
what was to be Husserl’s overarching aim, the quest for certain knowledge. Psychologism 
maintained that psychology was to be the founding science upon which all other sciences, 
including logic, mathematics, philosophy and the natural sciences could be built. Cooper has 
us note that the German ‘Wissenschaft’ (Norwegian: ‘vitenskap’), unlike the English ‘science’ 
can apply to such disciplines as history and philosophy as well as the natural sciences (p. 40) 
could designate nearly all areas of human knowledge. While Husserl initially wrote favorably 
about psychologism, he was made by his own studies and contemporary critique to change his 
position. The classical story is that it was Frege’s intense critique which led him to change, but 
as Zahavi points out this is in dispute by other Husserl scholars like Mohanty (1977), Bernet, 
Kern, and Marbach (1989) (Zahavi, 2003, p. 148).  
In his first major work, Logische Untersuchungen (1900-1901), Husserl wrote passionately 
against psychologism, and called for a distinction between the ideal and the real which Husserl 
held that the empirical science of psychology overlooked when trying to ground logic and 
mathematics in human brains. Husserl’s distinction between the two is in many ways similar to 
the German philosopher Gottlob Frege’s (1848 – 1925) distinction. However, unlike the 
Fregean critique of psychologism, Husserl believed it to be necessary to follow up on this 
criticism by way of an analysis of the intentionality of consciousness, and this interest in 
subjectivity and the first-person perspective is not shared by Frege (Zahavi, 2003, p. 11).  
Zahavi notes that the initial distinction Husserl draws between the real and the ideal is so 
fundamental and urgent that in his criticism of psychologism he occasionally “approaches a 
kind of (logical) Platonism”. Husserl responded to the critique of himself as being a Platonist, 
point out that he was engaged in a defense of the validity of ideality and was not trying to argue 
for the existence of ideal objects in a separate supernatural realm. In short, he was advocating 
a logical and an ontological investigation into ideality (Zahavi, 2003, p. 148). 
Psychologism, Husserl maintained, could only be truly overcome if it was possible to present 
an alternative account of the status of logic and objectivity. In order to do so, it was necessary 
to pay direct attention to the ideal objects themselves and not merely make do with empty and 
speculative hypotheses. Husserl thus called for a return “to the things themselves”, which was 
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to be somewhat of a founding slogan for phenomenology. This involved an emphasis on direct 
experience (Zahavi, 2003, p. 11-12). Husserl’s move here sees him move dramatically away 
from any association with Platonism, as he now champions for the understanding of the direct 
appearance of noumena (the way things appear) in awareness as opposed to idealist access to 
special realms. 
For Husserl, the return to the things themselves meant that if we wanted to clarify the true status 
of ideal logical principles or real physical objects too for that matter, we had to turn toward the 
subjectivity that experiences these principles and objects. One can already begin to see the 
appearance of direct appeals to personal experience as a critique to the stalemate of problems 
presented by the technique of disinterested reason. Concerns which Kierkegaard has voiced 
years prior. I doubt Husserl himself was motivated by Kierkegaard, but his switch to direct 
experience was an essential historical turning point for existential thinking. 
Husserl explored his return to the things themselves by making use of the intentionality of 
consciousness, which simply states that consciousness is always awareness of something – what 
it is directed or intended towards – and never a thing in itself. As an aside, according to the 
Stanford encyclopedia article on Consciousness and Intentionality, there is a difference between 
phenomenological perspectives and intentionality. For example, to say you are in a state that is 
phenomenally conscious is to say that you have an experience, or a state there is something it 
is like for you to be in (Stanford, Consciousness and Intentionality, introduction). Intentionality, 
however, has to do with “the directedness, ‘aboutness’ or reference of mental states”. As an 
example of mental states, the article names that one may think of or about something. For the 
contemporary discussions into intentionality, the definitions include – and is sometimes seen 
as equivalent to – what is called “mental representation” (Stanford, Consciousness and 
Intentionality, introduction). 
Husserl, however, labeled the units of consciousness intentional acts or intentional experiences, 
since “they always represent something as something, thus exhibiting what Brentano called 
intentionality” (Stanford, Edmund Husserl, section 2). Sometimes intentionality is described as 
the nothingness of consciousness by the later Husserl (my contention). 
Regarding intentionality, Aho writes that phenomenologists agree that all experience has an 
intentional structure, that is, my experience is always about or of something; it is always 
directed toward an object (p. 29). He further remarks that this entails a rejection of the Cartesian 
view of the self as an encapsulated mental receptacle of ‘inner’ thoughts, desires and beliefs 
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that is somehow separate and distinct from ‘outer’ objects. The relation of Husserl and 
Cartesianism is complicated historically, with some commenters like Barrett casting Husserl as 
a Cartesian outright. Others, like Aho frames Husserl as a direct opponent to Descartes’ 
position. A full analysis of just the historical interpretations of Husserl could fill a book. Suffice 
it to say that Husserl is not universally considered either as a Cartesian or a non-Cartesian by 
contemporary Husserl scholars. Some have even cast Sartre as a Cartesian. So loaded is the 
term, and so open to interpretation are the meanings that it would be outright overwhelming to 
present all the camps. Suffice it to say I agree with Aho, Cooper, Zahavi and others who view 
the position of the late Husserl as opposed to Cartesian mind/body dualism. 
Regarding the mind/body split – one of the dualisms heavily critiqued and dismissed by the 
existentialists – the early Husserl similarly rejects questions as to whether there is an external 
reality on the basis that such are metaphysical questions which has no place in epistemology. 
Note that the question of an external reality was a pressing philosophical concern at the time, 
derived from the skeptical tradition. Zahavi points out that in Husserl’s early phenomenology 
he did not want to commit himself to a specific metaphysics, be it a realism or idealism. Instead, 
he wanted to address formal questions of a more Kantian flavor, particularly questions 
concerning the condition of possibility for knowledge (Zahavi, 2003, p. 8).  
The initial phenomenology developed in Logische Untersuchungen was a purely descriptive 
phenomenology of the way things presented themselves to consciousness. In other words, the 
study not of whether they were real in any ontological sense, but how they came to us in their 
own right. With this method, Husserl wanted to study in a scientific manner the ways objects 
in consciousness yielded themselves to knowledge, or yielded themselves to meaning as some 
interpreters prefer (see Cooper and Stanford, Husserl).  
Husserl’s aim was not merely to explore objects, but to seek an ontologically secure basis upon 
which to base certain knowledge and science, and this motivation was to persist through all the 
evolutions of his phenomenology (Zahavi, 2003, p. 7). Because Husserl initially wanted 
phenomenology to serve as a foundation for science, based on the indubitable certainty of 
consciousness he similarly saw phenomenology as a ‘strict science’. The aim of ontological 
security aim was in part a response to the skeptical tradition, notably from Hume and Descartes 
(Stanford, Edmund Husserl, section 1) and not a shared aim (my contention). 
Note that the certainty os consciousness is given irrespective of the ontological status of the 
objects presented in consciousness. Whether the world, or anything for that matter (to give 
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Descartes his due) is real or not, the fact remain that you are conscious of them. As such, this 
could prove a certain grounding for all further knowledge. Descartes might have been able to 
doubt the world, himself and everything else, but he could not doubt that he doubted, he could 
not doubt that existence occurred, since doubt required existence. For Husserl, whether we 
doubt the ontology of the world, or ourselves, or a higher being which confers certainty, the 
fact remain that consciousness is occurring. Even if what is presented in consciousness is 
completely and utterly ontological fabrication, the fact remains that we are conscious of it (my 
contention). In a way this has parallels to the point I made about existence precedes essence. 
Because it is the case that both consciousness and existence are predicates which presentation 
or the existence of a world depends on, the certainty of the fact of their occurrence is at least 
proven – by virtue of the fact that they occur – whether or not their contents are true (my 
contention). While this could lead us to the question of what or who these objects are presented 
to, Husserl himself did not express such concerns in his early writings.  
In response to the problems posed by skepticism, such as the existence of the external world, 
or the epistemological problem of certain knowledge generally, Husserl’s wanted 
phenomenology to serve as a firm grounding upon which to ground certain knowledge, like 
necessary logical truths and mathematical certainty. The problem of the existence of an external 
world entails that when we are aware of objects – anything from lamps, to chairs, or our own 
limbs – the question of skepticism was how can we be certain that we are aware off really 
exists? Out there, in the real world? This is what is known as the classical problem of 
skepticism regarding the external world. Unlike Descartes’ methodological doubt which sought 
to question the existence of the external world, Husserl’s methodology does not involve 
questioning beliefs in the external world, but to set it out of action. Disconnect it, as it were 
(Cooper, p. 41).  
Husserl was extremely cautious not to make any metaphysical commitments in his early 
phenomenology, either to idealism or realism. In a way this also applies to his analysis of 
consciousness. He is interested in its mechanism of action, its structure of intentionality and 
leaves aside the metaphysical claim that consciousness is contingent on human beings. Zahavi 
reflects that, for the early Husserl, “phenomenology was supposed to be neither more nor less 
than a faithful description of that which appears (be it subjective acts or worldly objects), and 
should, as a consequence, avoid metaphysical and scientific postulates or speculations” 
(Zahavi, 2003, p. 13-14). 
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While his aim of seeking a secure foundation remained the same throughout his thinking, 
Husserl eventually came to realize the insufficiency of a purely descriptive phenomenology and 
instead turned towards what he called a transcendental phenomenology in his 1913 work Ideen 
zu einer reinen Phänomenologie undphänomenologischen Philosophie (Ideen 1) (Zahavi, 2003, 
p. 42). 
 
b. The Natural Attitude 
In Ideen 1, Husserl introduced what he called the natural attitude. The “natural attitude” refers 
to the state characterized by naïve acceptance of several metaphysical assumptions, such as the 
unexamined position regarding the ontological status or nature of objects in consciousness. For 
Husserl, one of the most obvious assumption we tended to make in the natural attitude was our 
implicit belief in the existence of a mind-, experience-, and theory-independent reality. 
Regardless of how obvious and natural the assumptions might seem, Husserl insisted that it was 
philosophically unacceptable to take the validity of these beliefs for granted. As a response to 
the concern about whether those objects are fundamentally real or not, Husserl urged us not to 
dogmatically assume the validity of these beliefs.  
Instead of being asleep in our own natural attitude, Husserl wanted us to ‘bracket’, or suspend 
the naïve belief in the way we think of things. He called the suspension of the natural attitude 
Epoché, a Greek word first used by Pyrrho of Elis. This was done in order to focus the 
investigation on the ways objects present themselves to consciousness, regardless of their 
ontological status. The bracketing procedure entailed a suspension of our natural inclinations, 
to forego conclusions regarding previous beliefs regarding what was taken for granted, for 
example the world – one’s natural attitude. It was not his aim to instantly get rid of the attitude. 
Instead Husserl maintained that we should keep the attitude, so as to be able to investigate it, 
but bracket its validity. Zahavi notes that the Epoché entails a change of attitude towards reality 
and not an exclusion of reality (Zahavi, 2003, p. 45). As Husserl says, “in the Epoché, I debar 
myself from using any judgement that concerns spatio-temporal reality, but without denying or 
doubting such judgments” (Ideas, p. 98-100). 
The Epoché, then, entailed a bracketing of the question of the reality of the external world. By 
leaving aside the question of the existence of the outside world, Husserl avoided, among other 
things, Kantean concerns of Noumenon and other questions about the validity of the external 
world, by ‘bracketing’ their truth value to focus only on the things themselves as they appeared 
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in consciousness. What this allowed Husserl to do was to suspend the immediate need for a 
yes/no, either/or answer, thus he was able to develop his theories further, rather than get stuck 
on the reality of the objects, which the classical debates had been for the better part of a decade. 
Husserl noted that he himself awakened his uncertainty of grantedness regarding the given-ness 
of the objects of consciousness by an interest in the inquiry “what is?”, stating that he got his 
question about the natural attitude from the Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711 – 1776). 
To my mind, this illustrates the role and importance of a curiosity about oneself and the world 
as the beginning step towards casting off one’s previous assumptions and begin to uncover a 
personally authentic mode of being. Without a willingness to forego our own previous 
conclusions about ourselves and the world, it becomes very hard to reach the point where we 
are willing to shed our previous beliefs in favor of more authentic ones, despite the subjective 
pre-given preference of authentic states, but I digress. 
Husserl, after having bracketed or suspended the natural attitude with the Epoché, employed 
his transcendental phenomenology to examine the natural attitude – the way we, until now, saw 
the world. With the Epoché, he wanted us to realize that we could never be certain about the 
validity of the natural attitude, but we could be certain about the fact that it appeared to us – 
that we were in fact conscious of something. 
The transcendental phenomenological method focused on the essential structures that allows 
the objects naively taken for granted in the natural attitude – characteristic of both our everyday 
life and ordinary science – to constitute themselves in consciousness (Stanford, Edmund 
Husserl, section 1). From this unshackled point of view, we could then use intentional 
consciousness as a basis to examine and cast off our prejudiced assumptions about ourselves 
and the world, and begin to explore perspectives, insights and viewpoints we had previously 
been ignorant or unavailable for. Zahavi writes that the Epoché is the term for our abrupt 
suspension of a naïve metaphysical attitude and likens it to a “philosophical gate of entry”. 
While this has some interesting overlap with the existential phenomenologists and their notions 
of casting aside unconscious and unexamined self-limiting notions, what I think is often 
overlooked generally is how radical a move this is by Husserl. The fact that he was led to his 
analysis of phenomenology on the basis of logically defined distinctions between ideal and real 
concerns of objects puts some rational validity behind his investigation. Having formally and 
logically cast aside the natural attitude in a manner which allowed others to follow his thinking, 
Page 57 of 103 
 
he essentially laid the groundwork for phenomenological and existential explorations of the 
first-person perspective.  
Why is logic so interesting a foundation? Consider the fact that Husserl – a logician – demanded 
a return to living experience. As Barrett points out (p. 300-302), another logician, Austrian-
British philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889 – 1951) urged us exactly the same. While it is 
true that Wittgenstein encouraged us to find the cure for the bewitchment to words which 
philosophy had ensnared us as a means to return the pre-given, Husserl has us cast aside the 
entire natural attitude of unexamined assumptions. In this way, Husserl’s move is as Socratean 
as it is Humean. To understand ourselves and presume to know ourselves and existentially 
embrace the examined life is undeniably the essence of Socrates, while Hume urges us to 
question the tendencies we have to assume the inductive cohesion of the natural world. I 
personally think that the radical nature of Husserl’s move is often overlooked by the technical 
sophistication inherent in his works, which is regrettable.  
Husserl was not the only thinker to suggest a suspension of our dogmatic assumptions as means 
of investigation and exploration. Kierkegaard had raised similar concerns about our dogmatic 
belief in the structures of society and our willingness to believe in and bind ourselves to them. 
For Kierkegaard, the notion that our normative structures could be sufficient and 
transcendentally freeing was a sign of the great complacency of his age. Both Kierkegaard and 
Husserl echoed similar themes regarding a critical existential reexamination of our situated 
positions, Husserl with his rejection of the natural attitude and his phenomenology and 
Kierkegaard with his protest of contemporary society. Kierkegaard would probably have 
rejected the systematic building of a philosophical system like Husserl’s, as he did with Hegel. 
Although it could be argued that since Husserl’s philosophy was oriented towards the lived 
experience of the individual, Kierkegaard might have struck a different tune, but I digress.  
By constructing his phenomenological method, Husserl laid the groundwork for contemporary 
and phenomenologically educated philosophers, so that they could themselves pursue 
explorations of consciousness, and perhaps ontological investigations of an existential nature 
without Kierkegaardian passionate rejections of all manners of established life in the search for 
their subjective truth. Such a truth could now be searched for via the exploration of the 
phenomenological space. 
 
c. Husserl, Heidegger and the Existentialist critique 
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Through all stages of his thinking, Husserl remained deeply committed to the epistemological 
aim of reaching for the ideal of fully justified knowledge. He also had a guiding effect on one 
of his students and research assistants, the young Heidegger, who later echoed some of Husserl 
themes, like his concerns for a secure foundation, writing in his Being and Time that one needed 
to ascertain the “ontological presuppositions of ontic enquiry”. 
As mentioned earlier, the repudiation of one’s dogmatic assumptions and rejection of 
unexamined beliefs – what can be called waking up from one’s natural attitude – is an important 
shared concern between Husserl and all the existential thinkers, not just Heidegger. While the 
initial ambition behind Husserl’s philosophy was considered idealistic and far removed from 
the concerns of the existentialists, it is also inescapable that Husserl’s phenomenology would 
later lay the foundation for the existential phenomenology of Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty 
and others. Cooper writes that “there is general agreement that the most significant versions of 
twentieth-century existentialism are developments, welcome or perverse, from 
phenomenology” (Cooper, p. 5). But as we have seen, the existentialists like Heidegger, 
Merleau-Ponty and Sartre all had different phenomenological approaches and concerns than 
Husserl, especially the Husserl of Ideen 1. 
The connection between Husserl and Heidegger is particularity interesting, and has been the 
focus of much scholarship. Their similarities are perhaps not surprising given the close 
relationship they shared. Husserl was the mentor of Heidegger, and the two worked closely 
together. Heidegger dedicated his 1927 work Being and Time to Husserl “in friendship and 
admiration”. Their collaboration included both when Heidegger worked as Husserl’s research 
assistant, and when they co-authored an article on phenomenology for the 1927 Encyclopeadia 
Britannica.  
This article is interesting and has drawn much attention from scholars, as drafts of this article 
show their initial disagreements over the role and scope of phenomenology. Husserl, at this 
point had sought to use his investigation of phenomenology to explore the relationship between 
the “I” of the cogito – Descartes’ cogito of the cogito ergo sum – and the transcendental “I” 
which Husserl understood as unhindered consciousness. In a move followed by Sartre, Husserl 
attempted to separate the “I” of the objects in consciousness from the ‘nothingness’ of 
consciousness itself – consciousness always being what it is directed towards and never a 
“thing” in itself. 
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By the time of the Britannica article, Husserl had already moved from his initial aims of refuting 
skepticism to seeking to separate the ‘I’ from consciousness via his Epoché. Interestingly, and 
important for the exploration of authenticity in this paper, Husserl wrote in the drafts for this 
article that “if I carry out the Epoché for myself, I am not a human ego”. Heidegger wrote in 
the margin to this “why not, is not this activity a potentiality of man?” (Appignanesi, 2013, p. 
69). We see in this argument the difference which was to separate Husserlian phenomenology 
and the existentialist’s critique.  
After the Britannica article, Heidegger employed Husserl’s phenomenological method when 
he wrote his own phenomenological work Being and Time, which featured an analytic of what 
he called Dasein. As we have seen, the Heidegger of Being and Time urged the primacy of 
ontological inquiry. However, unlike Husserl, Heidegger treated ontological inquiry as one of 
the aspects available to Dasein, and not the essential nature of Dasein itself.  
In brief, the existential phenomenologists focused more on the experience of consciousness as 
already involved and caught in a pre-existing world rather than an attempt to focus on a ‘pure’ 
or transcendental consciousness. It has for this reason been said that the origins of existential 
phenomenology rests on a rejection of idealist approaches to studying consciousness, in favor 
of the lived experience of the individual. This is an accurate description, as the emphasis on the 
existing individual caught in a pre-reflective engagement with the world is one of the defining 
characteristics of existentialism. As we shall see in the next section, the relationship between 
Husserl’s method and being-in-the-world is a bit more nuanced, but it is certainly the case that 
Husserl has historically been viewed as a bygone figure to the existential phenomenologists. 
Aho notes that the existentialist’s break with Husserl has to do with how phenomena are 
encountered. As we have seen, Husserl intended his Epoché to bracket out or negate the worldly 
prejudices of the natural attitude that “tend to distort what is given in our conscious experience 
(Aho, p. 29). The existential phenomenologists rejected Husserl’s early position in Ideen 1 by 
reacting to the proposition of a presuppositionless starting point which could be arrived at by 
bracketing prejudices and give access to consciousness that is pure and undistorted. Heidegger 
would voice this critique, and, according to Mulhall, voice it by saying that “there is no neutral 
perspective from which we might begin our questioning; the idea of a presuppositionless 
starting point, even for an exercise in fundamental ontology, must be rejected as an illusion” 
(Mulhall, 2005, p. 13). 
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The reading of Husserl which the existentialists critique is to my mind quite simplistic. One of 
the things it overlooks, or presupposes, is that one merely “performs” the Epoché in a matter of 
moments and then enjoys unhindered access to a “pure” consciousness untainted by our natural 
biases. To my mind, this perspective of Husserl’s method ignores that the ability to perform the 
Epoché and disengage from the contents of consciousness is trained systematically over years 
of practice. This is something which Husserl himself did and taught others who were interested 
in how to perform the method of Epoché, both by taking walks with interested groups and 
engaging in conversations. Also, when Husserl called for a return to the “things themselves”, 
he urged a return to direct experience rather than the prefabricated conceptions we put in their 
place (Barrett, 1958, p. 213).  
 
d. The Late Husserl 
While Zahavi agrees that much of the existentialist’s thinking rests on a critique of Husserl, and 
that Husserl’s phenomenology is traditionally regarded as “foundationalist, idealist and at 
times, by some, solipsistic” (Zahavi, 2003, p. 141) he remarks that Husserl’s phenomenology 
continued to evolve past the position so heavily critiqued by his later followers. Zahavi contends 
that the traditional account of Husserl is “misleading and outdated”. The view of Husserl as a 
bygone figure, according to Zahavi, owes its endurance to the fact that his philosophical 
successors had a tendency to criticize him in order to emphasize their own merits, and that, as 
Jewish, Husserl was ignored by a whole generation of philosophers due to the recent historical 
events in German history (Zahavi, 2003, p. 144).  
Towards the later stages of his thinking, Husserl’s phenomenological method sought to wrestle 
with themes like world constituting consciousness, his notion of intersubjectivity (the existence 
of many subjectivities in the world) and what he called the lifeworld and life of world 
consciousness (Weltbewußtseinslebe) (Zahavi, 2003, p. 74). This sort of language and themes 
has the late Husserl resembling Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty far more than the initial Husserl 
which the existential phenomenologists all critiqued and responded against. 
In order to make sense of this, we must keep in mind that Husserl lived, and philosophized, for 
a substantial amount of time, giving his last major lecture series just a few years before his 
death. Regarding the evolution of his thought, Zahavi notes that Husserl – like the other 
phenomenologists – later criticized his own presentation in Ideen 1 and called it an abstraction 
to speak of a pure, worldless I-pole, writing that full subjectivity is a world-experiencing life. 
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The late Husserl would favor concepts like lifeworld and life of world-consciousness over the 
solipsistic subjectivity of his early works.  
By these terms, Husserl envisioned intersubjectively engaged transcendental viewpoints, all 
engaged and socialized with each other. Far from an idealist Hegelian system, this view entailed 
deeply engaged existential subjects, all lived in ethical responsibility of having cast aside their 
dogmatic beliefs and assumptions inherent in the natural attitude, with the phenomenological 
perspective of each and every being experienced (my interpretation). However, the similarities 
with Hegel’s system might require a bit more than a blanket dismissal, as there are merits to 
this comparison, or as Zahavi puts it, “if Husserl's final position should remind some readers of 
elements in Hegel's thought, this is probably not without reason”. However, the seeming 
similarities is merely this, a seeming one. As Husserl’s assistant Eugen Fink pointed out, 
Husserl's theory, no matter how speculative it might sound, is no speculative construction but 
a simple articulation of the fundamental insights of the phenomenological reduction (Fink, 
1933, p. 378). Husserl’s concept of subjectivity was to undergo a long evolution, but it gradually 
expanded until it surpassed or even undermined the traditional opposition between subject and 
object (Zahavi, 2003, p. 74).  
The position of Husserl towards the end of his life presented by recent Husserl scholarship is 
based on previously unpublished research manuscripts and the works he left behind, which is 
still to this day being published and translated. In light of the previously unpublished research 
notes and his unpublished works, Fink remarked that “the topic of phenomenology is neither 
the world nor a worldless subject, but the becoming of the world in the self-constitution of the 
transcendental subject” (Zahavi, 2003, p. 75). As Husserl writes in the supplementary volume 
to his Die Krisis der Europäischen Wissenschaften (1936) “it is apodictically certain that the 
‘I’ must appear in the world as a human being”.  
Husserl offers the explanation that the transcendental subject can only constitute an objective 
world if it is incarnated and socialized. The transcendental subject was, for Husserl, the 
subjective point of view on the world itself. That is to say it was ontologically different from 
any objects or constructs of consciousness, such as an empirical “I”, a personal ego or an 
isolated cogito. 
The final position of Husserl takes self and world-constitution to go hand in hand (Zahavi, 2003, 
p. 76). The constitution of the world, the unfolding of self, and the establishing of 
intersubjectivity (multiple subjectivities all inhabiting the same world) are all parts in an 
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interrelated and simultaneous process. As Husserl writes in Ideen 2 “we, and the world belong 
together […] Ultimately, the constitutive process occurs in a threefold structure, subjectivity-
intersubjectivity-world” (Zahavi, 2003, p. 76). 
This is remarkably close to Heidegger’s concept of Dasein, an interconnected and engaged 
being-with or being-there-in-the-world. This similarities is not lost upon Zahavi either, who 
illustrates the similarities between Heidegger’s description of Daseins being-in-the-world and 
Husserl’s transcendental ego by directly quoting Heidegger. As the similarities this show is 
particularly striking, and is relevant to the Husserl/Heidegger distinction which will inform the 
next section, allow me to include it. 
“The world exists – that is, it is – only if Dasein exists, only if there is Dasein. Only if world is 
there, if Dasein exists as being-in-the-world, is there understanding of being, and only if this 
understanding exists are intraworldly beings unveiled as extant and handy. World-
understanding as Dasein-understanding is self-understanding. Self and world belong together 
in the single entity, the Dasein (my emphasis). Self and world are not two beings, like subject 
and object, or like I and thou, but self and world are the basic determination of the Dasein itself 
in the unity of the structure of being-in-the-world. (Heidegger 1989, p. 422) 
Compare this with Husserl descriptions, such as “the topic of phenomenology is the becoming 
of the world in the self-constitution of the transcendental subject”, “the constitutive process 
occurs in a threefold structure, subjectivity-intersubjectivity-world” and “intersubjectivity only 
exists and develops in the mutual interrelationship between subjects that are related to the 
world; and the world must be conceived as a common and public field of experience” (Zahavi, 
2003, p. 76). 
As I mentioned in Terms and Themes, the aim of this paper is to observe emergent similarities 
between the thinkers as they relate to the uncovering of authentic existence by self-inquiry. It 
is therefore not my intention to go in-depth or champion for specific interpretations of the 
thinkers. The point which is at hand to be made is whether Husserl’s descriptions are existential, 
or at least closer to it than previously thought. But why is this important? It matters because, as 
I see it, Husserl’s description of phenomenological investigation, his method of Epoché and his 
general contention that there was merit to exhaustive examination of subjectivity until the 
subject/object dualisms were overcome is very relevant to the pursuit of authentic existence.  
While on the note of seeing emergent similarities between the thinkers, the similarities between 
Husserl and Heidegger is echoed by others than just Zahavi. Cooper notes that “whether my 
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‘primordial’ experience of others is ‘Being-with’ them in a public world, as Heidegger thinks, 
or ‘Being-for’ them as an object of their attention, as Sartre holds, this issue is less important 
than the single conclusion to which these experiences attest: that I am in-a-world in which 
others must also be present” (Cooper, p. 106). Sartre writes that “the For-itself arises in a world 
which is a world for other For-itselfs” (Sartre, 1943, p. 520).  
Given these similarities, Zahavi “It is certainly striking how many similarities there are between 
Husserl’s account of the relation between self, world, and other, and the accounts to be found 
among the later phenomenologists (Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty)” (Zahavi, 2003, p. 
77). Barrett would echo this sentiment, writing that “in his last writings Husserl’s thought turns 
slowly and haltingly in the direction of Heidegger’s themes. The great rationalist is dragged 
slowly to earth” (Barrett, 1958, p. 12).  
For me, when Husserl says that transcendental subjectivity remains hidden as long as we are 
absorbed in the pre-philosophical natural attitude, where we live in self-oblivion among objects, 
which the Epoché and the reduction is capable of revealing, I cannot help but be reminded of 
the existentialists and their rejection of the unexamined or non-self-aware life. 
 
e. Husserl’s motivations 
With the continued evolution of Husserl’s thought, we can begin to see how his ever-evolving 
method allowed for ontological and existential inquiries. Also, to my mind, his separation 
between the empirical I of the senses and of the transcendental I of consciousness via his Epoché 
gives a very suiting philosophical framework within which the attainment of authentic existence 
via existential inquiry can be framed and understood. 
However, one more thing remains to be said about Husserl, and that is, as Zahavi notes, that 
one should take note of Husserl’s motivation for pursuing his aim of certain foundations, and 
for doing philosophy generally. 
Much of Husserl’s philosophy is theoretical in nature, and is a representation of the culmination 
of philosophically relevant themes of his time. Husserl’s works reflects much from the historical 
themes and concerns of modern philosophy (from Descartes onward), including the classic 
debates of the relationship between minds and the external world, the debate between 
Rationalism and Empiricism, the relation between subjectivity and selfhood and so on. Despite 
this, Husserl’s motivations were never theoretical in nature, but rather practical. Even more 
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precisely, according to Zahavi, Husserl’s motive for doing philosophy was an ethical one, “the 
ethical striving for a life lived in absolute self-responsibility” (Zahavi, 2003, p. 67, referencing 
Husserl’s First Philosophy lectures, 1923-24, first English translation 2019, p. 197). 
Throughout his life, Husserl pursued an “evidence-based, self-responsible life that the 
phenomenological search for a transcendental foundation makes possible” (Zahavi, 2003, p. 
68). For Husserl, living in the phenomenological attitude was not a “neutral impersonal 
occupation, but a praxis of decisive personal and existential significance” (Zahavi, 2017, p. 22 
– 24, referencing Husserl’s The Crisis of European Sciences, 1936, first English translation 
1970, p.140).  
In other words, for Husserl, the aim of philosophy is intimately linked to an ethical life, a life 
based on certain truths, so as to live in accordance with the truest insights attainable. It was the 
responsibility of the ethical participant to make deep commitments to having ontologically 
secure bases upon which to ground his actions. Thus, the search for absolute evidence was 
based on the demand for absolute self-responsibility. Husserl’s driving force, one might say, 
was the aim of an active, participating, curious and alive pursuit of verified truths in order to 
live an ethical life (Zahavi, 2003, p. 68). Husserl uses the term “presuppositionlessness” to 
describe the phenomenological and ethical state, a term which saw his phenomenology come 
under attack as idealistic. 
However, one must keep in mind that for Husserl this represents an infinite ideal – a realized 
life in critical self-responsibility – rather than as a given starting point (Zahavi, 2017, p. 24, 
referencing Erste Philosophie, p. 196, p. 244, Ideen 1, p. 139 and Cartesianische Meditationen, 
p. 53). 
Zahavi notes that this demand for absolute self-responsibility becomes of existential 
significance when what is addressed is our subjective experience, our very being, with the aim 
of actively and healthily engaging in a lifeworld with other transcendental subjects (Zahavi, 
2017, p 23). I find it useful to use the term “subjective viewpoints on reality” to describe 
transcendental subjects. What is important to note is that this term designate consciousness as 
such, a phenomenological viewpoint as it were, and not the objects in consciousness, like the 
ego or objects of the world. 
The ethical and existential significance of his aims are something Husserl links to the Socratic 
ideal. In Husserl’s 1923-24 lecture series “First Philosophy” (Erste Philosophie 1) Husserl 
explicitly refers to this Socratic-Platonic idea of philosophy: 
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“Socrates’ ethical reform of life is characterized by his construal of the truly satisfying 
life as a life based on pure reason. Such a life is one in which human beings, through 
unremitting self-reflection and a radical giving of account, exercise critique – ultimate 
evaluating critique – on their life-goals, and then, of course, mediated through these, 
on their life-paths, on their means of achieving these goals. Such giving of account and 
critique are carried out as cognitive processes, and moreover, according to Socrates, 
as a methodical return to the original source (my emphasis) of all legitimacy and our 
knowledge of it. Expressed in our terms, this occurs by recourse to perfect clarity, 
“insight,” “evidence.”” (Husserl, 1923-24, first English translation 2019, p 9). 
Interestingly, Husserl references his motivation by looking back at the Greeks, in this case 
Socrates. Heidegger would similarly look back to Athens for his research, and it is possibly a 
result of Husserl’s influence. By looking back to the Greeks, Husserl puts emphasis on the 
critical potential of reflection. According to Zahavi, by doing this Husserl is already indicating 
that his methodological use of reflection has other uses than “just compiling introspective 
reports” (Zahavi, 2017, p. 23).  
Husserl would also, in Krisis, critique the sciences – the Wissenschafts – for losing sight of the 
metaphysical frameworks within which they operate. Husserl notes that questions like 'What is 
truth?,' 'What is knowledge?,' 'What is reality?,' 'What is a good and meaningful life?,' and the 
like have all been categorically neglected by the Wissenschafts as a result of this neglect. Thus, 
not only was the sciences – the Wissenschafts – in need of an ontological and epistemological 
clarification, they had also lost their existential relevance. This is why Husserl accuses them of 
having gone bankrupt ethically as well as philosophically (Zahavi, 2003, p. 126).  
With such concerns in place, and the contribution of the method of phenomenology as it relates 
to what I call existential self-inquiry thoroughly explored, we can now turn to how Husserl’s 
method can be used for the aim of achieving personal authenticity. 
 
 
8. Phenomenology and Existential Ontology 
Phenomenology reflects the existentialist project in certain aspects. As we saw from the 
preceding section, Husserl’s method – in all its manifestations – maintained that any theoretical 
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demonstrations or proofs about the nature of reality are derived from and made possible by 
what is originally given in lived experience (Aho, p. 28-29). While this is true, it is also true 
that the critique of Husserl which motivated the existentialist response was a reappropriation of 
phenomenology, not as the study of objects as they appeared, but the study of ontology – of 
existence – of being-in-the-world as a pre-reflectively engaged human being, and not as an 
disconnected Cartesian mind or cogito inspecting sensations from a foreign and potentially 
unconnected mental realm. Merleau-Ponty especially would categorically deny subject/object 
dualism in his approach, even to the point of coming close to leaving out the first-person 
perspective altogether (my critique). Likewise, it is the case that the initial phenomenology of 
Husserl was rejected, expanded upon – or used – for other concerns by the existentialists.  To 
see how the reapproprication of phenomenology played out, let us turn to Heidegger. 
 
a. Dasein, ontological inquiry and inauthenticity 
Heidegger had a view about human beings which was very different from traditional accounts 
of humans as a disembodied subjectivity. For Heidegger, as we saw in his 1927 Encyclopeadia 
Britannica article disagreement with Husserl, performing what he called “ontic inquiry” was 
one of the modes of being which was available to the beings which we were, which he called 
Dasein. This was in contrast with Husserl’s observation that if I can perform the Epoché on my 
‘self’, then ipso facto he was not the self or human ego but whatever was aware off it. Heidegger 
was not uninspired by this however, and his point regarding existential self-inquiry in the form 
of ontic investigations into being was central to his description of Dasein. To see this, consider 
these remarks from the early pages of Being and Time: “In so far as Being constitutes what is 
asked about, and “Being” means the Being of entities, then entities themselves turn out to be 
what is interrogated” (Heidegger, 1927, p. 26). Or this quote; 
“Thus to work out the question of Being adequately, we must make an entity- the inquirer 
– transparent in his own Being. The very asking of this question is an entity’s mode of 
Being; and as such it gets its essential character from what is inquired about – namely, 
Being. This entity, which each of us is himself and which includes inquiring as one of 
the possibilities of its Being, we shall denote by the term “Dasein”. (Heidegger, 1927, 
p. 27). 
Interestingly, Heidegger specifically remarks in his description of Dasein that it is an entity 
which “each of us is himself” which had, or included, “inquiring as one of the possibilities of 
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its Being”. Since these investigators are beings – i.e. they exists, they are – they themselves are 
what is investigated, they are then both what is investigated and the investigators. Additionally, 
Heidegger remarks that “the question of Being is nothing other than the radicalization of an 
essential tendency-of-Being which belongs to Dasein itself – the pre-ontological understanding 
of Being” (Heidegger, 1927, p. 32). 
While Heidegger’s Dasein is a very well researched term, and interpretations are multivaried 
and subject of ongoing research and disputes, as far as this paper is concerned, the relevant 
focus is that Dasein designates existing beings which have investigation into beings as an 
option. Translated rather crudely, what I take this to mean is that since humans can ask questions 
such as “who am I?”, the asking of such questions is a way of being available to them. In other 
words, humans could not have performed existential examinations of both themselves, or Being 
generally, if doing so was not an existent option for them.  
To illustrate this, picture the following. We can easily imagine a reality of fully conscious 
humans, beings exactly like us in every conceivable regard except one – these beings could not 
analyze their own being, could not perform self-inquiry. Heidegger’s point is simple, but, to my 
mind, profound. We have the option of questioning existence – curiously turning the 
intentionality of consciousness back unto itself and asking where it is coming from. If we did 
not have this option – existentially permitted by the way reality operates – then we could not 
do it. In fact could we even have conceived of it? Could these humans who were like us, but 
unable to pose ontological self-investigative questions of existential significance have realized 
what they were missing?  
This is reflected by Heidegger, when he notes that the categories bequeathed by the 
philosophical tradition for understanding a being who can question his or her being are 
insufficient (Stanford, Existentialism, point 1). 
Consider similarly Heidegger’s remark that “the question of Being is nothing other than the 
radicalization of an essential tendency-of-Being which belongs to Dasein itself – the pre-
ontological understanding of Being”. I think this illustrates the point that the investigation into 
Being is not just an option for us, but points to a pre-given inherent ability or ‘tendency’ which 
we already have. Heidegger even called it an essential tendency, the pre-ontological 
understanding of Being. As I see it, this remarks why existentialists have referred to authentic 
existence as authentic existence, because it is in unison with a pre-given existence or nature, 
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which enables the possibility of inauthentic existence, such as living in self-estrangement from 
this pre-reflective being. 
In a way, this is similar to a point Kierkegaard was attempting to make clear to members of his 
society – that they already were. In addition to already existing, they already had, and knew of, 
despair as a backdrop to their life. This posed a lot of questions for Kierkegaard, which he 
attempted on numerous accounts and in many ways to answer. First of is why they were in 
despair. Why was not their existence unmarred by feelings of inauthenticity? Does not the 
presence of feelings of inauthenticity necessary entail an authentic mode from which they were 
estranged? Secondly, Kierkegaard remarked how people were able to self-deceive themselves. 
Why would they need stabilizing societal structures or to escape from contingencies if they 
were at heart content with life in all the ways it could be lived? How were they able to live so 
effectively in self-denial as to not see this? Thirdly, for Kierkegaard, how could the implications 
of this not be of the utmost importance to them every day? If boredom, a theme which he 
explored significantly in Either/Or, did not function as a convincing hint to the unsatisfactory 
nature of their mundane pursuits, that they were actually forsaking something else to which 
boredom indicated, something more pressing, urgent and pre-given to us, then what ever could? 
According to Robert Ferguson, in his book Life lessons from Kierkegaard, he notes that “with 
increasing severity during the course of Either/Or, [Kierkegaard] warns us that boredom is the 
most sinister and destructive of all enemies, driving us to fill our days with activity as we try to 
make life seem meaningful and important” (Ferguson, p. 14).  
Aho’s earlier remark, that “as beings who are self-conscious, our existence is always penetrated 
by feelings of uncertainty and doubt; we experience anguish in the face of our own death, in 
the radical contingency of our choices, and the sheer arbitrariness that anything, including 
ourselves, exists at all” is similarly to the point. 
 
b. Mind and Body 
We have already touched upon the critique of the view of man as a disembodied thinking 
substance, and this critique is one which Heidegger both explores and expands on. For 
Heidegger, our ordinary human life moves within a preconceptual understanding of Being, and 
it is this everyday understanding of Being in which we live, move and have our Being that 
Heidegger wants to get at as a philosopher (Barrett, p. 213). Cooper similarly remarks that the 
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“human being is, in Heidegger’s phrase, Being-in-the-world. This entails that 
phenomenological understanding must be ‘existential’, not ‘pure’” (Cooper, p. 6). 
An important point to note is that by turning phenomenology toward the question of what it 
means to be, Heidegger insisted that the question was to be raised concretely. In other words it 
is not primarily some academic exercise, but a burning concern arising from life itself – the 
question of what it means for me to be. According to the Stanford encyclopedia, “existential 
themes take on salience when one sees that the general question of the meaning of being 
involves first becoming clear about one's own being as an inquirer” (Stanford, Existentialism, 
section 1).  
For me, this highlights how Existential phenomenology is the description of a method for 
existential inquiry into the nature of our being, and that what this sort of understanding strives 
for is a reexamination of what our being means for us, and a thus a search for who, or what, we 
are. I have referred throughout to this kind of inquiry as self-inquiry, which involves 
examination of one’s being. Cooper notes that “existential freedom was understood in terms of 
a capacity to distance oneself from, and perhaps ‘refuse’ any of the beliefs and values which 
shape one’s directives” (Cooper, p. 177).  
A shared point of departure from Cartesian traditions is that this distancing of ourselves from 
objects of awareness which shape our beliefs about the world involves a removal of the dualistic 
perspective of ourselves as disconnected I’s, located either in an external mind-enclosed realm, 
or located somewhere in the body.  
When I say that we distance ourselves from objects of our awareness, it may sound a little to 
Husserlian, and some might even find Cartesian undertones in it. This is not my intent. The 
point is rather that, as the existentialists all go to great lengths to explore, we are self-alienated 
from the world and ourselves, and this alienation is imposed by the limits of our beliefs about 
ourselves and the way the world “has to be”.  
As Merleau-Ponty and others have stressed, we are situated pre-reflective bodies in the world. 
However I would contend that we, of course, have access to subjectivity – to a 
phenomenological perspective as it were. That is to say we have an awareness of the world in 
consciousness. Similarly, the limiting beliefs we hold are also capable of being analyzed and 
investigated through this awareness, either as vague feelings or as linguistic narrative structures 
like “I’m not the kind of person that can do this or that” etc. 
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So far this seems unremarkable, almost a commonsensical view, one that should not pose too 
many problems for either the existentialists, the phenomenologists, or the view of regular 
ordinary humans. The notion that we have internal access to sensations, a subjective perspective 
as it were, should not in and of itself entail that we are a Cartesian disconnected cogito, or 
inhabitants of Platonic realms removed from a factually existing world. As beings in bodies, 
involved with a world, reading and walking and talking and opening doors pretty much pre-
reflectively, we are also presented – or encumbered – with thoughts. 
This duality – this split – between “mind” and body has been the subject of a great many debates 
in philosophy. What the existentialist point out, building on Husserl’s notion as phenomena as 
primary, is that world, mind, body or whatever else, is ultimately presented to an existential 
predicate, an intentional correlate, or awareness if you will. Existence does precedes essence 
for the existentialists, and since “nothing is sacred” in the view of this, neither thoughts (or 
mind if one prefers), the external world, or my own bodily sensations are existentially prior to 
existence itself – they are all able to be by the fact of existence occurring.  
In other words we have bodies, we are conscious of an external world with other people in it, 
and we also have access to mental images, mental chatter and thoughts – thoughts like 
judgements, preconceptions, prejudices and imagined scenarios about remembered past events 
or imagined future ones. To see that this is so, consider that the opposite of this statement entails 
the refusal of having a body, being conscious, having mental events like memories or 
imagination and existing at all. I remember a personal insight I had once from reading Hume, 
thinking that “existence occurs… but anything beyond that is pretty much speculation”.  
The point to be made is that the debate between whether or not we are minds aware of bodies 
or bodies aware of minds is, to my mind, not the correct question. This is in fact yet another a 
dualistic picture of things, and the existentialists were adamant that what they all were after was 
the destruction of dualisms in favor of an authentic or “not-dual” (my interpretation) existential 
state. In essence, their view can be summed up as saying “the body is how I am, a relational 
way of being-in-the-world that dissolves the subject/object opposition altogether” (Aho, p. 31). 
To my mind, this account leaves out that existential phenomenology is still phenomenology, a 
study of the first-person perspective. For instance, both Sartre and Heidegger used 
phenomenology for ontological concerns, and as such they write from a viewpoint of the first-
person perspective. The (in my mind mistaken) view which Aho and Cooper sometimes present 
is that by simply describing the human being as a being-in-the-world, to treat it as sufficient to 
simply refer to the body as pre-given and pre-engaged, and seemingly forget or omit the 
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existence of subjectivity. This has its obvious errors. For one, it ignores the phenomenological 
point of view, and on the other it attempts to solve a dualistic problem by ignoring it. 
It is an historically accurate description of the existentialist critique on ‘disembodied reason’ or 
the Cartesian cogito as an inherently different substance from bodies, I do not think that a 
blanket dismissal of one of these views in favor of the other is sufficient either. That is to say, 
neither of these caricatured extremes offers the whole picture of the human situation (my view). 
Rather, I wish to propose that it is the case that human beings oscillate between these two ways 
of being and understanding themselves.  
At times we are caught ‘in our head’ and at times we engage with the world in a certain kind of 
flow with our tasks and environment. Neither of these are mutually exclusive of the other, and 
both are part of the way we experience our life. That is not to say that both are equally preferable 
however.  
While we are ‘stuck in our heads’ as it were, encumbered by thoughts and pressed with the 
marker of alienation of inauthenticity, the question for that existing being does not become one 
of theoretical analysis of mind/body dualism, but rather becomes how to overcome the 
alienation which results from this perception. This, as Cooper remarked, has been the approach 
and ambition which has informed and motivated the entire existentialist enterprise. 
To adopt either one of these views as conclusive and exclusive view of the human being does 
not permit the existing human being any reconnection with one’s own truth, or a means to 
overcome alienation. If the person considers himself as a disembodied mind, he will find it 
disconcerting to realize all the times he is pre-reflectively engaged with the world, and if he 
considers himself exclusively as a being-in-the-world he will find himself confused and guilty 
whenever he is encumbered by the presence of thoughts in his subjective awareness. 
This is an important point for my thesis. The way I see it, the human being is currently caught 
in a duality imposed by problematic thoughts. That is to say, the presence of a pre-reflective 
consciousness and a body in pre-reflective engagement in the world are not the problem which 
confronts us as alienation. The duality which causes our alienation from our authentic mode of 
existence is rather posed by problematic thoughts presented to pre-reflective awareness. As we 
saw in the section on problematic thoughts, we have a tendency to identify with the narrative 
chatter in our minds, and believe negatively loaded storylines about ourselves. This to my mind 
is what is inauthentic. Subjectivity, the first person perspective or the fact that consciousness 
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exists is not the problem, reason is not the problem, and the body is not the problem – the 
problem is the ‘I’, the alienated self, the tendency to treat our thoughts as ‘what we are’.  
While the picture of the human being in a ‘fluid engagement’ with the world is, to my mind, 
certainly closer to “what it is like” to be in an authentic existential state as opposed to one 
encumbered by personal narratives, it is not sufficient to simply describe this state and convince 
oneself of its validity. After all, as Kierkegaard noted, what use is a system in which I myself 
cannot inhabit? If we are conflicted by problematic thoughts to the point where we are restrained 
from productively functioning or being in the world to the best of our abilities, then it is not 
hard to imagine why the alienated state has received descriptions such as inauthentic. 
Underlying such descriptions is the vague, but very human intuition that it is not actually 
supposed to be this way. 
It is to my mind a significant misunderstanding to treat authentic existence as a perspective one 
adopts once, via the cool disconnected approach of reason and is done with, as opposed to an 
existential Socratic life-ideal of persistent self-inquiry into knowing oneself. 
 
c. Cartesian Concerns 
In support of this perspective, consider that Husserl and the existential phenomenologists were 
concerned with the overcoming of dualisms generally. If this seems strange, and the picture of 
Husserl as a Platonic Cartesian only interested in a disembodied mind observing an external 
world still seems prominent, consider Husserl’s opening move in establishing his 
phenomenology, made in his critique against psychologism. By focusing on the phenomena or 
way things appeared to us in consciousness exclusively, as a response to the stalemate between 
idealism and rationalism, Husserl’s opening aim of his method was the removal (which was 
done simply by ‘bracketing’) of dualistic concerns. Also keep in mind that Husserl also wanted 
us to keep the bracketed perspective, so as to analyze it, rather than just push it away into some 
dark recess to be left there as a hidden ‘exception to the rule’. 
The interest did not lay with disproving or proving the notion of a Cartesian subject caught in 
an ontologically unprovable world. This was bracketed – put aside – so as to focus on the things 
themselves. That Husserl’s phenomenological Epoché would later lead him to disabuse himself 
of the notion of an empirical ego altogether serves to illustrate the persistence of his 
investigation. Cooper writes that the two egos described by Husserl – the empirical and the 
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transcendental – differ in their most fundamental respects. The empirical ego is a natural object, 
related to other objects through causal connections, whereas the transcendental ego is pure 
intentionality (Cooper, p. 50). To my mind is it unfortunate wording by Husserl to maintain the 
term ‘ego’ in both descriptions as it suggests a sort of ‘higher order’ ‘I-construct’ not confined 
to the body. Regardless, since Husserl’s descriptions of intersubjective involvement by 
transcendental viewpoints (or egos) in a interconnected lifeworld rules out all forms of monism 
and solipsism, this wording is only unfortunate, not indicative or suggestive of a transcendental 
or metaphysical cogito (my contention). 
The important ambition Husserl showed was the persistent investigation and dismissal of 
anything subject to his Epoché; be it his natural attitude, his internal sensations, the empiricial 
ego or his own latent tendencies, nothing would go outside the phenomenological Epoché. To 
envision this as a world-independent, mind-oriented Cartesian perspective is, to my mind, to 
totally miss the point. As I see it, Husserl sought the deconstruction of the empirical ego for 
much the same reason he did everything else, the radical existential commitment to a life lived 
in full self-responsibility with the most correct picture possible. 
If the notion that Husserl sought after the deconstruction of the empirical ego in consciousness 
as a means of living an ethically engaged life – or a transcendentally unobscured one – might 
similarly seem contradictory to popular notions about Husserl, let us reexamine it by 
considering Husserl’s notion of lifeworld. Zahavi remarks that “Husserl's analysis of the 
lifeworld can be regarded as a new introduction to, or way toward, the transcendental-
phenomenological reduction, a way that radically questions a number of Cartesian motives in 
Husserl's thinking and that understands the relation between subjectivity and world in a very 
different manner than Ideen 1” (Zahavi, 2003, p. 125). 
I consider the picture of Husserl as a Cartesian, or as a fundamental idealist opposed to 
existential concerns as mistaken. To see this, keep in mind the similarities between Husserl’s 
notion of the natural attitude and the existentialist’s rejection of the unexamined life. When 
Husserl says that “transcendental subjectivity remains hidden as long as we are absorbed in the 
pre-philosophical natural attitude, where we live in self-oblivion among objects, which the 
Epoché and the reduction is capable of revealing”, I think it clear that we can see parallels to 
the existentialist’s rejection of the unexamined life spent in Bad Faith. 
In the introduction I mentioned the Socratic aim of living an examined life as a means of living 
the good life. With this in mind, I think that it was Husserl’s persistent inquiry into the ontology 
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of the empirical ego (the “I” as presented to consciousness) which led his later philosophy to 
be both transcendental and existential (my contention). As I see it, Husserl’s constant 
examination of the structures of consciousness through his phenomenological method and 
reduction was motivated by his unceasing effort at establishing an ethically motivated secure 
foundation upon which to understand oneself.  
Husserl noted that one does not only “do philosophy during the office hours”. For him it was a 
praxis which followed into his daily life, his philosophy then informed his approach to life, and 
his life informed his philosophy. Far from being motivated by a Cartesian methodological doubt 
– or fear of somehow being confined to a solipsistic void – Husserl’s persistent engagement 
with a world shows him as an active, if not relentless, investigator of an interconnected 
lifeworld. If anyone can be said to live the Socratic command to a fault, it would be Husserl.  
We may even ask ourselves whether this kind of life, a life spent in constant self-investigation 
and questioning is really a good life. We might have a certain ethical or moral incentive to 
analyze ourselves so as to be better persons and more just actors in the world. But is not 
Husserl’s engagement a bit much? Would it not better to simply “kick back and relax”, as it 
were? Husserl’s aim might even – with a certain sense of irony – be called idealistic. Do we not 
have the spouse, the children, the work, the societal implications, and recently, the obsessive 
social media concern with how everyone else is living their lives to first attend to? 
There is much to be said in response, and there might even be a point to be made for Aristotelean 
temperance among the virtues of assiduous and lazy. Who knows what Husserl’s response 
would have been, then and now? It should be noted that, for the phenomenologist dealing with 
the things themselves as primary, or the existentialists dealing with existence preceding essence, 
the search of self-understanding could be argued to be that in lieu of which we are able to have 
things like a spouse, a career, and a happy family. After all, do not these things require a certain 
amount of skill, both to achieve and then maintain? As I see it, the pursuit of self-investigation 
– self-inquiry – is not inherently work as we traditionally think of it, as in “yet another thing to 
deal with”. Rather, it represents a way of knowing ourselves, to partake in the soul’s search for 
meaning, to put it poetically. Such pursuits need not be taken only on vacation, or when alone 
in nature for example. It can be brought into every aspect of one’s life.  
 
d. Intentionality, Reflexivity and Pre-reflective Self-Consciousness 
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Regarding waking up from our unexamined lives, which I have taken to gather under the label 
of waking up from the natural attitude, we have seen how Sartre warned against living in Bad 
Faith, Heidegger about falling asleep to ‘the they’ and Kierkegaard about the Angst involved 
with the silent conformism to society. As we have touched upon, I suggest that both the 
existentialists and Husserl were pointing towards the same phenomena, that of waking up from 
the natural attitude.  
Whether viewed as a strictly theoretical state regarding the objects in consciousness or a state 
of living alienated unexamined lives, all the thinkers are adamant that a reexamination of them 
in order to live more existentially authentic lives are both possible, in order or important. Part 
of what this waking up entailed was discarding what we are not, what was not truly our own, 
such as the beliefs and unexamined assumptions about our lives. 
One way to bring about such awakenings is by coming to terms with a consequence following 
from the intentionality of consciousness, which Husserl explored. A brief note on intentionality, 
since most of the subsequent argumentation rests on it. The word ‘intentionality’ is a 
philosopher’s word (Stanford, Intentionality, introduction). The word has two particular areas 
of usages, one is in philosophy of mind and language, in which we can wonder how mental 
objects like sentences or images can be about something that does not exist in the world, for 
example, and the other is in relation to consciousness and phenomenology. As such, there are 
two entries in the Stanford encyclopedia relating to the problems of both uses. The latter use is 
the one which we shall be concerned with.  
According to the article, to say you are in a state that is (phenomenally) conscious is to say – 
on a certain understanding of these terms – that you have an experience, or a state there 
is something it is like for you to be in. “Feeling pain or dizziness, appearances of color or shape, 
and episodic thought are some widely accepted examples”. Intentionality, on the other hand, 
has to do with the directedness, aboutness, or reference of mental states—the fact that, for 
example, you think of or about something. Intentionality includes, and is sometimes seen as 
equivalent to, what is called “mental representation” (Stanford, Consciousness and 
Intentionality, introduction). 
In order to avoid spinning into an in-depth analysis of intentionality, it suffices to note that, for 
Husserl, for a mental state to be conscious was for it to be an experience (Erlebnis), a part of 
some “stream of consciousness”. Experiences in this stream of consciousness sense include, for 
Husserl, “perceptions, imaginative and pictorial representations, acts of conceptual thinking, 
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surmises and doubts, joys and griefs, hopes and fears, wishes and acts of will” (Stanford, 
Consciousness and Intentionality, section 3). 
What we are concerned with is the phenomenological interpretation of consciousness, and its 
related nature of intentionality. In particular, we are concerned with Husserl’s approach. First, 
consider Husserl’s introduction of what he called “pre-predicative” experience in Experience 
and Judgement (1939). With this term, Husserl holds that the sort of judgments we express in 
ordinary and scientific language are founded on the intentionality of pre-predicative experience, 
and that it is crucial to clarify the way in which such experience underlies judgment (Stanford, 
Consciousness and Intentionality, section 3).  
To help make sense of this, consider the following from the entry on self-consciousness: “If 
first-person thought is not grounded in [an awareness of] the self as an object, then some other 
account is arguably required to account for the capacity to entertain self-conscious thought 
(O’Brien 1995a). One suggestion is that subjects possess a form of “pre-reflective self-
awareness” as a necessary condition of consciousness (Sartre 1937, 1943: Introduction; Zahavi 
2005, 2007; Legrand 2006; cf. Kriegel 2009) (Stanford, Self-consciousness, section 3.2).  
If this sounds strange, keep in mind that the term “conscious” is not esoteric. But, as we’ve 
seen, its use is not readily characterized in a manner that provides some coherent, impartial 
framework for disciplined investigation. This is part of why theorizing about consciousness is 
so hard (Stanford, Consciousness and Intentionality, section 2). 
The ability of intentionality to be turned towards itself is called reflexivity. Reflexivity is 
essentially the relation of consciousness (in the sense of intentional directedness) and self-
consciousness. According to the Stanford article, Reflexivity entails three things.  
First, that necessarily, whenever there is a conscious state, there is, in some sense, some 
consciousness of it.  
Second, it is only occasionally and only in reflection that a conscious state is 
simultaneously an intentional object for the one whose state it is.  
Third, it entails that one’s conscious states ordinarily include a non-reflective 
consciousness of oneself, not as intentional object, but “as subject” (Stanford, Consciousness 
and Intentionality, section 3). In contemporary philosophy, the third sense is called pre-
reflective self-consciousness. 
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Regarding pre-reflective self-consciousness, one definition is that it is an implicit and first-
order awareness rather than an explicit or higher-order form of self-consciousness. “Indeed, an 
explicit reflective self-consciousness is possible only because there is a pre-reflective self-
awareness that is an on-going and more primary kind of self-consciousness” (Stanford, 
Phenomenological Approaches to Self-Consciousness, section 1). Although phenomenologists 
do not always agree on questions about method or whether there is an ego or self, according to 
the article they are in close to unanimous agreement about the idea that the experiential 
dimension always involves an implicit pre-reflective self-awareness. 
Pre-reflective self-consciousness is to my mind a very interesting term. According to the 
Stanford encyclopedia entry it is called pre-reflective because it is an awareness we have before 
we do any reflecting on our experience, in other words it is a consistent backdrop to our lives, 
whether we are actively thinking, reflecting, introspecting or not. On my view, this means that 
as long as you exist, pre-reflective self-consciousness is the inescapable baseline of your 
existence (my interpretation). 
The existence of pre-reflective self-consciousness is why examination of subjectivity and the 
first-person perspective is so important to reclaiming Authentic Existence. As the article notes, 
“along with Husserl, who maintained that consciousness always involves a self-appearance 
(Für-sich-selbst-erscheinens) and with Maurice Merleau-Ponty who states that consciousness 
is always given to itself and that the word ‘consciousness’ has no meaning independently of 
this self-givenness (Merleau-Ponty 1945, 488), Jean-Paul Sartre writes that pre-reflective self-
consciousness is not simply a quality added to the experience, an accessory; rather, it constitutes 
the very mode of being of the experience”: 
“This self-consciousness we ought to consider not as a new consciousness, but as the 
only mode of existence which is possible for a consciousness of something (Sartre 1943, 
p. 20)” 
“In short, unless a mental process is pre-reflectively self-conscious there will be nothing it is 
like to undergo the process, and it therefore cannot be a phenomenally conscious process 
(Zahavi 1999, 2005, 2014). An implication of this is obviously that the self-consciousness in 
question is so fundamental and basic that it can be ascribed to all creatures that are 
phenomenally conscious, including various non-human animals” (Stanford, Phenomenological 
Approaches to Self-Consciousness, section 1). 
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As I see it, an inquiry into the ontology of the ego or ‘I’ reveals it as dependent upon, and 
separable from, this pre-reflective self-consciousness, which serves as a kind of existential 
‘baseline’ upon which other kinds of being can be. I maintain that adherence to self-inquiry 
enables one to discard the ego in consciousness (what Husserl called the empirical ego) while 
still existing. This is because, contrary to Cartesian notions, what is ontologically foundational 
is the ego, ‘I’ or cogito, but pre-reflective self-consciousness (my contention).  
What pre-reflective self-consciousness is, is not transitive in relation to the state (of) which it 
is aware. To help see this, and how Sartre’s expansion or adaptation of Husserl’s works 
explored this, let us turn to his 1936 essay La Transcendance de L’Ego (first English translation 
1960 The Transcendence of the Ego) where Sartre notes that “problems concerning the relations 
of the “I” to consciousness are existential problems” (Sartre, 1936, p. 35). 
Note that, while Sartre’s position in this work is largely critical of Husserl’s notion about a 
transcendental I, it is not the aim of this paper to critically compare the two positions. What is 
important to note is that both these two thinkers engaged with the ontology of the empirical I 
and its relationship to pre-reflective self-consciousness (emergent similarities being the 
recurring theme). Also, since Sartre’s conception of Husserl in this notion could not be based 
on Husserl’s final position due to the censorship of Husserl by the Nazi’s, to treat the Husserl 
Sartre opposes as a position to analyze is at best one of historical scholarship of an outdated 
position.  
Sartre opens his essay by making a very clear statement, saying that “for most philosophers, the 
ego is an ‘inhabitant’ of consciousness […] We should like to show here that the ego is neither 
formally nor materially in consciousness: it is outside, in the world. It is a being of the world, 
like the ego of another” (Sartre, 1936-37, p. 1). In the essay, Sartre, like Husserl in his works, 
investigates the relationship between the ‘I’ and consciousness, and the constitution of the ego. 
While Husserl, at least in Ideen II and certainly in Cartesian Meditations believed the ‘I’ to be 
transcendental, i.e. world-constituting (and as we have seen Husserl moved away from this 
position towards the end of his career in favor of the intersubjectivity of the lifeworld), Sartre 
argues in Transcendence that what does the constituting is not a transcendental I, but rather a 
field. Sartre remarks that a feature of this field is that “the transcendental field becomes 
impersonal, or, if you like, ‘pre-personal,’ without an ‘I’ (Sartre, 1936, p. 36).  
Are we then to understand that for Sartre, pre-reflective self-consciousness is prior to selfhood, 
the ‘I’ or the cogito? To answer these questions, Sartre writes that “pre-reflective self-
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consciousness is the mode of existence of consciousness itself” (Sartre, 1936, p. 29), and that 
“a pure consciousness is an absolute quite simply because it is consciousness of itself. It remains 
therefore a ‘phenomenon’ in the very special sense in which ‘to be’ and ‘to appear’ are one. It 
is all lightness, all translucence” (Sartre, 1936, p. 42). 
Similarly, is this pre-existent field or absolute for Sartre related to the I Think of Descartes in a 
way that supports thinking as primary or which treats it as secondary to existence? Sartre 
answers this by writing that “the ‘I Think’ can accompany our representations because it appears 
on a foundation of unity which it did not help to create; rather, this prior unity makes the I Think 
possible” (Sartre, 1936, p. 36).  
In his conclusion, Sartre clarifies his position, saying 
“The conception of the ego which we propose sees to us to effect the liberation of the 
Transcendental Field, and at the same its purification. The Transcendental Field, 
purified of all ego-logical structure, recovers its primary transparency. In a sense, it is 
a nothing, since all physical, psycho-physical, and psychic objects, all truths, all values 
are outside it; since my ‘me’ has itself ceased to be a part of it. But this nothing is all 
since it is consciousness of all these objects (Sartre, 1936, p. 93).  
I agree with Sartre’s position against the positions which holds the I or the ‘I Think’ of Descartes 
as primary. I also think that by ‘Authentic Existence’ is meant this pre-reflective self-conscious 
unity which makes things like ‘I’, the empirical ego, thinking and inauthenticity possible and 
able to be experienced. Similarly, I maintain that we experience the separation from this 
underlying unity as inauthentic because it is a truer or ‘more genuine’ existential state to be in. 
As I see it, it follows that this split or duality-inspired separation separates us from this pre-
existent authentic unity. Also, I consider the signature feature of this division is experienced as 
alienation. While these claims and my position rests on certain observations by Sartre, they are 
not equal to his positions, either in Transcendence or his later Being and Nothingness. Rather, 
I think this view is representative of a general underlying agreement between the existentialists 
that there is a pre-given mode of being, the attainment of and abidance in leads to feelings of 
authenticity and a separation of leads to feelings of alienation. 
To quote Sartre again, “it is the non-reflective consciousness which renders the reflection [and 
any higher-order representation of it] possible” (1943, first English translation 1956, p. 20). 
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While Husserl’s position is similar enough that it suits the emerging picture of authentic states 
as pre-given to consciousness, it is not completely similar to Sartre’s. The Stanford article notes 
that “Husserl, earlier, in the first edition of Logical Investigations, affirmed a similar view. 
However, he did not claim, as Sartre sometimes seems to, that pre-reflective experience is “non-
egological” in the sense of being no one’s, or literally selfless, only that, phenomenologically, 
there are no grounds for regarding an ego as some unifying “center” of intentional relations (my 
emphasis) (Stanford, Phenomenological Approaches to Self-Consciousness, section 3). 
A similarity is also found in Heidegger, who, historically, linked such basic reflexivity (self-
disclosure) to the notion of an inescapable, everyday “inauthentic” or conventional self-
understanding, to be contrasted with an authentic form that can emerge from this in a kind of 
(“Angst”-triggered) crisis of meaningfulness (Stanford, Consciousness and Intentionality, 
section 3). While not identical to Husserl or Sartre’s views, it is nonetheless of the general 
agreement that an examination of reflexivity relates to inauthentic and authentic concerns 
regarding selfhood. 
When it comes to the removal of the empirical ego or the self-inquiry into authentic existence, 
keep in mind that the use of reflexivity and intentionality as a means to orient towards pre-
reflective self-consciousness is done over time, rather than instantly given as a 
‘presuppositionless starting point’. As I see it, one of the primary critiques of Husserl rests on 
considering the Epoché as an on/off switch regarding consciousness which we can instantly flip 
and so enjoy the fruits of what usually takes decades of introspective training to accomplish. 
Consider that most attentional training programs in fields like psychology is structured to 
function over at least 8-weeks in order to have clinical significance. The task of training 
awareness operates on a principle of training, much like the metaphor of training physical 
strength. To my mind the view that the Epoché represented an instant availability of 
transcendental ‘unobstructed’ awareness seems to be a very misleading critique. 
 
e. The Consequence of the Reflexivity of Intentionality 
Having indicated the role of pre-reflective self-consciousness in relation to Authenticity. There 
still remains to expand upon a consequence entailed by the reflexivity of intentionality. In all 
credit to Husserl, none of these explorations of either first-person perspective intentionality, 
examinations of selfhood, or reflexivity which he and his existential phenomenologists 
explored could have been done without his research. However, while previously I have 
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presented my own views largely by reflecting on the views of others, I here would like to present 
some of my thoughts regarding how to go about using phenomenology to use self-inquiry as a 
means to deconstruct the ego. Thus, what follows in this section is my own research, which 
builds on what we have explored thus far. 
Note that while this is the original research for this paper, some is built on previous research of 
mine on the trainability of introspection. The research on introspective trainability was 
submitted in the course Bachelor Essay in Philosophy (FIL251), supervised by Gunnar Karlsen. 
In that paper I wrote about the epistemic role and nature of introspection in response to Eric 
Schwitzgebel’s 2011 book Perplexities of Consciousness, where he brought attention to the 
implications posed by the fallibility of untrained, or “naïve” introspection. One of the central 
claims I presented in that paper was that introspection could be trained – that is, increased in 
reliability – and that this training could be proven by the subjectively experienced increase in 
introspective competence. This involved greater clarity, resolution, range, scope and access to 
mental phenomena which were presented to consciousness. While this paper does not deal with 
Schwitzgebel’s claims, the relation between increasing awareness of objects in consciousness 
as it relates to existential phenomenological inquiries are relevant to this paper.  
I think that the ambition of investigating and discarding the false, mistaken and limiting self-
beliefs with which we normally live with and within is important to uncovering authentic 
existence, and I consider it to be found in both Husserl and the existentialists. While Husserl’s 
approach was to investigate his first-person perspective with his Epoché, the existentialists not 
inspired by Husserl like Kierkegaard tended to speak about an existential choice with social 
consequences. Since intentionality of consciousness (and the nothingness of consciousness) 
means that consciousness is always awareness of something – what it is directed or intended 
towards – and never a thing in itself, the implications for reflexivity in relation to self-
consciousness remains open for exploration.to be explored. 
Since consciousness is, on the intentionality model, always awareness of something, it would 
follow logically that what is experiencing cannot be the object it experiences. Note that this is 
my contention and, as far as I am aware, not an explored part of any phenomenologists. By 
“what is experiencing” I wish to bring attention to a question which is rarely posed, even by the 
existential phenomenologists, and even more rarely answered. After all, what is it that observes? 
I ask this in the most general sense possible – I do not have an answer. The posing of this 
question is in a certain sense a form of Socratic dialogue. One answer might be that we take the 
view which Sartre proposed, that what it is that has the power to observe is a field, an underlying 
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unitary field which is removed of all objects, an absolute of sorts in which all reveals itself. But 
notice that descriptions like these come in the form of words. Not to paraphrase Wittgenstein, 
but notice that none of these words are, in themselves, what is actually observing. Words can 
designate entities in the world which are ‘real’ (like the coffee cup), and things which are ‘not 
real’ (like Centaurs). However, this is not a problem of language per se, rather, the question 
“what has the power to observe?” is an existential question which, like the process of death, is 
inescapably subjective to deal with. It is your own in a way that no one could ever resolve for 
you. In other words, if there is an actual answer to this question, it can only come to you in the 
form of an experience, as a subjective truth if you will, attained by the existing individual. For 
this reason, I shall not attempt to answer it better than Sartre already has. 
Questions like these are self-inquiries: they have the existential-ontological character of 
Dasein’s pre-existing mode of being as ontic inquiry. Other questions include “who am I?” or 
“where am I?”. 
When I say that what is experiencing cannot be the object it experiences, this is used to mean, 
in other words, that one cannot be both the experiencer of an object and the object experienced. 
Simply put, one cannot be what one can be aware of. This follows from introspection, for 
example. If I can be aware of a mental internal image introspectively, then I am aware of this 
image – it is presented to something which is different from this mental image. I call this 
principle that you cannot be what you can be aware of the principle of attentional 
disqualification, but it can also be thought of as the consequence of the reflexivity of 
intentionality. 
To illustrate this, take the following example. If I can be aware of something, take my cup of 
coffee for example, I cannot be the coffee cup – it is “out there, in the world” so to speak. If I 
were the coffee cup, then cessation of the cup would mean the cessation of me, a hypothesis 
which any quick test involving a throw and a wall would invalidate. The problem becomes more 
complicated and certainly hits “closer to home” when one considers one’s own physical body 
in this manner. For example, I can be aware of my right hand. By employing the same logic, it 
follows that this too, cannot be me. For instance, if I somehow lost my right hand, I would never 
make the claim that I had stopped existing, lost my first-person point of view or lost my me-
ness.  
Plenty of right handed amputees can live to tell the tale, and while they may certainly be reduced 
in functionality, their existence remains. Whatever existence is, it apparently does not reside in 
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the right hand, any more than it resides in the cup of coffee. Then, according to the implications 
of reflexivity of intentionality, we are necessarily aware of the objects in our first person 
perspective, but we never are the objects shown in our first person perspective. Again, this is 
my contention. 
As a further example, you are now reading this text. It would be very strange if you believed 
yourself to be this text, with letters and words printed on paper. This is to say, you are aware of 
the paper and the text and its meanings in your awareness, they have not suddenly become you 
in virtue of being presented to you. Husserl actually does make some remarks in support of this 
thinking. For instance, his aim was to describe our experiences as it is given from the first-
person perspective, and it is no part of my experience of the first person perspective of my right 
hand that something is occurring in my brain (Zahavi, p. 13, in reference to Husserl’s Ideen 2, 
p. 215-216). In other words, when I look at my right hand, I am only aware of the right hand, 
not the apparatuses which enable sensory data, like vision, the physical eyes or the visual cortex. 
Regarding this distinction, Zahavi writes that for Husserl, an objectively oriented 
phenomenology has as its main theme intentionality, and any proper investigation of 
intentionality must include an investigation of the intentional correlate. (Zahavi, 2017, p. 23 – 
24). On my view, I do not consider the intentional correlate as a reference to a ‘thing itself’ 
behind the noumena, as it were. Husserl’s bracketing had categorically ruled out such 
speculations, his concerns lay with what was available for exploration in consciousness. Husserl 
similarly referred to the nothingness of the intentionality of consciousness, stating clearly that 
consciousness was nothing but awareness-of. As such, for Husserl, the first-person 
phenomenological perspective was the only persistent and non-reducible or un-separate-able 
criterion of what we are (my contention). 
To help illustrate this, keep in mind the second definition of reflexivity from the Stanford article 
on Consciousness and Intentionality: 
“Second, it is only occasionally and only in reflection that a conscious state is 
simultaneously an intentional object for the one whose state it is” (Stanford, Consciousness and 
Intentionality, section 3). 
Reflexivity, on the second definition, entails that the intentionality of consciousness can be 
turned back by means of reflection (or introspection) (my contention). A conscious state can 
then be an intentional object on reflection, and, as the article states, this only happens 
occasionally. If the existentialists critique is to be translated to these terms, then we can say that 
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the awareness of ourselves as alive, as beings which are able to turn the intentionality of 
consciousness reflectively back unto itself so as to investigate our ontology, happens all too 
occasionally. 
It is my contention that a means of uncovering authentic existence is by the reflexivity of the 
intentionality of consciousness. Similarly, in all likelihood, one or more interpretations about 
pre-reflective self-consciousness overlaps with this. To help see this, consider the following 
passages:  
“If (as some phenomenologists’ views suggest) a pre-predicative, pre-reflective, 
practical understanding undetachable from the world is part of what makes us what we are, we 
may need to recognize the undetachability of our intentional consciousness” (Stanford, 
Consciousness and Intentionality, section 7). 
“[…] we need to see – against this background – what kind of distinctive self-
understanding reflective self-consciousness makes possible, if this is also part of what we are. 
We need to ask how much this sort of self-consciousness can do to detach us from social roles 
and practices, and what room this allows for authenticity, autonomy and self-constitution” 
(Stanford, Consciousness and Intentionality, section 7), 
In light of both the contemporary and historical notions about the role of first-person reflection 
and pre-reflective self-consciousness, I consider reflexivity of intentionality to be equivocal to 
what I call ‘self-inquiry’. While it is my own view that pre-reflective self-consciousness is 
related to authentic existence, there are philosophers and Heidegger commentators who lean 
towards this view. Consider for example the remark by Hubert Dreyfus that “any reflective 
awareness of our perceptions and actions always presupposes a non-reflective, non-self-
referential way of being-in-the-world” (Dreyfus, 1991, p. 54-59). 
As I see it, the ontological consequences of the reflexivity of intentionality is that the principle 
of attentional disqualification (that you cannot be what you can be aware of) holds true not only 
for external observation, but internal ones as well. In other words, I maintain that the same 
logical principle – that one cannot be what one is aware off – holds true for all objects in 
consciousness. Consider again the right-handed amputees. These are people who have lost their 
hand, but still exist. In other words, the ratio between existence and the physical body is not 
1:1. You can lose part of your body, like your spleen, an arm, a leg, your blood, certain parts of 
your brain or a hefty chunk of your liver, and still exist. As a consequence of our ability to 
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perform introspection, it is my contention that this same principle holds for internal events as 
well. 
As I see it, this is how Husserl, by carrying out the Epoché on himself came to disregard the 
ontological value of the empirical ego – the sense of ‘I’ which were subject to perception. Here, 
to my mind, we see the defining difference between Husserl and Descartes. While it is the case 
that Husserl investigated the first-person perspective, I think that his motivation was not one of 
skepticism or methodological doubt. This in fact was the very tradition he sought to undermine. 
I think that Husserl only carried out this ambition (the persistent investigation of the first-person 
perspective) because it already was a problem, an area of concern, a feature of investigation for 
him, and as such it merited analysis. Husserl did not set out to make a problem, but spent 
considerable time investigating a pre-existent one. 
Where Descartes sought to glorify the cogito as a primary ontological principle, hoping to 
ascertain some certainty from his doubts, Husserl’s method sought to systematically 
deconstruct the cogito. Zahavi reflects this view in his conclusion of Husserl, saying that 
“Husserl did not advocate a classical Cartesian-Kantian subject-philosophy, and that he was not 
a solipsist, but, on the contrary, treated intersubjectivity as a transcendental philosophical notion 
of utmost importance” (Zahavi, p. 140). 
In closing, I would like to remark that the reflexivity of intentionality, when brought to bear on 
the internal features which make up the sense of selfhood, and when discarded by attentional 
disqualification reveals the ontology of the ‘I’ – of the sense of selfhood as a being in the brain 
– as false. These notions suggest that there is a certain amount of relevance and merit to an old 
philosophical critique, that of there being no permanent, underlying, persistent self. 
 
 
9. No Self 
In this section we will very briefly present some of the more salient critiques of selfhood 
historically. As I believe that the preceding section said what needed to be said about the 
phenomenological investigation about selfhood as a means to uncover authentic existence, I 
should like to briefly supplement this with references to other thinkers who has endorsed similar 
conclusions. 
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a. Examples of theories of non-selfhood 
As we saw in the Terms and Themes section, selfhood has seen engagement by many 
philosophers. Nietzsche for example, viewed selves as a kind of convenient fiction. Similarly, 
philosophers like Hume, and contemporary figures like the late Derek Parfit and Daniel Dennett 
all shared critiques on the view that there was a fixed self. The French phenomenologist 
philosopher Paul Ricoeur explicitly explored a narrative theory of selfhood, and refers to the 
engagement with selfhood as “Philosophies of the cogito”.  
Regarding selfhood, existentialist philosopher Martin Buber (1878 – 1965) makes a salient 
observation, noting that “it belongs in the nature of experience to minimize the contribution 
made by the one who is experiencing to the constitution of the object experienced”. This 
encouraged people to ‘split’ experience, wrongly, into two independent factors: a ‘ghostly I’ 
and a ‘ready-made world’ (Buber, 1923, first English translation 1937, I and Thou, p. 21, p. 
26). As we have seen, this ‘ghostly I’ can, to my mind, be traced back to Descartes. What 
phenomenologists like Sartre and Ricoeur has attempted to argue, in line with Buber’s claim, 
is that phenomenological inspection of the I reveals only its constituent parts (narratives for 
Riceur) and no permanent, ontologically stable foundation or ‘sticking post’ for the narratives 
which constitute selfhood (my contention). 
Selfhood is currently a topic of debate in contemporary discussions, in fields such as philosophy 
of mind. Some contemporary philosophers of mind, like Daniel Dennett (1942 – present) has a 
deflationary theory of the self. For Dennett, selves are not physically detectable, they rather 
operate as a kind of psychologically convenient fiction. I have read through Dennett’s 1992 
book Consciousness explained where he introduced a term called heterophenomenology. 
Without going in depth, Dennett’s approach to the existence of selfhood has been one which 
has been informed by natural science fields like neuroscience, psychology and artificial 
intelligence. What I could gather from the book was that human beings operate in the world by 
a reference to stories about that world and their place in it. In a sense they create a kind of “life 
story” about a character which they identify with and puts as primary. They feature the stories 
of their lives as this character of ‘I’ and that this convenient yet fictional character is what is 
meant by ‘self’ (Dennett, 1992). According to Dennett, the self was fictitious, and were to be 
thought of like an arbitrary point of gravity of a hoop is a point in thin air.  
While Dennett’s view is not uncontroversial, it has a certain following and some basis in 
established science. As far as contemporary approaches goes, it is a relatively well-researched 
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one.  The viewpoint of the Self as a centerless collection of narratives is not new, some versions 
can be traced back to David Hume. As Hume writes in his treatise, when we look for the self 
"we are never intimately conscious of anything but a particular perception; man is a bundle or 
collection of different perceptions which succeed one another with an inconceivable rapidity 
and are in perpetual flux and movement" (Hume. A Treatise of Human Nature. I, IV, vi).  
Nietzsche similarly, considered the coherent structure of the self to be illusionary, saying “I am 
convinced of [ich halte] the phenomenalism of the inner world also; everything that reaches 
our consciousness is utterly and completely adjusted, simplified, schematized, interpreted, the 
actual process of inner ‘perception,’ the relation of causes between thoughts, feelings, desires, 
between subject and object, is absolutely concealed from us, and may be purely imaginary” 
(quoted in Ricoeur, 1990, p. 16 (introduction)). 
There are interesting similarities to Dennett’s account of selfhood and the accounts of Hume 
and Nietzsche. Equally interesting is the theory of phenomenologist philosopher Paul Ricoeur, 
who also developed a theory of selfhood related to narratives. They all refer to the constituent 
parts of the sense of selfhood without conceding the existence of a sense in itself. While Dennett 
writes much as a contrary or reactionary figure, and Hume wrote from the recesses of history, 
the topic of the existence of something so close to us is bound to be controversial. Interestingly, 
Ricoeur expresses a fascination for a kind of self-inquiry question in relation to selfhood, and 
comes up with a narrative theory of selfhood. As I see it, this is suggestive of a common unison 
in the theory of selfhood as constituted by narratives, which can be unraveled by self-
investigations. 
Regarding the engagement with selfhood, Ricoeur writes in his 1996 paper The Crisis of the 
Cogito that, “If Descartes's Cogito can be held as the opening of the era of modern subjectivity, 
it is to the extent that the I is taken for the first time in the position of foundation, i.e., as the 
ultimate condition for the possibility of all philosophical discourse” (Ricoeur, 1996, p. i).  
Ricoeur addresses the impact of language in the formation or layout of selves in his 1990 book 
Oneself as Another, writing “In introducing the problematic of the self by the question “who?”, 
we have in the same stroke opened the way for the genuine polysemy inherent in this question 
itself: Who is speaking or what? Who does What? About whom and about what does one 
construct a narrative?” (Ricoeur, 1990, p. 19).  
Regarding Ricoeur’s theory, the Stanford article on him notes that “Narrative identity has to do 
not just with the identity of the characters in a story or history, but with the larger claim that 
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personal identity in every case can be considered in terms of a narrative identity: what story 
does a person tell about his or her life, or what story do others tell about it? In effect, narrative 
identity is one of the ways in which we answer the question “who?” Who is this? Who said 
that? Did that? Who is that? Who are we?” (Stanford, Paul Ricoeur, introduction). 
 
b. Authentic existence and no self 
We have seen throughout the paper how references to a state free from duality and alienation 
are definitions of authentic existence. We have also seen references to pre-reflective self-
consciousness as an underlying unitary basis. My position regarding selfhood is that I consider 
it as inherently inauthentic and the source of dualistic alienation. I agree with philosophers like 
Hume, Nietzsche, Ricoeur and others and consider the self, in the form of a narrative structure 
held together by ‘sticky’ narratives to be inauthentic and ontologically false. 
When I say that there is no self, I encounter the near impossible task of correct terminological 
use. Selfhood is understood in so many ways by different traditions within philosophy that even 
mentioning all the different positions is itself a difficult undertaking. For contemporary 
analytical philosophy, the problem of selfhood might be referring to the problem of personal 
identity, in the sense of the criterion that ensues sameness over time.  
For some phenomenologists, like Sartre, ‘self’ might either refer to the ego which we see in 
consciousness, or for Husserl it might mean the transcendental ego which forms the basis for 
experience. For the sciences, like psychology, it might have a different meaning altogether. For 
the purposes of this paper, the terms ‘self’, ‘ego’, and ‘I’, are all used interchangeably to denote 
the fictitious core at the heart of our maladaptive operating system. What these terms designate 
is a supposed, though never actually shown or experienced ‘self’ residing somewhere in 
consciousness or the body.  
What I mean to say is that in there is no solid, fundamental, singular “I” residing somewhere 
in the body. There is no little homunculus in the middle of the brain directing things. The “I” 
which we take ourselves to be, is a narrative construct which we have mistakenly identified 
with. This false sense of selfhood comes from narrative linguistic structures, which are 
perceivable. That is to say, one can become aware of the narrative thought loops which 
constitute the sense of separated selfhood, but can never be aware of the ‘sticking post’ for all 
these narratives, a core unit say, because it does not exist. Most narrative structures are self-
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referential, that is, they point to a self which is posed, but never shown. One can be aware of 
the building blocks of the ego in consciousness, but never the ego itself, because it is fictitious. 
In other words, intentionality can be brought to bear on the mental constructs which constitute 
the illusion of selfhood, but never on the criterion for selfhood itself. It’s just dark. In this sense, 
the ‘I’ is a linguistic-ontological illusion, whose manifestation in the form of problematic 
thoughts inform our sense of alienation and separation from ourselves, each other and the world. 
What I mean to say is that there is a mental construct called “I”, which lies at the root of 
narratives which all posit its existence, like “I want coffee”. However, what authentic being 
entails and what existential inquiry reveals is that this I, although supposed, is not really there. 
It is fictional. It owes its endurance to the fact that the basis of its ontology is never inquired 
into. Inquiry into these structures, of the sort the existentialist have been writing about, take the 
form of self-inquiry questions like “who am I”, “where is this ‘I’? or “who hears?”. By a 
persistent adherence to such existential inquiries throughout one’s life, it is my contention that 
alienation can be overcome and the sense of self deconstructed. 
What I think is there once the maladaptive I construct and its manifestations has been removed 
by self-inquiry is what Sartre called a unitary absoluteness, or what Kierkegaard writes about 
as the sweet and complete stillness of world, which holds, sustains and underlies everything. 
As the existentialists refer to with their conceptions of being-in-the-world and pre-reflective 
engagement of the body, from this sweet stillness, activity and action emerges – spontaneously, 
effortlessly – and without the ego narrating this dancerless dance, there is just a return home to 
authenticity. 
Like Hume, and as a result of attentional training and existential inquiries, it becomes clear that, 
when I introspect, the only thing I am aware off are the stories that circulates around and around 
‘in my head’ as it were. I am never actually conscious of a ‘self’, only its constituents parts as 
they are presented to an intentional reflective pre-reflective self-awareness. What constitute the 
‘I’ is a sort of linguistic, narrative-generating machinery. After all, when you go looking for 
this supposed Self, what do you find, but stories? The capital-S Self is a complex collection of 
narratives assembling themselves around themselves. Certain aspects of this view is found in 
phenomenologists like Ricoeur, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, but it is a view I consider to follow 
from the analysis of intentionality pioneered by Husserl (my contention). 
Regarding the structure of the self as a production of narratives, let us turn to a metaphor. Picture 
a collection of fish swimming together in the same direction (called schooling). An example 
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would be a spherical shape. Every member swims around an arbitrary (randomly chosen) point 
of empty water, forming a large sphere shape. Since they tend to stack in height as well as 
length, they take the form of a sphere and not a circle. The point at which they circulate is just 
an empty point of water, but from the outside it might seem that they all rotate around some 
given core. This behavior helps safeguard the survival of the group. In the same fashion, picture 
a large gathering of interconnected linguistic formations (narrations, or stories) all pointing to 
a fictional point referred to simply as “I”. You can imagine something like narratives circulating 
in and out of observation always pointing back to the other narratives, but no one narrative 
points to a fixed “substance” that would constitute a self. Such narrative formations are always 
pointing to, and thus begging the existence of, a core of selfhood that is never itself subject to 
observation. In my view, this makes these narrative formations self-referential, without ever 
being self-generating. 
In this sense, what I term authentic existence is Popperian, that is, what is true and permanent 
cannot be stated (as in X is true). What is authentic and not subject to the principle of attentional 
disqualification can only falsify. If the ontology of the I was real, then inspecting its constituent 
narrative parts would not be of any ontological consequence, as it would just yield itself to 
presentation in full and remain. However the problem of introspective processes is that upon 
investigation into the origin and ontology of these narratives, they tend to go away and not come 
back. As I see it, ff something is ontologically true, or authentic, it would not disappear upon 
inspection. This is a very simple process, but impactful consequence of the disqualifying 
criterion of awareness.  
By investigating the ‘I’, one is not subjected to agonizing suffering or horrible despair, but finds 
surprisingly a very sweet stillness, and that the body ‘does itself’ perfectly well. What the pre-
reflective engagement of the body as being-in-the-world shows is that, contrary to rationalist 
tendencies, it is not the case that you have to compulsively think to beat your heart, or process 
the liver, or grow the bones. It is all done without the “I”. I do not mean, of course, that the 
body would do itself without the brain – keep in mind the Either/Or principle I mentioned in 
the start of the text. The “I” is a kind of narrative fiction operating in virtue of the amazing 
capacity which is the human neocortex; it is not the other way around. Loss of a self-referential 
narrative formation does not instantly kill the body, as we can be without thoughts in modes of 
sleep, hypnosis, meditation or walks in nature without suddenly dropping dead. 
Besides the insights yielded by direct personal first-person phenomenological experience 
behind a no-self view, it would also, to my mind, be challenging to pose the opposite view, that 
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of a core of permanent underlying selfhood. While commonsense, I think it would be 
complicated to defend if presented in its own merit. That is to say, a core of selfhood is, in my 
view, a problematic position to defend in itself, with or without my concerns addressed. Where 
would it be, for example? The self has no set location within the brain. The pineal gland does 
have many interesting neurological functions, but serve as the home for a self, living inside the 
brain is not one of them. To appeal to a smaller being living in the head is popular in fiction, 
the 1997 film ‘Men in Black’ feature such an example, and is appealing to the “I”, as it gives it 
a spatial location to imbue, but does not solve the problem. To posit such a notion as a smaller 
human living in our head is to postpone the question. After all, what lives inside that beings 
head, ad infinitum. 
One might ask why pose the question to begin with, does not the very posing of the question 
imply the lack of the criterion in a question-begging manner? To my mind the answer, and the 
reason to perform self-inquiry in general relates back to the problem of alienation. If there was 
no problem, then indeed this would seem a strange pursuit to endorse. However, when viewed 
from the perspective of the problem posed by problematic thoughts and the subsequent mental 
and societal impacts, I believe alienation has come to the forefront of our concurrent problems, 
not only as a poetic, vague ‘literary expression of an age’ but as an actual species concerning 
problem. In closing this paper, I wish to present recent emergent research on the brain as it 
relates to problematic thoughts and what I consider to be the problem posed by alienation.  
 
 
10. Two Networks and two modes of Being 
As mentioned, in this section I present some emergent research on contemporary studies on the 
brain. First, however, we touch upon the role of science in regard to philosophy.  
 
a. Brief remarks regarding Science and Philosophy 
It is my wish to suggest that the authentic and inauthentic modes of beings may have some 
physical correlation with some emerging findings in the field of cognitive neuroscience. 
I am acutely aware that, by employing recent findings in the natural sciences to explain 
authenticity I am – intentionally or not – faced with questions regarding the relationship 
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between philosophy and science. By making reference to very recent scientific findings in a 
paper about an established and traditioned philosophical term, I am making all kinds of 
unexamined assumptions. The question regarding philosophy’s relationship to the world as 
presented by the natural sciences is a profound and very complicated question. A whole vein of 
contemporary philosophy – philosophy of science – is dedicated to this and other related 
discussions. I could very well end up in lengthy – and conceivably productive – discussions 
relating philosophy and science, but it would take us too far away from the aims of this paper. 
Ultimately, since the claim I hope to make is that authenticity is urgently relevant to the 
challenges facing us today, I have decided in favor of presenting these findings as relevant to 
authenticity. They do not prove my position, but they are certainly interesting to consider. As 
someone who began their academic career in psychology and subsequently cognitive science 
(not the same as cognitive neuroscience) perhaps I was always going to lean favorably towards 
science as valid to philosophy, but I digress.  
Merleau-Ponty, for example, drew extensively on empirical science and neurological case 
studies in developing his own account of perception and embodied agency (Aho, p. 43). Going 
back to Aristotle, who certainly had a passionate interest in the workings of the natural world, 
for the pursuer of wisdom as a means to living the good life, seeking insight from the 
observations about nature seems defendable.  
 
b. The Task Positive Network and the Default Mode Network 
As mentioned, I do not wish to indicate that thinking is categorically or inherently flawed or 
wrong. The critique of reason has had some engagement in existential philosophy, which met 
with its fair share of rebuttal, so I wish to be particularly clear about this. The use of planning, 
reasoning, problem solving and so on is vital, while the negative rumination into narrative 
storylines about a ‘self’ and is not. As it stands, separations between these two ways of using 
reason – of thinking, as it were – has a baseline in recent scientific findings. 
As we saw in the beginning of this paper, a research experiment by Wilson et al. presented the 
findings that the research participants by and large found the activity of spending 15 minutes 
alone with their thoughts as uncomfortable. What Wilson et al. wrote about this, in addition to 
what has already been written in this paper, is that the neural activity (i.e. brain states) during 
the inward-directed thought which the participants were engaged in is called default-mode 
processing, and this neural activity has “been the focus of a great deal of attention in recent 
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years”. Wilson et al. stated that “the default mode network is a network which consists of 
several disconnected brain areas; this suggests that the “I” is spread all over the brain, rather 
than having one specific location” (Wilson et al. p. 76). 
The research on brain networks and functions began by the early 2000’s and has since seen a 
rapid growth. Starting with interest in 2001 by the research papers A default mode of brain 
function by Marcus Raichle et al., and Medial prefrontal cortex and self-referential mental 
activity: Relation to a default mode of brain function by Debra Gusnard et al. both published in 
the journal Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, a more recent 2010 paper by 
Andrews-Hanna et al. Functional-anatomic fractionation of the brain's default network 
published in Neuron has been a landmark paper which has led to a growing interest amongst 
scientific study.  
According to the emergent research, the brain has two very distinct networks both responsible 
for two different modes of operating. While the research is still in its infancy, much interesting 
research has surfaced in the 2010’s. Supposedly, there is a separate network for tasking and 
problem solving, referred to as the task positive/task control network and a network responsible 
for selfhood and ruminating self-related chatter, which was initially called the task negative 
network, now known as the Default Mode Network (DMN) or simply Default Network (DN).  
Historically, before the research in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s, it used to be thought that 
when we were not involved in tasking or work, the brain just shut off and did nothing. However, 
with the new emergent research this picture has been replaced with the view that when the brain 
is not engaged in tasking, it switches to a separate network responsible for a default mode of 
being (i.e. the default state when not otherwise occupied) which has several functions related 
to agency, selfhood and self-related rumination. For this reason, it has sometimes also 
colloquially been called the ‘selfing’ network. As I could gather, today there is general 
agreement that when not engaged in specific tasks, the default mode network is active and 
engages in self-referential narratives, which are mostly problematic.  
Interestingly, studies on popular awareness training techniques, indicate that medium to long 
term practitioners seem better able to remain engaged in the task positive network, also called 
the task control network, throughout the day. This suggestion was presented in a 2007 paper 
Attending to the present: mindfulness meditation reveals distinct neural modes of self-reference 
by Norman Farb et al. published in the journal Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience. 
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The research was conducted by using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) on 
participants either trained in mindfulness or not. 
In the study by Farb et al., the fMRI scans were used to “examine monitoring of enduring traits 
(narrative focus) or momentary experience (experiential focus) in both novice participants and 
those having attended an 8-week course in mindfulness meditation”. The paper describes the 
training as “a program that trains individuals to develop focused attention on the present” (Farb 
et al. 2007, p. 313-322). The conclusion presented in the paper is that “the results presented 
suggest a fundamental neural dissociation between two distinct forms of self-awareness that are 
habitually integrated but can be dissociated through attentional training: the self across time 
and in the present moment” (Farb et al. 2007, p. 313-322). 
These findings are echoed by a 2011 Yale study by Judson Brewer et al. published in the journal 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, which noted that people who meditated were 
able to decrease mind wandering (Brewer, et al. 2011). In this study, a lacking ability to regulate 
the default mode network was linked with a number of mental health issues such as autism, 
attention deficit disorder, anxiety and depression. Brewer noted that “the hallmarks of many 
forms of mental illness is a preoccupation with one’s own thoughts, a condition meditation 
seems to affect".  
While, Brewer et al. only demonstrated a correlation and not causation between these two 
regions and mediation, a 2013 study by Xiaotong Wen et al. from the University of Florida, 
Top-Down Regulation of Default Mode Activity in Spatial Visual Attention, published in the 
Journal of Neuroscience successfully demonstrated the causation. By examining the fMRI 
scans of subjects performing visual tasks which required concentration and tasks which did not, 
they were able to mark biostatistical data when observing how successful subjects were in 
performing the tasks and the correlation with what regions were activated.  
The Wen et al. paper explored the relation between the task control network (TCN) and the 
default mode network (DMN), stating them as two fundamental cortical systems, and echoing 
the relation of DMN activity to autism (Wen et al. 2013). The study also showed that when the 
DMN is not sufficiently suppressed, it distracts and interferes with the TCN by sending it 
signals, causing performance to drop. The Wen et al. researchers states that “we have shown 
that when the task control network (TCN) suppresses the default mode network (DMN) the 
person can do the task better and faster. The better the default mode network (DMN) is shut 
down, the better a person performs” (Wen et al., 2013). 
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c. The Default Mode Network and Mental Health 
The relation between default mode activity and mental health are echoed by a more recent meta-
review/overview paper The default network and self-generated thought: component processes, 
dynamic control, and clinical relevance by Andrews-Hanna et al. published in the journal 
Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences (p. 29-52) in 2014. In the 2014 review paper, the 
researchers explored the regulatory functions behind the activations of the different networks. 
Explicitly, they analyzed how the brain switches between the task positive network/task control 
network and the default mode network/default network and ways in which the brain could 
maintain the DMN de-activated for long periods. Regarding mental health and self-related 
chatter, Andrews-Hanna et al. states that “processing negative information increases the 
frequency of negative and retrospective thoughts, and task-unrelated thoughts can also lead to 
subsequent unhappiness" (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014, p. 32). The meta/review paper indicated 
that thinking about the self offsets the information value of self-referential, episodic, memory.  
Regarding the recent boom in research on these networks, the abstract of the 2014 review paper 
reads “Though only a decade has elapsed since the default network (DN) was first defined as a 
large-scale brain system, recent years have brought great insight into the network’s adaptive 
functions. A growing theme highlights the DN as playing a key role in internally directed or 
self-generated thought” (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014, abstract). 
As the review suggests, there seems to be clinically significant links to mental health treatment. 
The review paper concluded by discussing “clinical implications of disruptions to the integrity 
of the network, and considered disorders when thought content becomes polarized or network 
interactions become disrupted or imbalanced” (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014, abstract). In short, 
it seems that self-generated thoughts may cause mental health disorders and neurodegenerative 
diseases. Take, for example, this quote from the conclusion: 
“Many disorders including ADHD, schizophrenia, depression, rumination, and OCD 
have difficulty regulating the occurrence of self-generated thoughts. These impairments 
often manifest as increased distractibility or elevated levels of mindwandering, as well 
as hyperactivity of the DN and weaker anticorrelations with networks involved in 
external attention. By contrast, individuals with improved executive control are able to 
limit their self-generated thought to nondemanding or unimportant contexts. […] 
Depressed individuals, particularly those who ruminate, have “sticky thoughts” and 
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problems updating the contents of working memory and switching tasks, such that prior 
goal states exert a stronger influence on on-going mental processes than normal” 
(Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014, abstract). 
While these and other reports seem to form a rapidly developing picture on the relation between 
the brain and mental states, it is important to keep in mind that the research is still being 
conducted. In other words, the link between cognitive networks and subjective chatter is (to my 
mind) telling, relevant, but not conclusive. However, I think it realistic to conclude that they 
could account for subjective reports of well-being and increased productivity when not “caught 
in thinking” or when engaged in the world. As we have already seen, this has already been 
suggested by Heidegger, Sartre and others. 
There is a fundamental difference between productive use of reason and compulsive chatter. It 
is my position that currently, we are experiencing a problematic relationship with the latter, our 
compulsive self-related thoughts. These vacuous storylines about potential future outcomes, 
fears, worries, anxieties and dread fill our attentional space, distracting us from being present 
for our lives, and contributes very little to our functioning and happiness. In short, we have a 
problem with compulsive, problematic self-related thinking.  
The ‘good news’, so to speak, is that these internal narratives which causes so much 
unhappiness and wastes so much cognitive bandwidth can be reduced, “uninstalled” (to use a 
computer metaphor) and if persistently investigated, removed completely. As I see it, it is 
precisely the fact that they can be removed and are marked by alienation which yields them as 
inauthentic (my contention). If they were part of what Sartre has called the pre-given absolute 
or pre-reflective self-consciousness, and could not be removed by attention to attention, then I 
would not call them inauthentic. However, what is the ontological status of something that 
disappears when you pay attention to it? Would we call a barn in a field which disappeared 
when inspected for a real barn? Or for that matter, an authentic barn? 
If one is fully present, and not lost in negative self-talk, which is often irrelevant to the current 
situation, it stands to reason that one can be much more effective. We have all seen people get 
taken out of the moment or the task at hand and disappear “into their head”. As I see it, such 
distracting thoughts, often in the form of worries and stories do nothing constructive or helpful 
to the situations we encounter. They create a form of separation – of alienation – from the task 
at hand and our involvement with the world. When, however, we are not lost in our minds, 
generally we can be much more appropriate, useful and authentic. Tellingly, we usually find it 
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preferable to be “in the moment” – or engaged in the task rather than the chatter – as opposed 
to getting lost in ourselves, losing focus, not paying attention, et cetera. 
It is my assumption that we do not wish to get taken out of what is going on in the moment, but 
instead are involuntarily taken out – switched off as it were – by the pull of the latent inauthentic 
tendencies of our minds, our inauthentic mode of being.  
 
11.  Conclusion 
I hope that the nature and challenge posed by problematic thoughts, and the pursuit of existential 
self-inquiry via phenomenological traditions as means to reduce them have been, if not proven, 
then at least indicated as promising avenues of further research. As human beings, we have 
mental maps of the world which we consult when we engage with the world. Our “hardware” 
– that is to say our brain – have an utterly astonishing capability to function and adapt to its 
environment. As a species we have been to the moon, we have produced the music of Mozart, 
the Mona Lisa, technology to rival the gods of old legends, and not be forgotten, wondered 
about our place in the world. As far as computer metaphors go, we have great hardware, great 
“offline” processing capabilities. There are approximately 100 billion neurons and about 50 
trillion or so synaptic connections in your body. This staggering number of neurons and the 
sheer number of synaptic connections (links between neurons) makes the human brain one of 
the absolute wonders of the universe. The “software” which is currently running on it, however, 
is another matter. 
Regarding the tendency of our time for escapism via smartphones and social media, these may 
be seen as the “expressions of a generation”. However, I do not think this is the case. Rather, it 
seems to be the lack of a particular expression, which worries me. These distractions represent 
to us little more than means of escapism. As we saw from Wilson et al.’s experiment, people 
did not like being alone with their thoughts. I think that we should pay real attention to this and 
its implications, especially in regards to the emerging science on the default mode network and 
its connection with increasing problematic thoughts. I hope to have at least indicated that the 
theme of authentic existence represents a means of returning to a less conflicted mode of being 
by essentially paying attention to our lives, as opposed to escaping into digital distractions. 
To my mind, the use of digital distractions like TV, Facebook, Snapchat, Instagram, Netflix, 
YouTube, Tinder and other enhancements and replacements of our social hierarchical standing 
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all represent a response to the encumbered, alienated and inauthentic state in which we currently 
live. Would we have this pressing and for some, all-consuming need to be connected 24/7 via 
replacements of genuine human interaction if we did not feel, at some level, out of touch, scared, 
angst-filled, alone and, in truth, alienated? 
The needs and behaviors we display might indicate some underlying concern, it is hard to prove 
conclusively. Regardless of whether or not modernity expresses some particularly potent 
expression of alienation in the form of smartphones, I nevertheless maintain that the attainment 
of authenticity is of utmost importance, both to the existing individual and for general societal 
cohesion. Unfortunately, the use of the devices and our general tendency towards attentional 
distractions only serve to magnify our lacking ability to be at peace with ourselves. In a way, 
using these devices is very similar to wetting your pants to stay warm, it might make us feel 
better short term, but the result on a large scale is yet to be felt. The appeal of these devices and 
our responses to the problems of modernity are understandable however, as they show or 
suggests that our current state is a deeply flawed and dehumanized one. 
In a way it is puzzling, if not outright disconcerting, that the negative chatter in our minds – our 
self-referential narratives – have at the same time such influence over our well-being and at the 
same time is largely ignored as a possible problem. It is not inconceivable that in the near future, 
as the problem of inauthenticity increases, we might find ourselves distracted further by ever 
more escapes from reality. A negative feedback loop might occur – in a way is occurring – 
which should concern us a great deal. 
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